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Abstract 
This thesis is a critical study of the prospects for contemporary accounts of ethical 
intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an epistemological theory about the nature of our justified 
ethical beliefs, whose central claim is that we have at least some non-inferentially justified 
beliefs. Having been out of favour for much of the latter-part of the twentieth century, ethical 
intuitionism is enjoying something of a renaissance. Contemporary proponents of the view 
have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of the main objections previously 
brought against it. Furthermore, developments in epistemology have helped to make the notion 
of non-inferential justification (and the associated view, epistemological foundationalism) 
more philosophically respectable.  
 
As I will suggest, non-inferentially justified belief paradigmatically involves a belief that is 
justified by a non-doxastic state. In this thesis I will consider four accounts of ethical 
intuitionism which each claim that a particular kind of non-doxastic state can ground justified 
ethical beliefs: understandings, intellectual seemings, perceptual experiences and emotional 
experiences. Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists do not commit themselves to there 
being a distinctively ethical non-doxastic state. Rather, contemporary ethical intuitionists 
adopt a sort of innocence by association strategy, suggesting that that we gain non-inferential 
justification in ethics in much the same way as we get non-inferential justification in other 
domains.  
 
It is my purpose in this thesis to subject each of these four accounts of contemporary ethical 
intuitionism to sustained philosophical criticism. Although I do not think that ethical 
intuitionism is implausible, it is my view that the current enthusiasm for the position ought to 
be seriously tempered, and that much work will need to be done in order to make it acceptable 
as a meta-ethical view.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the understanding (self-evidence) account I argue that there are serious 
problems with the view that the substantive Rossian principles are non-inferentially justifiably 
believed on the basis of an adequate understanding of their content. Secondly, I go on to 
suggest, inter alia, that proponents of the intellectual seemings account of intuitionism cannot 
appeal to their favoured general epistemological principle in order to ground their ethical 
epistemology. Given this, much work needs to be done on their part in order to show why we 
 iii 
ought to think that intellectual seemings with an ethical content that is substantive get to 
justify. Thirdly, against the ethical perception account I suggest that even if it is true that 
ethical agents have perceptual experiences which represent ethical properties, it is not at all 
obvious that this supports ethical intuitionism, since insofar as such experiences get to justify, 
it seems plausible that they will ground inferentially or mediately justified beliefs. I do, 
however, suggest that a related perceptual view may be able to ground a plausible account of 
non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. Finally, I consider the ethical emotions account. 
Given that this is a relatively new view on the philosophical scene I spend much of my time 
defending it against some serious recent objections brought against it. However, I will also 
suggest that there are question marks surrounding the epistemological credentials of emotional 
experiences and that much work will therefore need to be done in order to make the view that 
emotional experiences do in fact non-inferentially justify ethical beliefs acceptable. 
 iv 
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Introduction 
This is a thesis on ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is, first and foremost, a theory in 
meta-ethics, which is the branch of philosophical ethics that evaluates our ethical discourse 
along metaphysical, semantic and epistemological lines (to name but a few). More precisely, 
ethical intuitionism is a theory in ethical epistemology, i.e., it is a theory about our justification 
for believing, and knowledge of, ethical propositions. Specifically, the core claim of ethical 
intuitionism – and the central focus of this thesis - is the following claim: 
 
EI: We have some non-inferentially
1
 justified ethical beliefs (and knowledge). 
 
Ethical intuitionism has, in some form of another, been around for centuries. There is a long 
and distinguished list of philosophers who have been labeled intuitionists: e.g., Francis 
Hutcheson,
2
 Thomas Reid,
3
 Henry Sidgwick,
4
 G.E. Moore,
5
 and W.D. Ross.
6
 I will, not, 
however be concerned with explicating or evaluating the intuitionist views of these 
philosophers in this thesis. Although many contemporary ethical intuitionists take their 
philosophical inspiration from these thinkers, e.g., Robert Audi’s philosophical rehabilitation 
of the work of W.D. Ross, it is my view that contemporary accounts constitute a significant 
improvement upon the historical versions of the view. I will therefore be focusing exclusively 
on contemporary versions of ethical intuitionism. 
 
Despite it being more-or-less universally out of favour in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, ethical intuitionism is enjoying something of a philosophical renaissance at the 
moment. This is partly due to the clarificatory work of philosophers like Robert Audi (2004) 
who have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of many of the supposed 
objections traditionally brought against it, e.g., the claims that intuitionism is committed to 
there being a special faculty of ethical intuition, or to there being metaphysically weird non-
natural properties etc. In addition, advancements in epistemology have shown that epistemic 
foundationalism (which ethical intuitionism has often been thought to be a type of – more on 
                                                 
1
 I will mostly employ the term ‘non-inferential justification’ throughout the thesis, although I will 
occasionally make use of the terms immediate and direct justification. On my view these terms are synonymous. 
See Pryor, J. (2004) for similar use of the term ‘immediate justification.’  
2
  See Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 
3
  See Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind 
4
  See Three Methods Of Ethics 
5
  See Principia Ethica 
6
  See The Right and The Good and The Foundations of Ethics 
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this later) need not be committed to the seemingly implausible claim that some of our beliefs 
are infallible or indefeasibly justified. However, despite these philosophical improvements, it 
is my view that contemporary ethical intuitionism has not yet been subjected to detailed 
enough scrutiny to make its acceptance reasonable. Hence a thesis-long treatment of the view 
is highly pertinent. 
 
Speaking roughly for now, the aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the prospects for four 
contemporary accounts of ethical intuitionism grounded in understanding, seemings, 
perceptions and emotions. Again, speaking roughly, my conclusion is that, although ethical 
intuitionism is not implausible, the current enthusiasm for the position ought to be seriously 
tempered, and that much work will need to be done in order to make it acceptable as a meta-
ethical view.  
 
It will be the purpose of this Introduction to provide a detailed explication of what 
contemporary ethical intuitionism is committed to and to set the stage for the critical work that 
will follow. In §1 I will outline the ancillary non-epistemological commitments of ethical 
intuitionism, distinguishing it from some key alternative meta-ethical positions. In §2 I will 
discuss in detail the core epistemological claim of ethical intuitionism, EI, connecting it with 
other epistemological issues and distinguishing it from alternative epistemological views. 
Finally in §3 I will provide an overview of the thesis and its conclusion, including a detailed 
chapter summary.  
 
1.  Ethical Intuitionism: Non-Epistemological Commitments 
In this section I will delineate (but will not argue for) the three ancillary non-epistemological 
theses that contemporary ethical intuitionists commit themselves to: cognitivism, robust 
ethical truth and robust realism. At the outset I should reiterate the point that I understand 
ethical intuitionism to be an epistemological thesis about the nature of our justified ethical 
beliefs and knowledge. Although contemporary ethical intuitionists (and their philosophical 
forebears) have committed themselves to the semantic and metaphysical views I am about to 
outline, it is my considered view that these features are not obviously necessary features of 
ethical intuitionism. In particular, I think this point holds for the commitment to robust 
realism, a metaphysical thesis which I will describe shortly. For purposes of space and to 
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avoid needless complication I will keep my comments on this issue to a minimum. I do, 
however, invite the reader to keep these points firmly in mind as we progress. 
 
Firstly, let me say something about cognitivism about ethical judgments. In order to 
understand what cognitivism amounts to, consider the following example of an ethical 
sentence that could be uttered as an ethical judgment in everyday contexts: 
 
(1) The use of nuclear weapons is ethically unjustified. 
 
Cognitivism is a thesis about the content or meaning of ethical judgments like (1). Cognitivists 
claim that judgments like (1) either involve the formation of ethical beliefs, or the expression 
of antecedently held (dispositional) ethical beliefs
7
 which purport to represent or describe the 
world as being a certain (ethical) way, in the same manner as non-ethical beliefs represent the 
world as being a certain (non-ethical) way, e.g., the United Kingdom possesses nuclear 
weapons.
8
 In other words, cognitivists claim that ethical judgments have a propositional 
content that includes an ethical propositional content; ethical judgments ascribe ethical 
properties, e.g., rightness, badness, cruelty, to certain states of affairs, action types (and 
tokens), individuals etc. In a different locution, ethical judgments are in the business of stating 
ethical facts. Like other beliefs, ethical judgments are assessable in terms of truth or falsity 
(they are truth-apt).
 9
 
 
By contrast, non-cognitivists claim that ethical judgments like (1) are not in the business of 
stating ethical facts or ascribing ethical properties to actions etc. Instead, depending on the sort 
of non-cognitivism we are talking about, the ethical judgment in (1) – and ethical judgments 
generally – will express some sort of non-representational attitude towards nuclear weapons, 
e.g., Boo for nuclear weapons, or perhaps some sort of prescription or command against it, 
                                                 
7
 Dispositional (or antecedently held, or mnemonically held) beliefs should be distinguished from 
dispositions to believe. A subject, S, might be disposed to believe that p without already holding that belief. For a 
full treatment of the distinction between dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe see Audi (1994). 
8
 For the view that ethical judgments can be understood as beliefs which are non-representational or non-
descriptive see the work of Horgan and Timmons (2006). I am unclear as to whether and how this sort of 
cognitivist expressivist view could be combined with an epistemological view like ethical intuitionism.  
9
 Ethical intuitionists, and cognitivists generally, face the problem of accounting for the apparent 
practicality of ethical judgments, i.e., that there seems to be a conceptual connection between making an ethical 
judgment and having some (defeasible) motivation to act in accordance with it. Cognitivists can either attempt to 
claim that ethical beliefs are capable of motivating (and thereby denying a plausible-sounding Humean account 
of motivation) or else deny that there is such a conceptual connection, i.e. by adopting externalism about ethical 
motivation.  
 4 
e.g., Don't support the existence of nuclear weapons. Of course, the judgment in (1) has some 
representational content, i.e., it represents the use of nuclear weapons, but the non-cognitivist 
claim is that the ethical element of (1) is non-fact-stating.
10
 So the ethical judgment in (1) does 
not ascribe the property of being ethically unjustified to the use of nuclear weapons but instead 
functions to express, e.g., disapproval, of nuclear weapons.
11
 As a result, non-cognitivists have 
traditionally claimed that judgments like (1) do not have a truth-value.
12
 
 
Contemporary ethical intuitionists are cognitivists about ethical judgments.
13
 Such a position 
may seem natural for intuitionists to adopt for at least two reasons. Firstly, given that ethical 
intuitionists are committed to there being non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs and ethical 
knowledge (which entails belief), the commitment to cognitivism seems an obvious option for 
them. Secondly, the commitment to cognitivism ought to be seen in the context of an overall 
commitment to preserving the way ethical discourse initially or pre-theoretically appears to us, 
a commitment which typifies ethical intuitionism in both its traditional and contemporary 
forms. To illustrate, upon first inspection, many of our ethical judgments do appear to have the 
surface form of declarative as opposed to, e.g., imperatival, sentences. Furthermore, ordinary 
ethical agents will often speak of themselves and others as having strongly held ethical beliefs, 
and engage in ethical disputes as if the judgments they were making expressed conflicting 
beliefs. Indeed, the contemporary intuitionist, Philip Stratton-Lake (2002) claims, ‘Pre-
reflectively, we have no doubt that our moral judgments express moral beliefs’14. Somewhat 
less stridently, Miller (2003) claims that ‘the surface form of moral discourse is propositional 
or cognitive’15, where the surface form of a discourse ‘is the way that discourse initially 
appears, in other words whatever is suggested by its surface syntax’16. 
 
                                                 
10
 Put another way: on the non-cognitivist view, moral predicates are predicates ‘only in the grammatical 
sense; below the surface – when we get to the “real meaning” of a moral judgment – the predicate disappears’ 
from Joyce, (2006), p. 53 
11
 In another locution, the primary sense of ethical judgments is prescriptive or expressive, while the 
secondary (non-ethical) sense of ethical judgments is fact-stating. See Brink (1989), p. 19. 
12
          Note, however, that this is not true of many contemporary expressivists, e.g., Blackburn (1996) who endorse 
minimalist or deflationary theories of truth. 
13
 Note, however, that some ethical intuitionists, e.g. Ross (whose position appears to be endorsed by the 
contemporary intuitionist Philip Stratton-Lake) allows that an ethical judgment can express a feeling of approval 
but in a way that ‘does not prevent such judgments from describing the world in some [presumably ethical] 
respect.’ Stratton-lake (2002) p. 14 
14
    Stratton-Lake, P., (2002), p. 1 
15
    Miller, A., (2003), p. 60 
16
    Ibid., p. 61 
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Consider now the second non-epistemological thesis contemporary intuitionists commit 
themselves to: robust ethical truth. There are actually two sub-theses at issue here. The first is 
the claim that at least some of our ethical judgments are true. Again, this seems a natural 
position for ethical intuitionists to take. The first reason is that this claim is presupposed by the 
notions of non-inferential ethical knowledge (which entails true belief) and – to a lesser extent 
– justified belief (where justification is understood as being in some sense truth-directed) 
which ethical intuitionists are committed to as part of their central thesis. The second reason is 
that ethical intuitionists are concerned with respecting the way ethical discourse appears pre-
theoretically, and it is plausible to claim that ordinary – non-philosophical - ethical agents 
regard certain ethical beliefs as being true. Some will think that (1) is such an example. Less 
controversially, the following appears to be a good candidate for a sentence expressing a true 
ethical proposition: 
 
(2) The systematic killing of the Jews during World War II was seriously 
ethically wrong. 
 
Not only do ordinary ethical agents think that (2) is true, they will also regard themselves as 
knowing (which entails truth) that the actions of the perpetrators of the holocaust were 
seriously wrong. In addition, the idea of there being ethical truths seems to be presupposed by 
the fact that ordinary ethical agents engage in ethical deliberation, i.e., that ethical agents think 
that there is a correct answer to ethical questions, which they can  sometimes (perhaps all too 
often) fail to pick-up on.  
 
The second sub-thesis – under the heading robust ethical truth – that contemporary ethical 
intuitionists commit themselves to is the view that truth ought to be understood in the robust 
or non-deflationary sense. Roughly, this is the view that to say of some proposition, p, that p is 
true, is to ascribe some metaphysically substantial or robust property to it, e.g., 
correspondence with the facts. In doing so, they reject deflationary theories of truth which 
claim that there is no such thing as a property of truth, or, if there is one, it does not have a 
substantial nature. Instead, on the deflationary view of truth, ‘the role of the words “true” and 
“false” in our language is simply to enable us to register our agreement and disagreement with 
what people say without going to the trouble of using all the words that they used to say it’17. 
                                                 
17
 Smith, M. (2004), p. 184 
 6 
Notice, that if a deflationary view of ethical truth could be made plausible (or a deflationary 
view of truth generally), then non-cognitivists can possibly account for ethical truth in our 
ethical discourse without this entailing a commitment amongst ethical agents to the existence 
of ethical facts or properties in any robust sense.
18
 
19
 
 
Talk of correspondence to ethical facts raises the question of what sort of things in the world 
make true ethical beliefs true (assuming a robust conception of truth), which, in turn, brings us 
on to the third and final non-epistemological commitment of contemporary ethical 
intuitionism; that of robust realism.
20
 Contemporary ethical intuitionists claim that ethical 
beliefs are true in virtue of facts which are in some sense constitutively independent of the 
ethical assessments, beliefs or agreements of particular ethical agents, including those made 
under idealised conditions. In doing so they reject the view that true ethical beliefs are true in 
virtue of facts which are in some sense constitutively dependent
21
 upon the ethical 
assessments, beliefs or agreements of particular ethical agents, perhaps under idealised 
conditions. David McNaughton (1988) has the following to say about the sort of robust 
realism contemporary intuitionists have in mind: 
 
it [robust moral realism] insists that there is a moral reality which is independent 
of our moral beliefs and which determines whether or not they are true or false. It 
holds that moral properties are genuine properties of things or actions; they are, as 
it is sometimes picturesquely put, part of the furniture of the world. We may or 
may not be sensitive to a particular moral property, but whether or not that 
property is present does not depend on what we think about the matter.
22
 
                                                 
18
 Counter to both of these views about ethical truth is the error-theorist who accepts that our everyday 
ethical judgments purport to ascribe ethical properties to actions (and more generally that our ethical discourse 
appears to presuppose that there are moral facts), but claims that all of our positive ethical beliefs are false 
because it denies that there are any ethical properties or facts for our ethical beliefs to refer to, e.g., Mackie 
(1977), Olson, (2010). 
19
  Whether someone could hold a deflationary view about truth and still sign up to some sort of ethical 
epistemology like intuitionism is an interesting question that I do not have the space to address here. Blackburn 
(1996) claims that the expressivist (who signs up to minimalism) can account for ethical knowledge as (roughly) 
being in a situation where we are reliable (but not in a way that involves a link with mind-independent facts) and 
where there is “no chance that an improvement in our position would undermine [our] evaluation.,” p. 88 
20
 Note that Stratton-Lake (2002) appears to think that by adopting a buck-passing account of goodness and 
rightness, ethical intuitionists can ‘deny that moral properties must be utterly independent of us and our responses 
in order to be objective.’ p. 12 It is not clear to me how accounting for goodness (or rightness) in terms of reasons 
(presumably mind-independent) for adopting pro-attitudes or conclusive reasons for performance, by itself, 
makes the realism at issue any less mind-independent. 
21
 I borrow this terminology from Michael Huemer (2005).  
22
 McNaughton, D., (1988), p. 7 
 7 
 
By adopting robust realism, contemporary ethical intuitionists reject, inter alia, subjectivist 
accounts, i.e., ethical facts are constitutively dependent on the ethical assessments or 
agreements of actual ethical agents, e.g. Harman (1977), sentimentalist accounts, i.e., ethical 
facts are constitutively dependent on the dispositions of certain properties to elicit merited 
responses from appropriately situated ethical agents, e.g., Wiggins (2007), and constructivist 
accounts, i.e., that an ethical judgment is true in virtue of the ethical assessments or 
agreements of ethical agents in idealised conditions, e.g., Milo (2007).  
 
As a brief aside, it is worth noting the suggestion from contemporary intuitionists such as 
Robert Audi (1996) and Philip Stratton-Lake (2002), that the work of Rawls – characterised 
here as a constructivist – is partly responsible for the re-emergence of ethical intuitionism as a 
serious meta-ethical view. Apparently, it is with Rawls and his endorsement of the process of 
reflective equilibrium, which involves – in part – giving considerable credence to our 
considered moral judgments,
23
 that we see the beginning of a general trend towards taking 
ethical intuitions seriously.
24
 It is, however, worth noting that for Rawls, considered moral 
judgments are not claimed to be “hooked up” to some mind-independent ethical reality. 
Rather, they are arguably an aid to our attaining self-understanding - specifically, an 
understanding of our ethical sensibility – and are more akin to “grammar intuitions” that can 
aid us in attaining a comprehension of our capacity to form grammatically well-formed 
sentences.
25
 
 
As I already mentioned at the beginning of this section, I am assuming, with tradition and in 
line with what contemporary meta-ethicists who are labelled intuitionists endorse, that ethical 
intuitionism involves the commitment to some form of robust realism. Let me reiterate and 
expand slightly upon that point. As should hopefully become clear, much of what I argue in 
favour of, and against, the core epistemological claim of ethical intuitionism stands 
independently of the commitment to some sort of robust realism, i.e., many of my 
discussion/objections are not directly related to the problem of how ethical agents get to be 
“hooked up” to a mind-independent ethical reality (although some of my arguments will 
                                                 
23
  A considered moral judgment is a judgment with a moral content that is formed, perhaps reflectively, 
under conditions apparently conducive to the avoidance of epistemic error. 
24
 Stratton-Lake mentions this in a footnote in his (2002) Introduction, p. 2 
25
 I take these points about the role of intuitions in Rawls from Lenman (2007). 
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involve speaking to directly to the problems faced by robustly realist versions of ethical 
intuitionism). Indeed, much of what I say would apply to other meta-ethical theories which 
sought to claim that we could have some form of non-inferential epistemic justification or 
knowledge along the lines discussed, e.g., constructivists.
26
 Unfortunately, I do not have the 
space to explore what is doubtless an extremely complicated issue. Let me simply say that 
given the nature of many of my arguments, this thesis should hopefully be of interest not just 
to those who are interested in ethical intuitionism in the “traditional” sense. 
 
It might be argued that we should regard the ethical intuitionist's commitment to robust 
realism as part of their overarching commitment to taking seriously the way ethical discourse 
initially or pre-theoretically appears to us. For example, it is claimed that when we consider 
the phenomenology of certain kinds of moral experience, e.g., direct judgments of 
obligation,
27
 
 
we find that ethical demands present themselves as originating from outside and 
that this, in turn, provides a pro tanto reason for favouring some form of realism.
 28
 Also, it is 
often said that, when engaged in ethical disagreement, ethical agents behave as if some form 
of realism were true. Note however, that (i) there have been recent challenges
29
 to the so-
called “argument from phenomenology”, and, (ii) even if the argument from phenomenology 
were sound, it would plausibly only provide pro tanto support for a form of realism and not to 
robust realism. It is therefore not entirely obvious how a commitment to robust realism is 
motivated by the way ethical discourse pre-theoretically appears. 
 
Despite these caveats, I will assume for the sake of simplicity that ethical intuitionists are 
committed to some form of robust realism. It should be pointed out, however, that there are 
                                                 
26
        Lenman (2007) explains that constructivists like Rawls think that our considered ethical judgments can 
have evidential value but in the same manner as our linguistic intuitions enjoy that status with respect to the facts 
about grammar. He states: ‘In seeking to characterize in general terms which English sentences are grammatical, 
which not, we take the linguistic intuitions of native speakers as enjoying evidential status. But this is not because 
we take ourselves thereby to be brought into contact with some external domain of grammatical facts determined 
prior to and independently of those intuitions about which the holders of those intuitions how somehow 
successfully contrived to find out a whole lot. The relationship between those intuitions and the grammatical facts 
is a considerably more intimate one. In investigating the grammar of the language I speak, we are in effect 
studying a complex feature of my psychology and my intuitive dispositions to judge sentences grammatically 
acceptable or otherwise stand in expressive, causal and indeed, to some extent, constitutive relations to that same 
feature that earns them a clear evidential status when our inquiry is a grammatical one. Similarly we might 
understand moral inquiry to be simply the study of our moral sensibilities, sensibilities of which our intuitive 
moral judgments are an expression.’ P. 70  
27
           This comes from Mandelbaum (1955). Direct judgments of obligation involve judgments made by an ethical 
agent about whether there is an ethical duty upon them to perform or refrain from some action. 
28
 See Mandelbaum (1955) for a seminal treatment of this issue. Mackie (1977) endorses the 
phenomenological claim about our moral experience but of course rejects realism. 
29
  See Horgan and Timmons (2008). 
 9 
varying degrees of robustness. To my mind, there is nothing in the core epistemological thesis 
of ethical intuitionism that necessitates a commitment to any particular degree of robustness. 
Let me illustrate this point with regard to three parameters. Firstly, consider the question of 
reducibility. Someone might reasonably claim that realism about a property e is a more robust 
form of realism if it is claimed that e is irreducible to other properties in the world.
30
 On this 
view, realism about mind-independent irreducible ethical properties would be more robust 
than a mind-independent realism about ethical properties which claimed that ethical properties 
are reducible to other properties, e.g., the property of rightness is reducible to the property of 
maximising happiness. However, ethical intuitionism is an epistemological thesis and I do not 
see how it is therefore committed to any particular view about irreducible ethical properties. 
 
Secondly, consider the claim from Mackie (1977) that ethical properties are motivating and 
categorically reason-giving properties. Someone might reasonably think that an ethical 
realism that posits such entities would be more robust than a view shorn of these apparently 
queer properties. However, it is again not at all obvious what connection there is between 
what is ostensibly a metaphysical view about the nature of moral properties and an 
epistemological view like ethical intuitionism, which is concerned with the nature of our 
ethical justified belief and knowledge.
31
 Of course, Mackie himself believed that once we 
accept that ethical properties are motivating (something which I myself do not endorse) and 
categorically reason-giving, then this does commit us to some apparently bogus 
epistemological view that requires a special faculty of intuition as queer as the properties it is 
supposed to detect. I do not, however, see how this follows since even if ethical properties are 
the way Mackie claims, this does not obviously necessitate some sort of sui generis faculty for 
detecting them. Ethical intuitionists need not commit themselves to intrinsically motivating 
ethical properties, nor to the view that we need some special faculty to detect them.  
 
Finally, and related to the previous discussions, someone might claim that a more robust 
realism is one which posits non-natural ethical properties, where these can be understood in 
contradistinction to natural properties. Is ethical intuitionism committed to there being non-
natural properties? Unfortunately, answering this question is made difficult by the fact that 
                                                 
30
 For this view about realism see Oddie (2005). 
31
       Timmons (1987) appears to agree: ‘one may hold that there are immediately justified moral belief 
beliefs… without having to postulate what Mackie calls “metaphysically queer” entities or properties and 
some special faculty for detecting them.’ p. 605 
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there is no consensus as to what a natural property is supposed to be. On some conceptions of 
naturalism, e.g., which claim that naturalism is the view that there are no empirically 
indefeasible synthetic a priori propositions (see Copp (2003)), ethical intuitionism is 
compatible with naturalism. Indeed, on this conception, even the apparently non-naturalist 
notion of self-evidence (more details on this below) can be made to fit in a naturalistic 
framework.
32
 On other conceptions, e.g., those which identify natural properties as those 
which are the subject of the sciences and that we can take science as our best guide to 
metaphysical truth (see Lenman (2006)), it is not obvious how the claim for non-inferentially 
justified ethical beliefs is incompatible with this. 
 
This concludes this section on the non-epistemological commitments that ethical intuitionists 
have tended to undertake. In the following section I will delineate the central epistemological 
claim of ethical intuitionism; the claim that we have at least some non-inferential justified 
ethical beliefs and ethical knowledge. 
 
2. Ethical Intuitionism: An Epistemological Thesis 
It was suggested in the previous section that ethical intuitionists have tended to commit 
themselves to three non-epistemological theses: cognitivism, robust ethical truth, and robust 
ethical realism. As I claimed, these are not necessary ingredients for an ethical intuitionist 
position. Furthermore, as I will now explain, they are also by no means sufficient. 
 
On my understanding, ethical intuitionism is an epistemological thesis.
33
 Epistemology can be 
roughly understood as the philosophical study of justified belief and knowledge. As an 
epistemological thesis, ethical intuitionism is a thesis about our ethical justified belief and 
knowledge. Before detailing what this thesis amounts to, let me say a little about justification 
and knowledge as I will be conceiving of them in this thesis. Firstly, when I speak of 
justification I will be referring to epistemic justification, i.e., S has epistemic justification for 
believing that p just in case S has positive support for the belief that p in terms of evidence or 
reasons for p that is in some way tied to the truth of p. Epistemic justification ought to be 
distinguished from instrumental or practical justification, which might involve reasons for 
                                                 
32
 For agreement on this note following from Crisp (2002): ‘it is unwise to saddle it [ethical intuitionism] as 
an epistemological thesis with any metaphysical commitment to non-natural properties’, p. 59 Audi (2004) also 
claims that his ethical intuitionism is not committed to non-naturalism. 
33
 Contrast this with methodological intuitionism; roughly, the view that there are a plurality of ethical first 
principles with no lexical priority. For details see Williams, B. (1995), p. 189 
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belief that are not tied to truth, but instead constitute reasons because of their positive effects, 
e.g., Mary believes in God – and is instrumentally justified in her belief - because holding that 
belief is psychologically beneficial for her. In speaking of epistemic justification I will also be 
making the following two assumptions: (i) justification can come in degrees, i.e., an agent S 
may have some justification for belief that p without having outright justification sufficient for 
reasonable belief that p, and, (ii) if an agent, S, is justified outright in believing that p, S will 
have a positive reason to believe that p, as opposed to simply having no good reason to reject 
p.
34
 I will mostly conduct my discussion and argument in terms of justification, but let me 
briefly say how I will be conceiving of knowledge. Knowledge will be assumed here to 
roughly amount to justified true belief plus some condition that can accommodate the Getter-
type cases.
35
 In doing so I will be assuming that justification is necessary for knowledge, 
although my considered view is that there may be some cases of knowledge that do not 
involve justification.
36
  
 
Recall, then, the core thesis of ethical intuitionism: 
 
EI: We have some non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs (and knowledge). 
 
Before focusing specifically on non-inferential justification, let us consider the general claim 
that we have justified ethical beliefs and knowledge. According to ethical intuitionists we can 
have epistemic justification for believing ethical propositions. That is to say, we have 
propositional justification for believing some ethical propositions. However, in order to claim 
that we have justified beliefs and knowledge, intuitionists must also show that at least some of 
our ethical beliefs are based upon adequate justification for belief.
37
 The notion of a basing 
relation here amounts to something like the following: to say that S's belief that p is based on 
epistemic source, e, is just to say that e is the reason (and perhaps the cause) for S holding that 
belief and the S will appreciate some sort of support relation between e and their belief that p. 
To see how these two notions might come apart, consider the following case. In his youth, 
                                                 
34
 For an account of permissive justification for belief that p, i.e. of having no good reason to reject p, see 
Sayre-McCord (1996). 
35
 So-called Gettier-cases (so named after Edmund Gettier (1967) apparently constitute counterexamples to 
the claim that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge. 
36
 e.g. see Audi (2003) on the case of the idiot savant.  
37
  See, e.g., Fumerton (1995), pp. 91-92. This relation between propositional and doxastic justification is widely 
accepted, although see Siegel (forthcoming) for discussion of complications. 
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Peter was taught the theory of evolution by several competent and enthusiastic science 
teachers. Being bright and attentive, Peter understood and internalized the strong supporting 
evidence for believing the theory of evolution. In such a case one might reasonably say that 
Peter has justification for believing the theory to be true. However, suppose that Peter believes 
the theory of evolution, but holds this belief on the basis of the say-so of a fairground guru and 
not on the basis of the testimonial evidence he acquired at school, i.e., the reason for his 
holding the belief is the testimony of the guru. In such a case we are inclined to say that the 
Peter’s belief is unjustified since it is based on an epistemically inappropriate source.  
 
So in order to avoid the conclusion that no ethical agents have justified beliefs ethical 
intuitionists are therefore committed to claiming (and showing) that at least some ethical 
agents sometimes base their beliefs – where the basing relation is normative and causal - upon 
propositional justifications for those beliefs, i.e., that we can have ethical justification both in 
the propositional and doxastic senses. Note that the claim that we have justified ethical beliefs 
and ethical knowledge seems to be in tune with our everyday, pre-theoretical thinking about 
the matter. We do often speak of individuals having ethical knowledge (as was suggested 
might be the case for (1) and (2)). Furthermore, we often take ourselves – most commonly in 
the context of ethical disagreement - to be engaged in the process of providing justification 
(understood in the epistemic sense) for our ethical beliefs. 
 
In contrast, ethical sceptics
38
, deny that we have ethical justification and knowledge. There are 
two broad ways in which they might argue for this. Firstly, they might deny that we ever have 
propositional justification for believing ethical propositions. A principal motivation for 
thinking this is due to the epistemic regress argument (more on this shortly), although there 
are other reasons why someone might be a sceptic, e.g., due to worries about the lack of 
satisfactory responses to the possibility of ethical nihilism. Note that someone could, however, 
be a sceptic about propositional justification in ethics whilst maintaining that we have 
justification in non-ethical domains, e.g., empirical beliefs based upon sensory experience. 
Alternatively, a less orthodox sceptic might accept that we have propositional justification for 
believing ethical propositions but deny that any ethical beliefs are ever based upon adequate 
                                                 
38
  The primary exponent of ethical scepticism is Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a). Note, however, that 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s view is subtler than a blanket denial of ethical justification and knowledge; he distinguishes 
between having everyday and philosophical justification, claiming that we have some of the former but none of 
the latter when it comes to ethical beliefs. 
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propositional justification. Again, this might be a fact peculiar to ethics or a general problem 
with the sorts of things epistemic agents base their beliefs upon, e.g., someone might hold the 
view that all of our ethical beliefs are based upon ethical intuitions, which as a matter of fact, 
do not justify, whilst maintaining that we could have propositional justification for believing 
ethical propositions from some other source, e.g., from religious testimony or religious 
experience. 
 
At this stage it is useful to consider the epistemic regress argument. Not only does the regress 
argument constitute a key plank in the traditional ethical sceptic's position, it also enables us to 
understand a primary motivation for ethical intuitionism, i.e., the view can be plausibly 
understood as being partly motivated out of a need to respond to the regress argument. The 
regress argument (as I am characterising it) goes as follows: 
 
Epistemic Regress Argument (ethical) 
P1: If a subject, S, has justification for believing an ethical proposition, p, then 
S's justification must derive from another of S's justified beliefs, q. 
P2: No S can have justification for believing an ethical proposition p in virtue 
of holding purely non-ethical justified beliefs, q, r, s etc (the so-called 
Autonomy of Ethics). 
C1: If S has justification for believing ethical proposition, p, then S's 
justification must derive from another of S's justified ethical beliefs, q. 
P3: If S has justification for believing ethical proposition q, then S's 
justification must derive from another of S's justified ethical beliefs, r, and so 
on for any putative justified ethical belief, n, held by S.  
C2: If S has justification for believing ethical proposition, p, then either the 
belief that p is justified in virtue of an infinite chain of justification, or else the 
belief that p is justified in virtue of a circular chain of justification, i.e., the 
justification for believing p includes the belief that p. 
P4: No belief that p is justified in virtue of an infinite chain of justification. 
P5: No belief that p is justified in virtue of a circular chain of justification. 
C3: Therefore, no S has justification for believing an ethical proposition p.  
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Applied to the case of ethical beliefs, the epistemic regress argument – if sound – entails 
ethical scepticism (note that the same argument can be given for knowledge). As stated before, 
ethical scepticism runs counter to everyday thinking about ethical beliefs; we take it that we 
know that the actions of the perpetrators of the holocaust were wrong. Outlining the regress 
argument is, however, useful, as we can understand the key epistemological positions, 
including ethical intuitionism, as seeking to provide responses to it. Apart from ethical 
intuitionism, the other major epistemological position is ethical coherentism.
39
  
 
Before focusing on ethical intuitionism, let me say a little about ethical coherentism (for 
proponents, see Brink (1989), Sayre-McCord (1996)).
40
 Ethical coherentists about epistemic 
justification will deny a crucial background assumption of the regress argument, which is most 
perspicuous in premise P3; that of linear justification (note that they may also deny P2, and 
therefore C1).
41
 Coherentists will claim that it is the assumption of a linear chain of 
justification that apparently leads us to scepticism via the regress, i.e., the claim that a belief 
that p is justified by q, which is justified by r, and so on in a chain-like fashion. Coherentists 
are able to avoid this result because they conceive of justification as holistic; justification 
accrues to a belief just in case it is a member of a coherent set of beliefs. More specifically: 
 
Ethical Coherentism: A subject, S, has justification for believing ethical 
proposition p just in case the belief that p is a member of a coherent set of 
beliefs, q, r, s etc held by S.  
 
Just as justification can come in degrees, coherence is also a degreed notion. Hence, 
coherentists claim that a belief is justified according to the degree it coheres with other beliefs 
the subject holds. That is to say, a belief that p is justified to the extent that it exhibits the 
features associated with coherence, e.g., logical and probabilistic consistency with other 
                                                 
39
 There are other significant epistemological views available that I ignore here for purposes of space. Most 
notably is that of ethical contextualism; roughly, the view that correct ascriptions of epistemic justification and 
knowledge to ethical believers are determined by contextual factors. On this view, one could have non-inferential 
justification for believing certain ethical propositions in particular contexts. For this view, see the work of 
Timmons (1996). Also worth flagging up is the possibility of infinitism about ethical justification, i.e., the view 
that we should accept that there is an infinite chain of justification, but deny that this is epistemically vicious. No-
one to my knowledge holds this view for ethical justification, although Klein (2007) holds it for justification 
generally. 
40
 John Rawls is often cited as a proponent of epistemic coherentism. I omit reference to him here because I 
am limiting discussion to ethical coherentists who are ethical realists in the robust sense I have outlined. 
41
 I am assuming here that coherentism, at least in its plausible forms, does not amount to the claim that 
circular justification is legitimate so long as the circle of justification is sufficiently large. 
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beliefs, being a member of a comprehensive set of beliefs, standing in explanatory relations to 
a significant number of other beliefs etc.
42
 So, whether an ethical belief is justified depends 
upon the number of evidential relations (of the sort suggested) it stands in to other beliefs. In a 
sense, we needn't think of coherence being the justifying property, but rather, that coherence is 
a measure of the evidential relations/support that a belief that p stands in to other beliefs.
43
 
 
By contrast, ethical intuitionists who accept the autonomy of ethics – and this is the standard 
intuitionist position
44
 – respond to the regress argument by denying C1; that is, by denying 
that the justification for believing an ethical proposition, p, must derive from other justified 
beliefs, q, r, s etc. Instead, ethical intuitionists claim that we have non-inferential justification 
(and justified beliefs). Before proceeding to explicate in detail what non-inferential 
justification amounts to, it is worth considering how ethical intuitionism relates to 
foundationalism. Ethical intuitionism is often characterised as being committed to – or being a 
species of – epistemic foundationalism for ethical beliefs. Ethical foundationalism can be 
characterised as follows: 
 
Ethical Foundationalism (EF): An ethical belief that p is justified just in case 
p is either (a) a basic or non-inferentially justified belief, or, (b) p is non-basic 
or inferentially justified but whose justification is ultimately traceable to a basic 
or non-inferentially justified belief, q. 
 
As should be apparent, non-inferential justification is a necessary component of the ethical 
foundationalist’s epistemological picture. However, a commitment to non-inferential 
justification does not entail a commitment to foundationalism since EF requires – in addition 
                                                 
42
 From Brink, D. (1989), p. 103 
43
 I am ignoring here the question of how coherentism relates to the notion of reflective equilibrium. 
Coherentists like Brink and McCord appear to regard reflective equilibrium as intimately related to coherentism. 
Note the following from McCord: ‘All along, as the method would have it, one should increase the coherence of 
one's beliefs by eliminating inconsistencies, articulating principles that are already implicit in one's judgments, 
and seeking out further grounds that would justify and unify these judgments and principles, always willing to 
shift one's judgments in light of the developments.’ (1996: 141) In addition, some of what Rawls says in A 
Theory of Justice suggests that he is committed to coherentism: ‘justification is a matter of the mutual support of 
many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view’; it is not a matter of appealing to 
‘self-evident premises or conditions on principles’, p. 21. However, it seems reasonable that one could be an 
advocate of reflective equilibrium whilst denying coherentism, e.g. one could claim that considered ethical 
judgments have a degree of non-inferential justification (which can of course be defeated, e.g. by incoherence 
with general principles). Perhaps the best thing to say is that although coherentism and the method of reflective 
equilibrium sit comfortably, neither entails the other.   
44
            See Sturgeon (2002) and Väyrynen (2008) for discussion of this point. 
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to non-inferential justification - that there are adequate epistemic connections, e.g., deductive, 
non-deductive etc, between our basic and non-basic beliefs. One could, however, hold that 
there is non-inferential justification but maintain that non-foundational beliefs are justified on 
the basis of some other epistemic feature, e.g., coherence.
45
 Indeed, this latter ‘mixed’ view 
has been attributed to Russell.
46
 Alternatively, one could hold that only foundational beliefs 
are justified, or, that foundational beliefs have some degree of non-inferential justification, but 
need to be part of a coherent set of beliefs in order to have full-blown justification sufficient 
for reasonable belief.
47
 It is not my purpose to arbitrate between these views in this thesis. On 
my characterisation they are all forms of ethical intuitionism (although admittedly, ethical 
intuitionists are likely to sign up to ethical foundationalism).
48
 Instead, I will focus on the 
claim for non-inferential propositional and doxastic justification, treating this as the core 
thesis of ethical intuitionism. This seems reasonable since if there were no non-inferential 
justification for ethical beliefs then ethical foundationalism and the other theories gestured 
towards would be falsified.  
 
What, then, is non-inferential justification? A recent influential conception of non-inferential 
propositional justification is due to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2007): 
 
Non-Inferential Justification (NI): A subject, S, has non-inferential 
justification for believing that p just in case S has justification for believing that 
p independently of any actual inference or any ability to infer p from other 
beliefs, q, r, s etc that S holds.
49
 
 
The core thought behind Sinnott-Armstrong's conception of non-inferential justification ought 
to be distinguished from two other positions in the philosophical vicinity.
50
 Firstly, someone 
                                                 
45
 Ethical foundationalists can of course allow that coherence can play an negative epistemic role, e.g., if the 
belief that p doesn't cohere with the rest of what the subject believes – perhaps because it is rendered highly 
improbable by the other beliefs – then this can constitute an epistemic defeater for the belief. In the terminology 
of Robert Audi, non-inferentially justified beliefs may be negatively dependent on coherence. However, 
foundationalists will claim that coherence is insufficient for justification. 
46
  See Brink, D., (1989), p. 101 for details. 
      
47
         See Van Roojen (forthcoming) for discussion. 
48
  Timmons (1987) makes the same point in passing, p. 597 
49
  This conception can be gleaned from the claims Sinnott-Armstrong makes in his (2006) and (2007). As 
outlined, this conception is for propositional justification; non-inferential doxastic justification will amount to NI 
plus a basing relation between the belief and the source of non-inferential propositional justification. 
50
 The following discussion of the non-inferred and non-inferable theses owes much to Elizabeth Tropman's 
discussion in her (forthcoming). 
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might think that for an S to be non-inferentially justified in believing that p is for it to be the 
case that S has not actually inferred that p. Call this the non-inferred thesis. Contemporary 
ethical intuitionists – rightly - reject the non-inferred thesis, since the fact that a belief that p 
has not been explicitly (psychologically) inferred by an S does not entail that the S in question 
has justification for believing that p independently of the ability to infer p from other beliefs 
they hold. As an example, it might be the case that  a scientist non-inferentially judges that 
some complex theoretical hypothesis, t,  is correct, but is only justified in believing this due to 
their ability to infer t from the stock of (largely true) background beliefs they hold.
51
  
 
Despite rejecting the non-inferred thesis, it is worth pointing out that contemporary ethical 
intuitionism is arguably motivated – at least in part - by the ostensible fact that many of the 
ethical beliefs that everyday ethical agents hold are apparently formed non-inferentially in the 
psychological sense.
52
 That is, they are formed without any explicit reasoning or inference and 
are, phenomenologically-speaking immediate. It is, however, important to note that although 
such phenomenological evidence by no means establishes the truth of ethical intuitionism, it is 
arguable whether it establishes something like a prima facie reason for the view. 
 
The second thesis in the vicinity of Sinnott-Armstrong's conception of non-inferential 
justification is what I am denoting the non-inferable thesis, which is basically the claim that 
for an S to be non-inferentially justified in believing that p is for it to be the case that S cannot 
infer p from other beliefs that she holds. Contemporary ethical intuitionists reject the non-
infereable thesis, allowing that an S may have non-inferential justification for a belief that p 
that could be inferred from other beliefs, q, r, s etc that S holds, or could be inferred from 
other beliefs that S does not presently hold. Note that in allowing for inferential justification of 
non-inferentially justified beliefs, intuitionists can apparently answer the criticism that non-
inferential justification entails that we can't say anything in favour of our non-inferentially 
held beliefs. According to Sinnott-Armstrong's conception of non-inferential justification, it is 
not the fact that p is non-inferable from other beliefs that makes belief that p non-inferentially 
justified; rather, it is the fact that S would have justification for believing that p independently 
of the ability to infer p that makes their belief non-inferentially justified.  
 
                                                 
51
 See Sturgeon (2002) for a similar view about the epistemic status of scientific 'intuitions.' 
52
 For evidence of this, see the work of Haidt (2001). 
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Despite constituting an apparently plausible conception of non-inferential justification, it has 
been recently persuasively argued by Elizabeth Tropman (forthcoming) that NI does not 
adequately capture what ethical intuitionists mean when they claim that we have non-
inferential justification for at least some ethical beliefs. To see why, it is worth noting that 
Sinnott-Armstrong has a particularly weak conception of inferable in mind; e.g., a belief that p 
being inferable includes being able to deduce it from other beliefs, the ability to draw 
inductive inferences, arguments to the best explanation, analogical arguments, appeals to 
authority, statistical generalisations, second-order inferences about the status of the belief that 
p or the conditions in which it was formed. Importantly, a belief that p can be inferred from 
sources which are not in fact the reason why the subject holds the belief, i.e., not the epistemic 
source upon which the belief that p is based.  
 
With this in mind, consider a case where an ethical agent holds an ethical belief that p but 
where they are incapable of inferring that p from anything else they believe. Given that we are 
understanding the notion of inferable in a broad sense, it seems that if the subject really were 
incapable of inferring that p from anything else they believed, we might reasonably withhold 
attributing justification to them for believing that proposition, e.g., we might wonder whether 
they actually grasp or understand p. Yet, given that the things from which S could infer the 
belief that p may in fact not be the reason or the epistemic basis for their believing that p, and 
given how broad a sense of inferability is being employed, we might reasonably doubt that this 
inferential ability is what actually justifies the belief, i.e., the premises of possible inferences 
may not form part or the whole of the reason the subject has for holding the belief. As 
Tropman (forthcoming) suggests, ‘being able to draw an inference to a belief might be a 
minimal condition for being justified in believing it, even if this inferential ability is not what 
justifies the belief.’ (online version) Instead, Tropman suggests that what is important about 
non-inferential justification, and specifically, non-inferentially justified belief, is that the 
justified beliefs in question are not held on the basis of other beliefs that the subject holds.
53
 
So, it seems that following constitutes an improved characterisation of non-inferential 
justification: 
 
                                                 
53
 Note that Tropman thinks that adopting this alternative conception of non-inferential justification can 
serve to deflect against the recent challenges from Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). 
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NI*: A subject, S, has non-inferential justification for believing that p just in 
case S has justification for believing that p independently of basing the belief 
that p on another belief.  
 
At this point it seems that there are two ways in which one could cash out the idea of 
justification independently of being based on a belief: a negative and a positive conception.
54
 
The negative way of construing this simply involves claiming that there is some justification 
in ethics which accrues to belief independently of being based on other beliefs. This of course 
leaves unanswered the question of what – if anything – a non-inferentially justified belief is 
based upon. This brings us to the positive conception. Positive conceptions of non-inferential 
justification will specify what non-inferentially justified beliefs are in fact based upon, i.e., in 
virtue of what are non-inferentially justified beliefs non-inferentially justified. Now, although 
it is by no means the only way of characterising the base of non-inferentially justified beliefs I 
favour a positive conception which claims that a non-inferentially justified belief is one which 
is not justified on the basis of another belief, but is instead justified on the basis of a non-
doxastic (non-belief) state. As an illustration, note the following from Väyrynen (2008): 
 
A non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is based by some non-
inferential mechanism on some kind of reasons or evidence, where non-
doxastic states such as experiences and phenomenal and intellectual 
appearances are the relevant kind of reasons or evidence.
55
  
 
There are of course alternative ways of cashing out a positive conception of non-inferential 
justification. For example, some contemporary ethical intuitionists, notably Robert Audi and 
Roger Crisp, sometimes speak of our non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs as being based 
upon/the result of the exercise of our faculty of reason. However, when it comes to cashing 
out what the relevant faculty of reason actually is the suggestions from intuitionists aren’t 
terribly illuminating, e.g., Crisp (2002) simply claims that it involves (at least partly) the 
capacity to make non-inferential ethical judgments and thereby to have the possibility of 
attaining knowledge. Somewhat more helpfully, Robert Audi claims that the faculty of reason 
                                                 
54
 I think this mirrors the debate about characterising a priori knowledge, i.e. between negative conceptions 
that claim a priori knowledge is knowledge independent of experience and positive conceptions that claim a 
priori knowledge is knowledge derived from, e.g., rational intuition. 
55
 This is taken from remarks Väyrynen makes in his (2008) p. 491 
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might enable us to form conclusions of reflection – roughly, a belief formed on the basis of 
considering a proposition holistically – which, he claims, can be legitimately be thought of as 
involving non-inferential justification. However, it is not clear to me that such conclusions of 
reflection are non-inferentially justified, because it is unclear in what sense a belief based 
upon reflection is not in fact based upon beliefs (those formed during reflection) in a way that 
makes the justification seem inferential.
56
  
 
Alternatively, someone might suggest that a non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is 
the result of a reliable process.
57
 However, there is the problem of whether any beliefs are 
actually based upon reliable processes as such, i.e., whether the reason that ordinary ethical 
agents have for holding ethical beliefs is that they are the result of a reliable process. 
Furthermore, reliabilists distinguish between belief-dependent and belief-independent 
processes
58
 – the former being their gloss on inferential justification – and presumably the 
latter sort of process will involve a substantial role for non-doxastic states, e.g., perceptual 
experiences. I propose then, that it is highly plausible to suggest that non-inferential 
justification is best understood as typically or paradigmatically involving justification that 
derives from a non-doxastic state. Ethical intuitionism is therefore best characterised as the 
view that we have justification for believing ethical propositions on the basis of non-doxastic 
states, and that at least some ethical beliefs that are based on non-doxastic states are justified. 
(I should, however, note that this conception will be revised in chapter 2. I delay discussion of 
this in order to avoid needless complication).  
 
Given the plausible characterisation of non-inferential justification as justification that derives 
from non-doxastic states, we can now distinguish ethical intuitionism's central epistemological 
claim from two alternative theses in the vicinity. Firstly, it is claimed by Brink (1989) that 
non-inferential justification basically amounts to the claim that some beliefs are self-justifying, 
                                                 
56
       For a similar sort of worry see Sinnott-Armstrong (2007). It has been suggested to me by Fiona 
Macpherson that the formation of the belief in the cogito seems to be a case of a non-inferentially justified 
conclusion of reflection. I would agree with this. However, it is important to realise that reflection on the cogito 
seems to play a different role than it does in other putative cases of conclusions of reflection. Specifically, it 
seems that reflection on the proposition ‘I am thinking’ itself constitutes evidence for the conclusion that ‘I exist.’ 
This does not seem to be the standard way in which conclusions of reflection – as Audi understands it – 
apparently result in justified beliefs.  
      
57
         E.g., Shafer-Landau (2003). 
58
      See Goldman (1979). The idea here is that a reliable process which is belief-dependent cannot confer 
justification independently of the input beliefs to the process being themselves justified. 
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where self-justification is ‘actually the limiting case of circular reasoning’59. Unsurprisingly, 
Brink thinks that there is something highly problematic about self-justification
60
 since ‘no 
belief about the world can also be the reason for thinking that that belief is true’61. Given my 
account of non-inferential justification we can, however, see that this is not what ethical 
intuitionists are committed to. Non-inferential justification does not depend upon the bogus 
notion of a belief that justifies itself. Rather, it is a belief that is justified on the basis of a non-
doxastic state (although there will presumably have to be some important relation between the 
contents of the non-doxastic and belief states). Following from this, we can also see that non-
inferential justification does not amount to groundless justification as Brink also suggests, i.e., 
the view that some beliefs – the basic or foundational ones – are neither justified nor 
unjustified, but are epistemically groundless. Instead, non-inferentially justified beliefs do 
have an epistemic ground; what distinguishes them is that their ground is a non-doxastic state.  
 
Let me end this discussion of non-inferential justification by making two further clarificatory 
points. Firstly, it ought to be noted that the justification involved in non-inferential 
justification is not indefeasible justification, at least not necessarily.
62
 Instead, ethical 
intuitionists (and non-ethicists who countenance non-inferential justification) are happy to 
concede that the justification one obtains on the basis of a non-doxastic state can be defeated – 
e.g., rebutted or undermined - by countervailing evidence. Secondly, it should also be borne in 
mind that ethical intuitionism's commitment to non-inferential justification (characterised by 
me as justification on the basis of non-doxastic states) does not – by itself - necessarily 
commit them to taking a particular side in the debate in general epistemology between 
epistemic internalists and epistemic externalists.
63
 Epistemic internalism about justification 
(note that the debate is also had with respect to knowledge) can be understood as follows: 
 
Epistemic Internalism: A subject S is justified in believing that p just in case 
the factors that justify p for S are cognitively accessibly to S. 
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 Brink, (1989), p. 117  
60
 Although Stratton-Lake (2002) and Shafer Landau (2003) – on occasion – appear to fall into the trap of 
conflating non-inferential with self-justification. 
61
 Ibid., p. 117 Someone might think that the belief that I am thinking is a plausible counterexample to this 
claim. 
62
 See the work of Robert Audi (1999), (2004) for this claim. 
      
63
       As we shall see in later chapters, it may be the case that only certain kinds of non-doxastic states get to 
justify, and the factors which enable a particular non-doxastic state to justify might be out a subject’s ken. Hence 
the view that non-inferential justification is justification on the basis of non-doxastic states need not rule out 
externalism about justification. 
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Externalism about justification is just the denial of internalism, i.e., S's justification for 
believing that p might depend on factors which are not cognitively accessible to S. It is not my 
purpose here to get embroiled in the debate between internalists and externalists. As I 
suggested, ethical intuitionism's commitment to non-inferential justification – as I think it is 
best characterised - does not, by itself, entail any particular stance on the internalist/externalist 
debate. Indeed, contemporary intuitionists do not fall neatly on either side of the divide. For 
example, the leading contemporary intuitionists, Michael Huemer and Robert Audi, are both 
internalists about justification (although Audi is an externalist when it comes to knowledge), 
while other important figures in recent work on intuitionism, Russ Shafer-Landau and Sabine 
Roeser, adopt an externalist perspective. In this thesis I will avoid explicit discussion of what I 
take to be a somewhat orthogonal issue vis-à-vis the truth of ethical intuitionism. 
 
Now that I have outlined my characterisation of ethical intuitionism, I would like to end this 
clarificatory section by briefly considering some notable objections to the view, the majority 
of which I will not be considering in this thesis. Firstly, someone might simply reject ethical 
intuitionism because they endorse some sort of global scepticism which entails its falsity. I do 
not find global scepticism very appealing and will not be discussing in this thesis. Supposing 
then, that we bracket global scepticism, many ethicists will be happy to admit that non-
inferential justification exists in non-ethical domains. That is, they will agree that we can have 
justified beliefs that are epistemically grounded in non-doxastic states. The paradigm example 
of this is sensory or perceptual experience, e.g. visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and 
audition.
64
 Other plausible examples include introspective experiences, e.g., the feeling of 
pain, states of understanding, e.g. my understanding of 2+2=4.
65
 However, despite there 
being some degree of consensus on the existence of non-inferential justification in non-ethical 
domains, many philosophers think that the conclusion of the regress argument, i.e., that there 
is no non-inferential justification for ethical beliefs, is true. 
 
There are a number of arguments someone might give in favour of this view. I will briefly 
mention three notable examples. Firstly, an argument which I will not be discussing in this 
                                                 
64
 This assumes – correctly in my view – that perceptual experiences are non-doxastic states. Indeed, I will 
assume this throughout the thesis. 
65
  Also, see Hunter (1997) for the view that understanding sentences confers non-inferential justification for 
beliefs about their meaning. 
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thesis is what I am denoting the Confirmation Objection, developed by Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (2006), (2007). Speaking roughly, Sinnott-Armstrong argues that we cannot have 
non-inferential justification for believing ethical propositions because of the following: firstly, 
many of the ethical beliefs we hold are formed in conditions where (i) we are partial, (ii) there 
is significant disagreement amongst epistemic peers,
 
(iii) we are emotional in a way that 
clouds our ethical judgment, (iv) we are susceptible for illusion or framing errors, or, (v) our 
beliefs have dubious origins. Secondly, since so many of our ethical beliefs are formed in 
these circumstances, for any given belief, ethical agents need to have confirmation that that 
belief constitutes an exception, i.e., they need to have beliefs about the reliability epistemic 
trustworthiness of their ethical beliefs. Hence, Sinnott-Armstrong claims that any justification 
we could have for ethical beliefs would have to be inferential justification. As stated I will not 
be discussing or addressing the Confirmation Objection in this thesis, although it is worth 
noting that there have been a number of plausible responses made to it, e.g. Shafer-Landau 
(2008), Smith (2010), Väyrynen (2008).  
 
Another argument against the claim that there is non-inferential justification and knowledge in 
ethics is that it requires positing ‘some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly 
different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else’66. Call this the Queerness 
Objection. I have already referred to the Queerness Objection in the previous section, but it is 
worth reiterating the points made there. The claim that we have non-inferentially justified 
ethical beliefs is an epistemological claim. The Queerness Objection, however, involves 
attributing to intuitionism a particular view about the nature of ethical properties, i.e., that they 
are motivating and categorically reason-giving, and to a particular view about the 
epistemological ramifications of adopting that view. In response, I do not see (i) why ethical 
intuitionists need to be committed to metaphysically queer ethical properties, and, (ii) why a 
metaphysical commitment of that sort necessarily entails that the concomitant epistemology 
will be queer. Therefore I do not think the Queerness Objection should really worry ethical 
intuitionists. 
 
A more pressing challenge in the vicinity of the Queerness Objection is the objection that non-
inferential ethical epistemology (and indeed, ethical epistemology generally), is faced with the 
insurmountable problem of explaining how ethical agents can be “hooked up” to ethical 
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 Mackie (1977), p. 95-6 
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reality. This is apparently a particular problem for ethics because ethical properties are 
normally assumed to be causally inefficacious. Call this the Ethical Reality Objection. Note 
firstly, that the Ethical Reality Objection is primarily a problem for robust realist accounts of 
ethical intuitionism, and arguably isn't a major problem for intuitionists who reject this view. 
It does seem that contemporary ethical intuitionists – who do commit themselves to robust 
realism – owe us some explanation as to how ethical agents can come to be adequately hooked 
up to ethical reality in a way which could make their ethical beliefs justified (or constitute 
knowledge). For the most part, I will not be directly discussing this very deep and complicated 
issue; however, some of the points I will make against ethical intuitionism will involve 
reference to this problem.  
 
This concludes my exposition of the central thesis of ethical intuitionism. In the following 
section I will briefly outline the structure and content of the thesis. 
 
3. Thesis Overview 
It was suggested in the previous section that we can best understand the ethical intuitionist’s 
epistemological claim as amounting to the view that we can have justification for ethical 
beliefs on the basis of non-doxastic states. Immediately it might be assumed that the non-
doxastic states that ethical intuitionists have in mind here are ethical intuitions. However, 
contemporary intuitionists do not commit themselves to the claim that there is some special 
ethical non-doxastic state that sets it apart from everything else. Rather, contemporary
67
 
ethical intuitionists adopt a sort of innocence by association strategy in attempting to cash out 
what sort of non-doxastic states can ground non-inferential justification. That is to say, they 
claim that we gain non-inferential justification in ethics in much the same way as we get non-
inferential justification in other domains.  
 
To illustrate, contemporary ethical intuitionists (e.g. Robert Audi, Brad Hooker, Russ Shafer-
Landau, Philip Stratton-Lake) claim that just as some non-ethical propositions are self-evident, 
e.g., all eligible bachelors are unmarried men, no object is red and green all over, in the sense 
that an adequate understanding of them can confer propositional justification for believing 
them (where understanding is apparently a non-doxastic state) there are some self-evident 
ethical propositions which are knowable in a similar way. Insofar as we think that there are 
                                                 
67
 Traditional intuitionists such as Sidgwick and Ross also appear to have adopted this line of argument. 
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self-evident propositions generally (and even naturalists can apparently accommodate this 
notion
68
), there is no great mystery about our having non-inferential understanding-based 
justification for believing ethical propositions.
69
  
 
As a second illustration; some ethical intuitionists (e.g. Robert Audi, Michael Huemer) claim 
that we can have propositional justification for believing ethical propositions in virtue of 
having intellectual seemings (where these are understood as being non-doxastic states) about 
ethical propositions. However, in order to support the epistemic credentials of these ethical 
seemings they make two claims. Firstly, they claim that there is nothing dubious about 
intellectual seeming states generally because intellectual seeming states are just a species of a 
broader category of justification-conferring seeming states, which includes perceptual and 
introspective states. Insofar as there is nothing dubious about the epistemic credentials of 
perception and introspection there is nothing suspicious about intellectual seeming states. 
Secondly, once the epistemic credentials of intellectual seeming states have been established, 
they claim that ethical seemings are just a sub-category of these and hence we have no reason 
to doubt the epistemic credibility of beliefs based upon ethical seemings. In addition to all of 
this, Michael Huemer (2007) argues that any epistemological theory which denies the 
justificatory power of all types of seemings – including seemings with an ethical content – is 
self-defeating. Hence, we have excellent general epistemological reasons for thinking that 
ethical seemings justify. 
 
Before proceeding, a brief word on the term intuition is in order: on some contemporary 
accounts, e.g., Audi, Crisp, ethical intuitions are non-inferentially held beliefs which are, inter 
alia, formed on the basis of adequate understandings of ethical propositions. On other 
accounts, e.g., Huemer, ethical intuitions are non-doxastic seeming states that can cause 
and/or form the basis for ethical beliefs but are not themselves beliefs. As I am characterising 
ethical intuitionism, both understanding and seeming states can be broadly understood as 
intuitions, and hence any justified beliefs acquired on the basis of these states can be rightly 
categorised as intuitively justified beliefs. Note, however, that by characterising intuitionism as 
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 e.g., see the work of Copp (2003), and more recently, Jenkins (2008). 
69
 Of course, the problem might be that ethical intuitionists are committed to a particularly controversial kind 
of a priori knowledge, i.e. synthetic a priori knowledge. In response, intuitionists tend to point to the case of 
mathematical knowledge as a respectable example of synthetic a priori knowledge. Some, e.g. Lenman (2007) 
complain that this isn’t very helpful given that the epistemology of mathematics is particularly murky. In chapter 
1 I consider the possibility that the principles ethical intuitionists are concerned with defending might be analytic.  
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committed to the view that we have justified ethical beliefs on the basis of non-doxastic states, 
I do not take the view to be – necessarily - that all of our ethical beliefs are justified by 
intuitions.  
 
As a third illustration of the innocence by association strategy; some ethical intuitionists (e.g. 
Robert Audi, John Greco, Justin McBrayer, David McNaughton) claim that we can have non-
inferential justification for believing ethical propositions on the basis of having ethical 
perceptual experiences, e.g. a perceptual experience as of the cruelty of setting fire to a cat, 
where perceptual experiences are apparently a paradigm of non-doxastic states that can ground 
non-inferential justification. Insofar as we think that there is nothing epistemically suspicious 
about perceptual-based justification in non-ethical domains then there is no motivation for 
thinking that there is necessarily anything epistemically awry about non-inferential perceptual-
based justification for believing ethical propositions. Moreover, insofar as we think that we 
can perceive complex properties that are not obviously causally efficacious in any robust 
sense, e.g., the property of being a table, then there appears to be no bar to thinking that we 
could perceive ethical properties. 
 
As a fourth and final illustration, some ethical intuitionists, (e.g. Robert Audi and Sabine 
Roeser
70
) claim that we can have non-inferential justification for believing ethical propositions 
on the basis of having emotional experiences (where emotional experiences are construed as 
non-doxastic states) in much the same way as we can have emotions-based justification for 
believing non-ethical propositions, e.g., my fear can apparently justify me in believing that I 
am in danger. Insofar as there is nothing epistemically problematic about non-ethical 
emotional-based justification (admittedly this is perhaps a good deal less obvious that in the 
other cases), we shouldn't shy away from the claim that ethical emotions can justify ethical 
beliefs. 
 
This thesis is concerned with critically evaluating the prospects for these contemporary 
versions/models of ethical intuitionism. That is, I will be critically evaluating the claim that we 
have non-inferential justification for believing ethical propositions and have non-inferentially 
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 In her (2011) Roeser claims that ethical emotions are non-inferentially justified judgments (where 
judgments are a species of belief). However, in recent presentations and discussions she appears to have revised 
this view, claiming instead that ethical emotions are non-doxastic states which can ground non-inferential 
justification in a way similar to the way perceptual experiences putatively do. 
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justified ethical beliefs on the basis of understandings (of self-evident propositions), seemings, 
perceptions, and/or emotions. The thesis does not constitute a wholesale rejection of ethical 
intuitionism, for it is not my view that there are no non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. 
For example, I think that we could plausibly have non-inferential justification for believing 
non-substantive ethical propositions (an outline of this concept will follow in chapter 1). 
However, I will suggest that there are significant problems for ethical intuitionism when it 
comes to the non-inferential justification of substantive propositions. In more detail, I will be 
arguing the following: 
 
Self-Evidence: we have good reason to doubt that the substantive Rossian 
principles (which contemporary proponents of ethical intuitionism posit as self-
evident) are in fact non-inferentially justifiably believed on the basis of an 
adequate understanding. 
 
Seemings: inter alia, it is not at all obvious how ethical seemings about 
substantive propositions get to justify (non-inferentially or otherwise). 
 
Ethical Perception: insofar as they confer any justification, we have reason to 
doubt that ethical perceptual experiences (if there are any) confer non-
inferential justification. 
 
Emotions: it is not at all obvious how ethical emotions are supposed to justify 
beliefs. 
 
Despite raising these problems for these accounts of ethical intuitionism, I will have some 
things to say in their support. Indeed, I spend a good deal of time defending the self-evidence, 
perception and emotions accounts against objections that I do not think count against those 
views. Given this, my thesis is best understood as a mapping of the conceptual space in an aim 
to get clearer on what the prospects for ethical intuitionism in its contemporary forms are. If I 
were to sum up the conclusion of the thesis in a sentence it would be the following: ethical 
intuitionism is not implausible, but much more work needs to be done in order to begin to 
make it a reasonable meta-ethical view to adopt. 
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Here, then, is a summary of the chapters that will follow:  
 
Chapter One: Self-Evidence 
In chapter one of the thesis I consider the understanding/self-evidence account of non-
inferential justification. Specifically, I am interested in casting doubt on the view that the 
Rossian principles of prima facie duty are self-evident. The first part of the chapter involves 
delineating the concept of self-evidence and responding on behalf of the intuitionist to a recent 
objection to the view. Roughly, I argue that intuitionists should not be embarrassed by the fact 
that there does not appear to be any necessary connection between understanding a self-
evident ethical proposition and believing it, given that it is doubtful that a similar entailment 
holds for non-ethical self-evident propositions. In the second part I proceed to consider an 
objection which does present a serious problem for intuitionists: the Understanding Objection. 
This is roughly the view that it is not at all obvious how an understanding of a substantive 
proposition – such as a Rossian principle – could ground justified belief in it. I argue that 
although the intuitionist can plausibly argue that the Understanding Objection is unsound, an 
amended version of the argument, Understanding* is sound. Specifically, the intuitionist is 
faced with the following dilemma: either the Rossian principles are only justifiably believed 
inferentially or else they are committed to the claim that all true non-contingent ethical 
propositions are self-evident. In order to avoid the latter disjunct I argue that we have good 
reason to reject the claim that the Rossian principles are self-evident. In the final part I end by 
considering and rejecting the view that the Rossian principles could be justifiably believed on 
the basis of understanding them because they are propositions which are default reasonable to 
believe. 
 
Chapter Two: Seemings 
In chapter two of the thesis I consider the Seemings Account (S-Account) of non-inferential 
justification. In the first part of the chapter I outline what proponents of the S-Account are 
committed to: this involves explaining their account of ethical intuitions (which they claim are 
intellectual seemings), their epistemological principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, and their 
Self-Defeat Argument; roughly, the claim that any epistemological theory which does not 
allow all seemings to confer justification (the claim of Phenomenal Conservatism) is self-
defeating. In the second part of the chapter I argue that it is possible to credibly resist the Self-
Defeat argument and that ethical intuitionists cannot therefore simply rely on the principle of 
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Phenomenal Conservatism to ground their ethical epistemology. Also, I raise serious concerns 
about the ability of intellectual seemings about substantive propositions to confer justification, 
given that it is unclear how they are supposed to justify. A similar problem does not arise for 
seemings about non-substantive propositions which are plausibly the upshot of conceptual 
competency. Given this, ethical intuitionists have a lot more work to do in order to show that 
seemings about substantive ethical propositions are justification-conferring. In the third 
section I offer further reasons for rejecting the S-Account of justification (upon which the S-
Account of ethical intuitionism depends). Specifically, I argue that the S-Account is 
committed to the following odd claim: all of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially 
justified. After considering some ways in which the proponent of the seemings-account can 
respond, I contend that we have reason to reject the S-Account in its current form. In the 
fourth section I go on to suggest that, given the arguments of the previous sections, ethical 
intuitionists would be well-advised to adopt something like a restricted Phenomenal 
Conservatism. However, in addition to the philosophical work required in order to show that 
substantive ethical seemings do get to justify belief, I will show that ethical intuitionists ought 
to adopt a new conception of non-inferential justification and justified belief. After outlining 
my preferred conception, I will consider some applications of my account, notably to the case 
of the Rossian principles. 
 
Chapter Three: Ethical Perception 
In the third chapter I go on to consider the ethical perception account. This is roughly the view 
that (i) we can have ethical perceptual experiences (EP*), and, (ii) we can have some non-
inferentially justified ethical beliefs in virtue of having these ethical perceptual experiences 
(EPj). In the first part of the chapter I explain the motivations for holding these views. In 
section two I defend EP* against some recent objections – notably the Looks Objection. There 
I argue that by distinguishing between what is phenomenally present and what is 
phenomenally present as absent in perceptual experience, the claim that ethical properties 
don’t look a certain way is not at all obvious. In section three I go on to present what I take to 
be the most plausible account of how ethical perception could be possible: via the mechanism 
of cognitive penetration. In this context I respond to two further objections; the Is There 
Anything We Don’t Perceive Objection and the Directness Objection. In section four, I go on 
to consider EPj: the epistemological claim that ethical perceptual experiences can non-
inferentially justify beliefs. I argue that, despite there being no obvious knock-down objections 
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to the possibility of there being ethical perception, given my improved account of non-
inferential justification (outlined in chapter 2) it is not at all obvious that beliefs based upon 
ethical perceptual experiences are in fact non-inferentially-justifying (insofar as they do get to 
justify). In the final section, I consider the view that we could have non-inferential 
“perceptual” justification for believing ethical propositions even if it is false that we can have 
perceptual experiences that represent ethical properties. Interestingly, I think that the prospects 
for this sort of view are better than the view that we have non-inferential justification on the 
basis of ethical perceptual experiences.  
 
Chapter Four: Emotions 
In the fourth and final chapter of the thesis I go on to consider the emotions account of non-
inferential justification. This is roughly the view that (i) emotional experiences are non-
doxastic states (EN), and, (ii) emotional experiences can ground non-inferentially justify 
ethical beliefs (EJ). In the first part of the chapter I will outline the reasons for thinking that 
emotional experiences are non-doxastic states (EN). In the second section I go on to consider 
EJ. The emotions account of ethical intuitionism is perhaps the least discussed of the three 
views, so I spend much of the chapter defending the view against objections that I do not think 
are successful. In the second section I respond to the Basing Objection to EJ: emotions are 
rarely or never the reason why subjects hold ethical beliefs. I argue that we have good reason 
to think that emotional experiences are at least sometimes taken at face value by subjects and 
hence that emotions are capable of grounding non-inferentially justified belief. In the third 
section I provide a partial response to the Justification Objection to EJ, i.e., to the claim that 
emotions are incapable of conferring justification by themselves. However, I will suggest that 
ethical intuitionists who adopt robust realism still owe us an explanation as to how emotional 
experiences can justify us in believing ethical propositions. In the fourth and final section I 
argue against the Proxy Objection to EJ, which essentially involves arguing against the two 
related claims that (i) emotional experiences are rendered justificatorily otiose when subjects 
become non-emotionally aware of the non-ethical features which constitute reasons for 
making their emotional state justified or appropriate, and, (ii) emotional subjects have 
normative reasons to gain a non-emotional awareness of non-ethical features because of the 
goal of understanding.  
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           Conclusion 
That completes the Introductory chapter. In the following chapter I critically assess the 
prospects for the understanding-based/self-evidence account of ethical intuitionism. 
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Chapter 1: Ethical Intuitionism and Self-Evidence 
Many contemporary ethical intuitionists follow their philosophical forebears by claiming that 
some ethical propositions possess the epistemological property of self-evidence (e.g. Audi 
(1999), (2004), (2008), Hooker (2002), Shafer-Landau (2003), Stratton-Lake (2002)). Self-
evidence is characterized by the leading exponent of ethical intuitionism, Robert Audi (1999), 
in the following way: 
 
SE: a truth such that any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (a) 
in virtue of having that understanding, one is justified in believing the 
proposition (i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact believes it 
or not); and (b) if one believes the proposition on the basis of that 
understanding of it, then one knows it.
71
 
 
According to Audi, a proposition which is self-evident is an a priori proposition; indeed, self-
evident propositions are said to constitute the base
72
 of the a priori.
 
Put negatively, self-evident 
propositions are knowable in a way which is ‘independent of experience’, or ‘not based on 
experiential sources’73, and are only epistemologically dependent on experience inasmuch as it 
will plausibly be required in order to furnish individuals with possession of the concepts which 
figure in self-evident propositions. Put more positively, according to SE an adequate 
understanding confers non-inferential and defeasible
74
 justification for belief in self-evident 
propositions, and if a rational agent forms their belief on the basis of this adequate 
understanding then they will non-inferentially know it. Adequate understanding obviously 
plays a key epistemological role and is characterized by Audi in the following way: 
 
[an adequate understanding is] more than simply getting the general sense of 
some sentence expressing it… adequacy here implies not only seeing what the 
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     Audi, R., (1999), p. 206 
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    i.e. ‘a priori propositions are those that are either (a) self-evident, in the sense specified above – call these 
directly self-evident or a priori in the narrow sense – or, (b) though not self-evident, self-evidently entailed by at 
least one proposition that is – call these indirectly self-evident, or (c) neither directly nor indirectly self-evident, 
but provable by self-evident steps from a proposition that is self-evident – call these ultimately a priori.’ (1999), 
p. 221 
73
   The extent to which we can characterise a priori knowledge as based on non-experiential sources is a 
particularly difficult issue. This point shouldn’t, however, be conflated with the idea that gaining concepts which 
figure in a priori propositions may require sensory experience. See Casullo (2003), pp. 150-8 for a treatment of 
this complex issue. 
74
     Although not indefeasible, the propositional justification that one gets in virtue of adequately understanding 
a self-evident proposition is ‘plausibly considered as strong as any justification there can be.’ Audi, (1998), p. 95 
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proposition says but also a kind of knowing how. One must know how to use it 
in description and reasoning; for instance, one must be able to apply it to – and 
withhold its application from – an appropriately wide range of cases. Similarly 
one must be able to see some of its logical implications, to distinguish it from a 
certain range of close relatives, and to comprehend its elements and some of 
their relations.
75
  
 
Although adequately understanding and seeing the truth of a luminous self-evident 
proposition, e.g., the truth that all bachelors are eligible unmarried men, might come with 
ease to normal rational agents, Audi claims that some considerable degree of reflection is 
required in order to adequately understand and/or see the truth of other more complex self-
evident propositions. Audi denotes the former class of self-evident propositions immediately 
self-evident, and the latter class mediately self-evident. As part of his ethical intuitionism, 
Audi follows W.D. Ross in his espousal of both the truth and the self-evidence of the prima 
facie duties (hereafter, the Rossian principles) - those of fidelity, reparation, justice, gratitude, 
beneficence and self-improvement, and of non-injury.
76
 Importantly, the Rossian principles 
are, according to Audi, examples of mediate self-evidence: 
 
In my view, the [Rossian] principles are plausibly considered mediately self-
evident (roughly, self-evident, but not knowable by us apart from reflection – 
possibly a great deal of reflection – on their content).77 
 
Note that with regard to both immediate and mediate self-evidence, adequate understanding is 
not claimed to reveal the self-evidence or necessity
78
 of the proposition in question, but merely 
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      Audi, R., (2004), pp. 49/50 
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    Audi adds his own duties of liberty and respectfulness to the original Rossian list. The claim that the Rossian 
principles are self-evident is not essential to intuitionism. One could, e.g., hold that more general utilitarian 
principles are self-evident. Indeed, this was the view of Sidgwick. Alternatively, one could argue that 
propositions about particular cases are self-evident; this appears to have been the view of Prichard. I focus here 
on the Rossian principles because (i) contemporary intuitionists tend to focus on them, and, (ii) they seem to me 
to be the most plausible candidates for self-evidence. Utilitarian principles don’t seem to be true let alone self-
evident, whilst it is unclear how particular truths could be self-evident, given that they will be contingent. Note 
also that Audi’s conception of self-evidence is quite different from the more basic conceptions that we find in 
Prichard, Ross and (to a lesser degree) Sidgwick.  
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     Audi, R., (2002), in Stratton-Lake, P. (eds.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, p. 48 
78
   Note that Audi appears to respect the post-Kripkean consensus that there is no entailment between a 
proposition’s being a priori and it being necessary (and vice versa), and hence remains tentatively agnostic as to 
the modal status of self-evident propositions. It does, however, seem that a proposition’s being self-evident sits 
uncomfortably with it’s being contingent. This is because it is not clear how understanding a contingent 
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its truth. Also, Audi appears to allow that in many cases of immediate and mediate self-
evident truths (perhaps with the exception of axiomatic truths), their being self-evident does 
not preclude their being known inferentially. With regards to mediate self-evidence 
specifically, it is important to note at the outset that it is not wholly clear from Audi’s remarks 
just what adequate understanding is supposed to involve. For example, it is not clear whether 
it is supposed to be equivalent to, or is supposed to outstrip, what might be loosely called 
grasp of meaning (or knowledge of meaning-facts). Related to this, it is also not altogether 
clear whether Audi thinks that reflection is simply required in order to adequately understand 
these propositions, or may in fact be necessary over-and-above adequate understanding in 
order to discern the truth of mediately self-evident propositions.
79
 What is clear is that Audi 
thinks that the truth of mediately self-evident propositions need not be immediately obvious to 
rational agents upon first inspection or even once they have attained an adequate 
understanding.
80
  
 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to evaluate the claim that the Rossian principles are self-
evident in the way that contemporary ethical intuitionists claim. Speaking roughly for now; it 
is my view that, once we become clear about what an adequate understanding of a putatively 
mediate self-evident proposition like a Rossian principle amounts to, we have good reason to 
reject the claim that an adequate understanding of the Rossian principles can confer non-
inferential justification for believing them.  
 
Before going into the details of my argument, let me first say a few things about a notable 
feature of Audi’s account of self-evidence; the fact that SE is a non-belief-entailing conception 
of self-evidence. Although any rational agent, S, who adequately understands a self-evident 
proposition, p, will thereby have propositional justification for believing that p,
81
 there is, 
according to Audi, no such entailment between S’s adequately understanding self-evident 
                                                                                                                                                         
proposition, e.g., John’s theft of the apple was wrong, could furnish an individual with justification for believing 
it. In addition to understanding, we would plausibly need, inter alia, justification for believing the empirical 
propositions that John stole the apple. 
79
     Cf. Shafer-Landau’s account of self-evidence: ‘A proposition p is self-evident = df. p is such that adequately 
understanding and attentively considering just p is sufficient to justify believing that p.’ (2003) p. 247 
80
    For the latter claim, consider the following remarks from Audi: ‘it does not follow from the self-evidence of 
a proposition that if one (adequately) understands (and considers) the proposition, one does believe it… one can 
fail initially to ‘see’ a self-evident truth yet later grasp it in just the way one grasps the truth of a paradigmatically 
self-evident proposition: one obvious in itself the moment we consider it… in some cases we can see what a self-
evident proposition says – and thus understand it – before seeing that, or how, it is true.’ Audi (2004), p. 49 
81
      This has what I take to be the odd implication that someone who firmly denies a Rossian principle still has 
propositional justification – provided that they retain adequate understanding. 
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proposition, p, and S’s assenting to p, or even p’s seeming to be true to S. Indeed, it seems that 
outright disbelief is quite possible for self-evident propositions, and, in the case of mediate 
self-evidence (which is associated with ‘synthetic’ or ‘substantive’ propositions – more on 
these notions later), e.g., the Rossian principles, philosophical theses, disagreement on their 
truth is not particularly unusual. Despite this, Audi does think that there is an important 
connection between understanding and belief in the case of self-evidence:  
 
An adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition, p, does imply (at least 
in a rational person) a disposition to believe it, indeed one strong enough so 
that there should be an explanation for non-belief given comprehending 
consideration of p.
82
  
 
Given that Audi and other ethical intuitionists, e.g., Shafer-Landau, Stratton-Lake, Hooker 
hold a non-belief-entailing conception of self-evidence, one might wonder what the motivation 
might be for claiming that there is any connection between adequate understanding and belief, 
i.e., that understanding necessitates a disposition-to-believe. One suggestion
83
 is that it would 
perhaps be odd if there were no connection between adequately understanding self-evident 
propositions and believing them. That is to say, although ethical intuitionists seem to be quite 
correct in warning against conflating the concepts of SELF-EVIDENCE and OBVIOUSNESS, one 
still might think that for a proposition, p, to have the special epistemic status of self-evidence, 
an adequate understanding of p must place rational agents in a cognitive position such that 
they are in some sense inclined towards believing p.  
 
Something like this worry – that, if there was no link between understanding and believing 
self-evident propositions, this would jar with the notion that an understanding of such 
                                                 
82
 Audi (2008), p. 488 In his (1994), Audi offers the following rough characterisation of a disposition-to-
believe: ‘a condition in which a (causal) basis for a belief is already present in such a way that, typically, the 
proposition need only be thought of, in order to be believed. S needs an occasion to form the belief, but does not 
lack an adequate psychological basis for it.’ p. 426 
83
      Another suggestion is that adequate understanding is to be understood by analogy with perceptual 
experience. Indeed, in a recent paper (2010), Audi claims that states of adequate understanding are somewhat 
analogous to perceptual states, e.g., neither states are belief-entailing although both states have a content upon 
which beliefs may be formed (justifiably we might assume). Furthermore, in his (1994) Audi appears to subscribe 
to the view that perceptual experiences necessitate a disposition to believe their contents. Let me note here that 
there seems to be an obvious epistemic disanalogy between understanding and perceptual experience; whereas 
there seems to be something about the nature of perceptual representation which gives one a justification for 
belief on its basis, there isn’t something about understanding as such which gives one a justification. Rather it is 
something about the proposition in question (namely, that they are self-evident) which makes understanding it 
yield justification. 
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propositions could, by itself, yield knowledge - is expressed somewhat more stridently in the 
following remarks from Klemmens Kappel (2002): 
 
one cannot coherently hold that there is no tendency whatsoever among 
sufficiently rational beings to believe self-evident propositions, and yet hold 
that, if they nonetheless do believe them, this belief amounts to knowledge.
84
 
 
The important thing to say here is that Kappel is making what, on the face of it, seems to be a 
particularly strong claim. To say that it is incoherent or contradictory to deny a relatively 
robust link between understanding and belief whilst maintaining a link between understanding 
and justification, demands argument. Nowhere does Kappel provide such an argument and 
hence, in the absence of further reasons, we might wonder what grounds there are for thinking 
that there is some conceptual tension in claiming that p is self-evident, but where agents need 
not be inclined towards believing it. 
 
Indeed, I think that Kappel’s worry is ultimately misplaced for the following sort of reason: it 
seems that there are a great many propositions which we will want to say are paradigm 
candidates for self-evidence, e.g., blatantly analytic truths, but where there may not be a 
necessary link between understanding and belief (including a disposition-to-believe). For 
example, Timothy Williamson (2007)
85
 has offered some plausible arguments to the effect that 
competent users of the concept VIXEN might fail to be disposed-to-believe the proposition 
expressed in the analytic statement ‘all vixens are female foxes.’ Elsewhere, it seems that 
competent logicians, e.g., Van McGee, can ostensibly retain understanding whilst denying the 
validity of what are normally taken to be luminously valid inference patterns, such as modus 
ponens. 
 
In addition to the possibilities thrown up by Williamson’s arguments, it is my view that Audi 
would be well-advised to drop the claim for a disposition-to-believe. I hold this view for two 
main reasons. Firstly, whereas it is perhaps controversial whether possessors of the concept 
VIXEN could fail to have a disposition-to-believe that all vixens are female, it seems highly 
plausible that competent users of the concepts figuring in the Rossian principles, e.g., MORAL 
                                                 
84
     From his (2002), pp. 400-401  
85
  From his (2007). Note, however, that Williamson appears to think this undermines the view that some 
propositions are knowable in virtue of understanding. I do not follow him in making this claim. 
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REASON, PRIMA FACIE, PROMISE etc. could fail to be have such a disposition, despite having 
adequate understanding.
86
 Indeed, this appears to be the case for moral particularists
87
 such as 
Jonathan Dancy (see his (1993), (2003)), since under plausible accounts of dispositions, the 
moral particularist fails to fulfill the conditions for being attributed with a disposition-to-
believe. For example, consider the following simple conditional account of dispositions as 
applied to self-evidence: 
 
Simple: A rational agent, S, is disposed-to-believe self-evident proposition, p, 
(which they adequately understand), when they think about, reflect upon, and 
attentively consider p iff S would come to believe that p if they thought about, 
reflected upon, and attentively considered p. 
 
If we consider the case of the moral particularist the right-hand side of Simple would appear to 
be false. Furthermore, if we consider other more complex conditional accounts or non-
conditional accounts, we seem to end up with the same result.
88
 Secondly, making the claim 
that some individuals, e.g., moral particularists, can comprehendingly deny the Rossian 
principles whilst retaining a disposition-to-believe would appear to suggest that we have a 
case of masked dispositions, i.e., a disposition which is prevented from manifesting itself by 
some other feature or object. The problem here is that in order to give a satisfactory account of 
how a disposition-to-believe might be masked, this might involve having to make certain 
psychological claims which are significantly more controversial than the claim that knowledge 
of the self-evident simply requires the ‘ability to understand and think’89. Specifically, I 
suspect that it might involve having to claim that a disposition-to-believe a self-evident 
proposition can persist in the face of the adoption of contrary beliefs because the disposition is 
grounded in a modular faculty of the mind, or at the very least, a part of the mind that is 
                                                 
86
         Note that I am operating with a vague notion of adequate understanding here. As will become clear, it is 
my considered view that an adequate understanding of complex and substantive propositions appears to involve 
more than mere grasp of meaning. However, I would still claim that the point about dispositions-to-believe holds 
even if adequate understanding is robust. 
87                  A moral particularist believes that moral reasons are multivalent. For example, that an action 
would be the keeping of a promise may count in favour (morally) of that action in some cases, but in other 
cases be morally neutral with respect to the action (or count against it). 
88
         Adopting more complex conditional accounts, e.g. the ideal conditions account (see Mumford (1998)) and 
the ceteris paribus account (see Steinberg (2010)), makes the attribution of a disposition-to-believe more difficult 
to assess but plausibly relies on some conception of masked dispositions, which, as I claim, may involve hefty 
psychological commitments. Also, if we adopt a non-conditional account of dispositions (see Fara (2005)), then it 
seems obvious that the moral particularist doesn’t have a disposition-to-believe the Rossian principles. 
89
         Stratton-Lake, P. (2002), p. 22. He takes this characterisation of ‘moderate rationalism’ from Bonjour. 
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informationally encapsulated.
90
 Otherwise it is hard to see how a disposition could persist in 
the face of the adoption of contrary beliefs and/or dispositions. Now, although this claim isn’t 
obviously false (at least not a priori), it is a good deal more controversial than the more modest 
claim that we can know some propositions in virtue of our capacity to adequately understand 
them. Hence, insofar as ethical intuitionists want to avoid extra philosophical commitments, 
there may be good reasons to drop the claim that there is a disposition-to-believe all self-
evident propositions, even if there might be a disposition-to-believe some of them.  
 
As should already be clear, I do not think that the lack of a disposition-to-believe the Rossian 
principles rules out their being self-evident, as Kappel would perhaps have us believe. Not 
only would such a strong condition potentially rule out all propositions from being self-
evident (or at least a very great many that we would normally take to be self-evident), it is not 
at all obvious to me that the justificatory story in Audi’s account of self-evidence has anything 
to do with any putative links between understanding and belief for rational agents, i.e., there 
doesn’t seem to be any obvious difficulty in adequate understanding grounding propositional 
justification, even if it doesn’t necessarily ground justified belief and knowledge.91 Hence I do 
not think that ethical intuitionists need to worry too much about there being the lack of a 
disposition-to-believe their favoured principles.  
 
Despite being able to survive this challenge, I think that there are significant problems with the 
ethical intuitionist’s claim that the Rossian principles are non-inferentially knowable or 
justifiably believed in virtue of an adequate understanding of them. It will be the primary 
purpose of this chapter to argue for this claim. I will conduct my argument in the context of a 
consideration of what I take to be a significant objection to the ethical intuitionist’s claim 
about self-evidence which has been raised in the recent ethical literature; the Understanding 
Objection. My claim is that some version of this objection is sound, and that we have strong 
reason to doubt the truth of the claim that the Rossian principles are non-inferentially justified 
by an adequate understanding of them.  
 
                                                 
90
     Williamson (2007) considers whether it might be plausible to claim that there is a logic module which 
grounds our disposition-to-believe analytic truths (which are reducible to truths of logic). He rejects this claim on 
empirical grounds. Note that positing a logical module wouldn’t appear to be much help to ethical intuitionists 
given that the Rossian principles do not appear to be good candidates for being reducible to truths of logic.  
91
     Note, however, that Williamson (2007) claims that proponents of epistemic-analyticity are committed to 
there being understanding-belief links in order to ground their epistemology.  
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Given its pivotal role in the discussion that follows, let me end this introductory section by 
saying a bit about what the Understanding Objection amounts to. Although many non-
sceptical philosophers might agree with ethical intuitionists that there are indeed self-evident 
moral truths in the way defined, some philosophers have expressed doubts about the idea that 
adequately understanding the propositions which some a priori ethical intuitionists are 
interested in defending, the Rossian principles, could make justification and knowledge of 
them available to a subject. Here are a couple of examples of the objection: 
 
a priori ethical intuitionism requires that there be self-evident ethical truths. 
But how is it supposed to be possible to have justification to believe substantive 
synthetic ethical truths solely on the basis of an adequate understanding of 
them? A priori intuitionists must explain how this can be so.
92
 
 
And, 
 
it is not yet clear what it is to understand a proposition in a way that is 
sufficient for justifiedly believing it… Analytic truths might get by on 
understanding alone, but ethical intuitionists (rightly) deny that substantive 
ethical truths are analytic. Without any explanation of how this is supposed to 
work, the grasping of self-evident propositions is inadequate as a theory of 
intuitions and intuitive justification.
93
 
 
The first thing to note is that both of our dissenters appear to acknowledge the existence of 
some self-evident (and hence a priori) propositions. Hence, the objection that is being 
expressed here does not appear to be a radical empiricist objection (e.g., of a Quinean variety) 
about the existence of a priori justification. Rather, the objection apparently amounts to 
something like the following: although there is nothing, prima facie, epistemologically 
problematic about claiming self-evidence, i.e., understanding-based justification, in the case of 
analytic statements and/or non-substantive propositions,
94
 there is, however, something about 
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        Väyrynen, P. (2008), p. 507 
93
        Bedke, M.S., (2008), p. 255 
94
       On the face of it, self-evidence is a property of propositions and analyticity is a property of statements. 
Also, understanding is usually taken to be of sentences or statements. To accommodate this terminology I will 
assume the following (rough) bridging principle: when S understands a statement, T, S grasps the proposition, p, 
expressed by the statement T.  
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the nature of synthetic statements and/or substantive propositions which makes them – in lieu 
of further explanation – unsuitable candidates for self-evidence. Note here the postulation by 
our dissenters of a close relationship between the analytic and the non-substantive, or at the 
very least, the presumption that analytic statements aren’t in the business of expressing 
substantive propositions. Also note the following claim from Väyrynen: ‘substantive ethical 
truths should be synthetic’95. 
 
In essence, our dissenters might be roughly understood as expressing something like
96
 a 
moderate empiricist worry, i.e., the objection that there is something mysterious about the 
possibility of synthetic and/or substantive self-evident truths which are knowable simply on 
the basis of understanding them. Roughly-speaking, one might put the complaint in the 
following way: for any proposition, p, in order to have a justified belief that p, it is a necessary 
condition that S grasps p. However, in the case of analytic and/or non-substantive truths, e.g. 
all wrong actions are wrong actions, S’s understanding is also sufficient for justified belief 
that p, whereas in the case of synthetic and/or substantive truths, e.g. it would be wrong to kill 
one person to save five, S needs – in some admittedly vague sense – to engage in 
cognitive/epistemic activity over-and-above mere grasp of meaning. Put another way, one 
might reasonably think that in the case of synthetic and/or substantive truths, understanding is 
only the beginning of the process of acquiring justification.  
 
As applied specifically to the Rossian principles, I think we can express the Understanding 
Objection in the following argument-form: 
 
P1: The Rossian principles are substantive propositions. 
P2: Substantive propositions are synthetic (not analytic). 
                                                 
95
     From his (2008), p. 507 
96
    How accurate it is to label our dissenters as expressing a moderate empiricist worry is a tricky issue. Let me 
explain. One might be a moderate empiricist in the standard sense that one thinks that all substantive knowledge 
of the world depends upon sense experience for its justification. A weaker view would be that of a moderate 
empiricist who doubts that substantive knowledge of the world could be had on the basis of understanding, but 
allows that substantive knowledge could in principle be attained non-experientially. A further view would be that 
of a moderate empiricist who is sceptical of understanding-based substantive knowledge but who thinks that 
reason does – in ways distinct from mere understanding - in fact ground substantive knowledge. I labour this 
point here since it seems that both of our dissenters may in fact fall into the third category, e.g., Bedke apparently 
endorses some sort of seemings based account of substantive a priori justification, while Väyrynen appears to be 
at ease with the idea of ‘substantive ethical thought.’ 
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P3: If a proposition is substantive and synthetic, then the proposition’s self-
evident status is dubious and/or mysterious. 
C: The self-evident status of the Rossian principles is dubious and /or 
mysterious. 
 
Given the validity of the Understanding Objection, an ethical intuitionist wishing to deny the 
conclusion needs to deny one of P1-P3. In a nut-shell, and simplifying greatly, I intend to 
argue that, even if the Understanding Objection is unsound as it stands, an amended version of 
it is sound, and therefore we have good reason to believe that the self-evident status of the 
Rossian principles is dubious.  
 
The structure of the chapter will be as follows: 
 
In the following section, §1, I will proceed to briefly discuss the distinction between 
substantive and non-substantive propositions. This discussion will not only facilitate an 
evaluation of P1 of the Understanding Objection, but will facilitate discussion in later chapters 
where I will employ the distinction. 
 
In §2 I will go on to apply my rough characterisation of the distinction between substantive 
and non-substantive propositions to the case of the Rossian principles. I will argue that, 
although the status of the Rossian principles is perhaps less obvious than is usually assumed, it 
seems that on the most plausible interpretation of what an adequate understanding of them is 
supposed to involve, they come out as substantive propositions. Hence P1 of the 
Understanding Objection is true. 
 
In §3 I will then go on to evaluate P2. It will be argued that if the Rossian principles do indeed 
meet certain sufficient conditions for substantivity, then it is unlikely that they could meet 
necessary conditions for being analytic, at least under the epistemic conception of analyticity. 
However, if we adopt a Kantian conception of analyticity, I will suggest that the Rossian 
principles could constitute substantive Kantian-analytic truths.
97
 Indeed, something like 
                                                 
97
    I will not be considering the metaphysical conception of analyticity, i.e. the view that a statement is analytic 
just in case it is true in virtue of its meaning (A. J. Ayer appears to have held this view of the analytic). This 
conception of analyticity was apparently debunked by Quine, and contemporary proponents of epistemic-
analyticity also reject it. In any case, given their commitment to robust realism, ethical intuitionists would not 
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appears to be the claim of Robert Audi (2008). Thus there may be good reason to think that P2 
is false.  
 
However, it will then be shown in §4 that, even if P2 of the Understanding Objection is false, 
an amended version of the argument is sound. Specifically, it will be argued that, given the 
relatively robust conception of adequate understanding that ethical intuitionists appear to be 
committed to, they are faced with the following dilemma:  either it is doubtful whether 
knowledge of the Rossian principles could be anything other than inferential, or else, the 
account of adequate understanding offered by ethical intuitionists commits them to the 
implausible claim that all non-contingent ethical truths are self-evident.
98
 I will conclude that, 
in lieu of further argument, we have strong reason to doubt that the Rossian principles are non-
inferentially knowable on the basis of adequate understanding as ethical intuitionists claim. 
 
Finally, in §5, I will briefly consider the proposal that the Rossian principles could be regarded 
as self-evident provided that ethical intuitionists jettison the claim that only a robust adequate 
understanding could ground justification. Specifically, I will consider the view that they could 
be examples of propositions that are default reasonable to believe, i.e., in the same way that 
the external world exists is, on some accounts, default reasonable to believe.
99
 I will highlight 
some significant shortcomings of this account before suggesting that, given the way the notion 
of default reasonability is plausibly understood, it is unlikely that the Rossian principles are 
candidates for this sort of epistemic status. 
 
Thus, the overall conclusion of the chapter is that the self-evident status of the Rossian 
principles is highly dubious. 
 
Let me begin by outlining a rough account of the distinction between non-substantive and 
substantive propositions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
want to claim that the Rossian principles are simply true in virtue of their meaning. 
98
    Recall that it is not clear how a contingent proposition, e.g. John’s theft of the apple was wrong, could be 
self-evident, given that one would presumably require justification for believing that John stole the apple. 
99
    In a sense, this can be taken as denying the truth of P3 – if we understand self-evidence in terms of default 
reasonability, then we can have substantive and synthetic ‘self-evident’ truths without any naturalistic worries. 
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1. Non-Substantive and Substantive Propositions 
I will begin by considering the concept of a non-substantive proposition. This will facilitate an 
evaluation of whether the Rossian principles are correctly regarded as substantive, i.e., an 
evaluation of P1 of the Understanding Objection. Although the issue of whether a true 
proposition is non-substantive or substantive would appear to be itself a substantive question, I 
suggest that a useful way into mapping the distinction would be to begin with a few 
supposedly
100
 paradigmatic ethical examples of these propositions: 
 
(a) All wrong actions are wrong actions. 
 
(b) Murder is wrongful killing. 
 
(c) If scenarios x and y are identical in all their non-ethical respects then scenarios 
x and y will be identical in all ethical respects.
101
 
 
The proposition expressed in sentence (a) is a logical truth of the form All F’s are F’s. 
Proposition (b) also seems to be reducible to a logical truth similar to (a) by substitution of the 
subject term for a synonymous expression (assuming that we take ‘murder’ to be synonymous 
with something like ‘wrongful killing,’ which would seem to be relatively non-controversial). 
In this sense, (b) is what some philosophers would refer to as Frege-analytic. However, 
proposition (c) - which is of course a rough characterisation of the supervenience relation of 
the ethical upon the non-ethical - seems to be a different case since it is not at all obvious how 
exactly it could be reduced to a logical truth. So, if propositions (a)-(c) are all non-substantive, 
it can’t be in virtue of their being reducible to truths of logic.  
 
Although I will not offer an analysis of the concept NON-SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITION I suggest 
that the following constitutes a rough
102
 necessary condition on what it takes to fall under this 
concept: 
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   The precise nature of this distinction is not an object of unanimous agreement. Indeed many philosophers 
make use of the distinction without ever defining or characterizing it. 
101
   See Jackson, F., (1998), for the claim that the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical is a conceptual 
truth. 
102
   I claim that this is rough because it may not be immune to weird counter-examples that obtain in distant 
possible worlds, e.g., there may be a world where the belief that modus ponens is invalid does not constitute 
evidence that the subject in question fails to understand it. This might be because the society is based on 
dialetheist principles. Despite this, I think that my rough characterisation captures the redundant features of our 
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(1) If a proposition, p, is non-substantive, then a denial of p – or a failure to 
manifest belief that p – by an agent, S, constitutes either prima facie or 
conclusive evidence that S fails to grasp p (or fails to understand a sentence, T, 
expressing the proposition p). 
 
The first thing to note about (1), is that it is reasonably permissive
103
 since it allows that 
someone can deny a non-substantive proposition without that constituting conclusive evidence 
that they have failed to understand it. This seems appropriate given the sorts of arguments that 
Williamson (2007) presents to the effect that competent users of concepts can 
comprehendingly deny what appear to be luminously analytic and, presumably, non-
substantive propositions. Note also that the notion of evidence is being tied to the notion of a 
competent user of concept, i.e., a denial of a non-substantive proposition, p, by agent, S, will 
constitute conclusive/non-conclusive evidence to a competent user of the concepts in p, U, that 
S fails to understand p. Notice also that, although a permissive condition allows for genuine 
(as opposed to merely verbal) disagreement over non-substantive propositions, there may be 
some non-substantive propositions for which genuine disagreement is not possible, i.e., the 
ones for which denial by an S constitutes conclusive evidence that S fails to grasp p.  
 
In addition to (1), I think it is plausible to suggest that another (rough) necessary condition on 
a proposition’s being non-substantive is the following: 
 
(2) If a proposition¸ p, is non-substantive, then, ceteris paribus, grasping p (or 
understanding a sentence, T, which expresses p), puts one in a position to 
recognise that p is true. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
concept of NON-SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITION, even if it isn’t precisely correct. To put this point another 
way, my aim here is to merely characterise this concept here; talking in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions does, however, aid clarity of argument. Thanks to Gareth Young for valuable and helpful discussions 
on this topic. 
103
  Note the following from Phillip Pettit (2003) ‘if a proposition is such that just to count to as a proper 
participant in the discourse in question, just to count as someone who understands what is going on, you must 
accept the proposition or you reject it, then it is non-substantive.’ p. 423 Note that this appears to be a sufficient 
condition for a proposition’s being non-substantive. To my mind this isn’t very plausible since it seems to count 
as non-substantive, propositions such as the grass is green, which seem to be trivial but substantive.  
 45 
Note here that the term in a position to is supposed to denote a cognitive standing of the agent 
such that they needn’t engage in inferential processes or consider other propositions in order to 
be able to recognise the truth of the proposition in question, i.e., it is not supposed to pick out 
a cognitive standing whereby the agent may need to undergo some sort of capacious cognitive 
process of open-ended character and duration in order to recognise truth. One way to fill this 
claim out would be to say that in the case of non-substantive propositions, one’s understanding 
performs all the intellectual work required to discern its truth-value, such that a recognition of 
their truth can be said to fall-out of having that understanding. The ceteris paribus clause is 
included to accommodate cases where an individual, S, has adopted a theory which calls for 
the rejection of p such that it is no longer psychologically accurate to say that S is in a position 
to recognize the truth of p, e.g., a logician who rejects the validity of modus ponens due to 
their holding some coherent philosophical theory.  
 
I take (1) and (2) to be plausible rough necessary conditions on non-substantivity. In what 
follows, I would like to briefly consider two additional features which might be thought to be 
associated with the concept, but which I do not want to commit myself to.  
 
Someone might think that what unites our putative paradigms of non-substantive propositions 
(a)-(c), is that they don’t really tell us anything about the content of moral requirements 
(perhaps, less helpfully, they don’t tell us anything about the substance of morality). Even if it 
seems that (a) and (b) are in some sense about the content of morality it would be tempting 
here to say that, for someone who understands them, they fail to reveal anything informative 
about it, in the sense that acceptance is just part and parcel of possessing the concepts and 
being a participant in the discourse. To use the terminology employed by some philosophers, 
non-substantive propositions might be regarded as the platitudes surrounding a particular 
concept.
104
 Given this, we might think that the following constitutes an additional necessary 
condition on non-substantivity: 
 
(3) If a proposition, p, is non-substantive, then its truth is platitudinous or 
uninformative to those who grasp p (or understand a sentence, T, expressing p). 
 
                                                 
104
  See Smith, (1994) Ch. 2 and Miller, (2003), Ch.2 for something like this view.  
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Although I find this plausible for a great many cases, (3) is probably too strong given the 
possibility that a competent user of a concept might come to find the truth of an ostensibly 
non-substantive proposition in which that concept figures surprising or informative, e.g. we 
could imagine this being the case for proposition (c). I think this is possible despite the fact 
that such a truth may in fact be trivial.  
 
Following from this, perhaps something like this is a more plausible necessary condition: 
 
(4) If a proposition, p, is non-substantive then either it is not made true by features 
of the world (where the ‘world’ picks out something like the mind-independent 
world), or, if p does place constraints on the world, it is a trivial or trifling truth.  
 
The thought lying behind the first disjunct of the consequent in (4) is that non-substantive 
propositions are made true by features of our meanings and ideas, and don’t hinge on reality. 
Now it is of course a substantive matter whether there could indeed be any proposition which 
owes its truth-value to anything but the world (including necessary propositions). Suppose that 
Quine was correct in rejecting this view. Perhaps, then, the second disjunct holds in the case of 
non-substantive propositions, i.e., if knowledge of the non-substantive is in some sense 
knowledge of the world (as opposed to, say, knowledge of the relations between ideas) then it 
is knowledge of trivial propositions.
105
 The reader might think that a problem with this 
characterisation is that it is not wholly obvious what exactly counts as a trivial truth; one 
suggestion would be that if an ethical truth is trivial then it doesn’t require substantive moral 
thinking (more on this below) in order to determine its truth-value and isn’t in any appropriate 
sense explanatory.   
 
This concludes my account of some rough necessary conditions for falling under the concept 
NON-SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITION. As stated, (1) and (2) constitute what I take to be essential 
features of our concept of non-substantivity, whereas I am less committed to (4) and think that 
(3) is probably false. Given my commitment to (1) and (2), on my account the following 
constitute rough sufficient conditions for a propositions’ being substantive: 
 
                                                 
105
   This is not to be confused with view attributed to David Lewis that our knowledge of necessary truths is 
trivial, i.e. everyone has knowledge of necessary truths without any epistemic activity. 
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(5) If the denial of a proposition, p, – or a failure to manifest belief that p – by an 
agent, S, does not constitute either prima facie or conclusive evidence that S 
fails to grasp p (or fails to understand a sentence, T, expressing the proposition 
p), then p is a substantive proposition. 
 
(6) If grasping a proposition, p, (or understanding a sentence, T, which expresses 
p), does not, ceteris paribus, put one in a position to recognize that p is true, 
then p is a substantive proposition. 
 
Are these plausible sufficient conditions for a proposition to fall under the concept 
SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITION? To see how they are, consider the following which I take to be 
paradigm examples of substantive ethical propositions (and supposing for the sake of 
argument that they are true): 
 
(d) It would be prima facie wrong to push a fat man onto a train track in order to 
block a runaway trolley, even if this would prevent the death of five innocent 
individuals. 
 
(e) It is prima facie morally wrong to deliberately kill a human foetus.106 
 
Plausibly, having a grasp of propositions (d) and (e) is compatible with assenting to, 
withholding belief or disbelieving them, i.e., we wouldn’t accuse someone of evincing some 
sort of conceptual failing if they failed to adopt a particular propositional attitude towards 
them – even given time to reflect. Indeed, we need not take disbelief in (d) or (e) as even 
prima facie evidence that the individual in question fails to grasp them. In addition to this I 
take it that it is uncontroversial that genuine disagreement can be had with respect to these 
propositions, e.g., consider the protracted philosophical debates between utilitarians and 
deontologists, or between those opposed on the matter of abortion. Given all of this, 
                                                 
106
   Bedke (2008) considers the example torturing infants for fun is wrong and asks whether we ought to regard 
this as a substantive or non-substantive proposition. He claims that perhaps we wouldn’t and shouldn’t regard 
someone who denies this as conceptually confused, but we do better to think of them as being morally corrupt. 
Given my characteristation, it is unclear whether this proposition (and others like it) meet any of the sufficient 
conditions for substantivity. Although this lack of clarity might be regarded as a vice, I take it to be a virtue of my 
account that it remains agnostic on difficult borderline cases like the ones in question. 
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propositions (d) and (e) meet a sufficient condition for falling under the concept SUBSTANTIVE 
PROPOSITION (see sufficient condition (5)), which is just the result we were looking for. 
 
What, then of the relation between understanding and being in a position to discern truth-
value? Do propositions (d) and (e) meet sufficient condition (6) for substantivity? In contrast 
to (a)-(c) it appears that merely grasping the propositions expressed in (d) and (e), does not – 
by itself - place one in a position to see that they are true (again, supposing for the sake of 
argument that they are true), i.e., an agent could grasp (d) without having any idea as to its 
truth-value. Although a grasp of the concepts of (d) might plausibly confer justification for 
belief about what (d) means, it seems that something more is required in order to be in a 
position to discern their truth-value (as opposed to merely plumping for an answer).
107
 
Väyrynen (2008) refers to this something more as ‘substantive ethical thought’. However, by 
itself, this suggestion isn’t terribly helpful – we will want to know more about the nature of the 
thought which is apparently required to discern substantive ethical truths/falsehoods. 
Whatever its nature, presumably the idea is that ‘substantive thought’ is quite different from 
what we might call comprehensional thought (the sort of thought involved in grasping the 
meaning of something), and that it is hard to see how comprehension could be sufficient for 
being in a position to discern the truth-value of (d) – in a sense, we might think that grasping 
(d) is just the beginning of the process of evaluating its truth-value. So again, it seems that 
proposition (d) and (e) meet another sufficient condition for substantivity. 
 
Before proceeding, can we say anything about what substantive thought might be and how it 
might differ from its comprehensional cousin? In order to get a grip on this difficult issue, it 
might be helpful to start with an illustrative non-ethical case: consider the non-substantive 
proposition that all bachelors are eligible unmarried males. Presumably one is in a position to 
know whether this is true simply on the basis of grasping the respective concepts. Now 
consider a similar, but nonetheless substantive, proposition: all bachelors are eligible harried 
males. It seems that simply grasping this proposition doesn’t put someone in a position to see 
whether or not it is true (aside from harbouring doubts about making strict generalisations 
about potentially heterogeneous groups). Presumably in this case, one would have to do some 
empirical investigation and observation to find out whether it is in fact the case that bachelors 
                                                 
107
   Put another way: if understanding were all that was needed to recognise the truth of (d) and (e) then it seems 
hard to reconcile this with the ethical deliberation that we would expect to accompany a consideration of it. 
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happen to be harassed individuals. Now, regarding the case of substantive ethical propositions, 
I suspect that Väyrynen has something like the following in mind: that substantive ethical 
thought fulfils the same sort of functional role as empirical investigation in the non-ethical 
case described. There is of course an obvious disanalogy between the two: unlike the case of 
establishing the truth of all bachelors are eligible harried males, some might argue that in 
order to engage in substantive ethical thought one need not leave the confines of the armchair. 
Nevertheless, I take it that the idea here is that some sort of cognitive activity over-and-above 
mere comprehension of meaning is plausibly required in order to justifiably believe ethical 
propositions like (d), for much the same reason as empirical investigation over-and-above 
understanding is required in the case of substantive non-ethical claims of the sort discussed. 
 
Before concluding this section I think it is worth briefly noting that the following could 
constitute a further sufficient condition for substantivity: 
 
(7) If a proposition, p, is made true by features of the world (where the ‘world’ 
picks out something like the mind-independent world) and is non-trivially true, 
then p is a substantive proposition.  
 
It seems that paradigmatic substantive ethical propositions like (d) and (e) meet this further 
condition too. For instance, there is a sense in which the truth of these claims (assuming of 
course that they are indeed truth-apt) is something which is not the product of linguistic or 
conventional stipulation, and are dependent on features of ‘the world’ in some stronger sense. 
A possible problem with (7) is determining just what is meant by a truth being non-trivial. To 
repeat an earlier suggestion: we might think that a non-trivial truth is one which requires 
substantive thought or non-comprehensional epistemic activity in order to determine its truth-
value. Also, at level of general principles, we might think that non-trivial principles are those 
which purport to be explanatory. Given all this, according to my account, propositions (d) and 
(e) meet all three sufficient conditions for substantivity. Note again, however, that I am only 
committed to the truth of (5) and (6) as sufficient conditions for falling under the concept 
SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITION. Indeed, from here on in I will be focusing on the necessary 
conditions (1) and (2) and the sufficient conditions (5) and (6). The reader is invited to keep 
the rest in mind. 
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Now that I have summarised what I take to be some plausible necessary conditions on non-
substantivity and some sufficient conditions for a propositions’ being substantive, I would like 
to apply this account to the case of the Rossian principles, to see whether a priori ethical 
intuitionists are in fact committed to P1 of the Understanding Objection. As I shall suggest, 
although their status is not exactly obvious (they appear to be somewhat less substantive than 
paradigmatic substantive ethical propositions (d) and (e)), under the most plausible 
interpretation of what an adequate understanding of a Rossian principle should involve, they 
come out as substantive on my characterization. Hence P1 is most likely true. 
 
2. The Rossian Principles, Substantivity and the Understanding Objection 
Consider the following example of a Rossian principle: 
 
(f) There is always an ineradicable but overridable moral reason to keep one’s promises. 
 
A glance at the literature on ethical intuitionism reveals that prominent a priori ethical 
intuitionists think that the Rossian principles are substantive: 
 
substantive propositions like Ross’s principles of prima facie duty can be 
candidates for a priori justification and even (as he claimed) self-evidence.
108
  
 
Given my characterisation in §1 of substantivity and non-substantivity, are ethical intuitionists 
correct in making this claim? Do the Rossian principles such as (1) meet either of the proposed 
sufficient conditions for substantivity? Let us consider (5) first: 
 
5) If the denial of a proposition, p, – or a failure to manifest belief that p – by an 
agent, S, neither constitutes prima facie nor conclusive evidence that S fails to 
grasp p (or fails to understand a sentence, T, expressing the proposition p). 
 
Does proposition (f) meet this sufficient condition? Certainly, it seems that, like propositions 
(d) and (e) and unlike propositions (a)-(c), denial of (f) by an agent, S, ought not to be taken as 
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    Audi, R., (1999), p. 223  
       Also, note that according to Crisp, Henry Sidgwick also regarded his fundamental principles as ‘synthetic a 
priori truths – that is, substantive truths, that can be known merely by the proper understanding of them.’ See 
Crisp (2002), p. 59 
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conclusive evidence that the S fails to grasp (f). Indeed, as was shown earlier, contemporary a 
priori ethical intuitionists appear relaxed about allowing that an adequate understanding of (f) 
is compatible with denial of its truth, particularly if the subject in question is committed to a 
theory calling for the rejection of (f). Also, I take it that the debate between the Rossian and 
moral particularists who reject (f), is regarded by both parties as a genuine debate, and not 
merely a verbal disagreement.  
 
However, with respect to the idea that the denial of a Rossian principle like (f) by an S 
constitutes prima facie evidence that the S in question fails to grasp (f) things become a bit 
more complicated. The first significant point of note is that it might be the case that not all of 
the Rossian principles are of a piece. That is to say, some of the principles seem to be – for 
want of a better expression – intuitively less substantive than others. I have in mind here the 
following Rossian principle:  
 
(g) There is always an ineradicable but overridable reason to be just.109 
 
I can imagine someone arguing that a denial of (g) by an S does constitute prima facie 
evidence that they have failed to grasp the proposition expressed. Plausibly this has something 
to do with the fact that JUSTICE appears to be itself a normative concept, and hence we think 
that there is going to be a more intimate conceptual link between this concept and MORAL 
REASON. Hence, we might think that (g) would fail to meet one of my sufficient conditions for 
substantivity, (5), while at the same time fulfilling a necessary condition for non-substantivity, 
(1). If so, then its status as a substantive proposition is unclear. 
 
In addition to this, someone might make a similar claim about the following Rossian principle: 
 
(h) There is always an ineradicable but overridable reason to refrain from acts of injury. 
 
Indeed, with respect to (h), Robert Audi (1997) appears to suggest something like this 
(although note that nowhere does Audi explicitly subscribe to anything like the necessary and 
sufficient conditions I have set out): 
 
                                                 
109
   More specifically: we have a duty to prevent (or overturn) a distribution of benefits and burdens which is not 
in accordance with the merit of the persons concerned.  
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 Keeping in mind what constitutes a prima facie duty, consider how we would 
regard some native speaker of English who denied that there is (say) a prima 
facie duty not to injure other people and – to get the right connection with what 
Ross meant by ‘duty’ – meant by this something implying it would not be even 
prima facie wrong. Our first thought is that there is a misunderstanding of some 
key term, such as ‘prima facie’.110 
 
Now it may be the case that Audi chose this particular Rossian principle for a reason; namely, 
that it seems particularly plausible that there is always a moral reason to refrain from acts of 
injury. However, we might also interpret Audi as wanting to make a similar point with regard 
to all of the Rossian principles, i.e. that denial of any of the Rossian principles constitutes 
prima facie evidence that the S in question fails to understand them. So Audi might be 
interpreted as wanting to make the same point about the Rossian promissory principle (f) and 
the following: 
 
(i) There is always an ineradicable but overridable reason to be beneficent. 
 
(j) There is always an ineradicable but overridable reason to express gratitude. 
 
(k) There is always an ineradicable but overridable reason to improve oneself. 
 
This point might be brought into more focus if we think of the Rossian principles (f)-(k) as 
mid-level principles upon which there is significant consensus in philosophical ethics. 
Significant and substantive ethical disagreement could perhaps be characterized as being about 
how to capture and explain these mid-level principles in an over-arching general theory.
111
  
 
Of course, there is some disagreement regarding the Rossian principles. Moral particularists, 
for example, will deny that moral reasons, as such, are univalent in the way that Ross and 
Audi claim. Is it implausible to say that the moral particularist’s denial of a Rossian principle 
constitutes prima facie evidence that they fail to understand it? I must confess that I am not 
                                                 
110
    From his (1997), p. 57  Note that in more recent work (2004), (2008), Audi distinguishes between agreement 
in reasons and agreement on reasons. He thinks that theoretical dispute on reasons is quite reasonable, even if it is 
among individuals for whom there is agreement in reasons. I would suggest that in making this distinction Audi 
is possibly reining back from the claim expressed in this quotation. 
111
   I take this suggestion from a footnote in Crisp (2007).  
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sure what we ought to say about this issue. Let me say that I don’t think that it is obviously 
implausible to say this. Note that the claim here is that the denial of a Rossian principle by an 
S constitutes prima facie evidence that S fails to grasp the principle, i.e., there is an initial 
presumption of a failure of understanding which can be cancelled once further evidence about 
the reasons (presumably theoretical) for denial are brought to the fore.
112
 Despite this, I can 
imagine someone claiming that it is simply not true that denying the Rossian principles 
constitutes any evidence that the S in question fails to understand them. One reason why 
someone might think this is that the principles are not obviously conceptual or analytic truths, 
and hence we might wonder why a lack of belief should be necessarily connected in some way 
to evidence of comprehensional failure. Another, more significant reason, is that an adequate 
understanding may in fact involve something more robust than a mere grasp of meaning, i.e., 
more than a grasp of meaning is required in order to see that they are true, and hence it is not 
clear why failing to believe a Rossian principle should constitute prima facie evidence that the 
subject doesn’t grasp its meaning. 
 
In order to see this point in more detail, it is important that we consider the other sufficiency 
condition for substantivity: 
 
(6) If grasping a proposition, p, (or understanding a sentence, T, which expresses 
p), does not, ceteris paribus, put one in a position to recognize that p is true, 
then p is a substantive proposition. 
 
Do the Rossian principles meet this sufficiency condition? An overview of the contemporary 
intuitionist literature reveals that there is some lack of clarity on this. I think this probably 
stems from a more general lack of specificity amongst intuitionists as to (i) what adequate 
understanding involves and how this relates to what might be termed grasp of meaning, and, 
(ii) whether reflection is required over-and-above adequate understanding in order to discern 
truth. Let me explain these points. If it turned out that adequate understanding amounts to 
simply grasping the meaning of the principle in question, then ethical intuitionists might have 
in mind the following thought: the Rossian principles are complex propositions, i.e., the 
concepts of PRIMA FACIE, DEFEASIBILITY, PROMISE etc are not easy concepts to grasp. This is 
                                                 
112
   Note that the claim could be contextualized such that it only applies to individuals who are not engaged in 
philosophical ethics, i.e., out-with philosophical ethics, if someone denies a Rossian principle this constitutes 
prima facie evidence that they have failed to grasp it. However, I can imagine someone denying this point too. 
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why reflection is required to see what they mean, and hence to see that they are true. On this 
first view, it would seem that the principles fail to meet the sufficient condition for 
substantivity expressed in (6). Alternatively, ethical intuitionists might be claiming that 
reflection is required in addition to an adequate understanding (construed as grasp of meaning) 
in order to see that they are true. On this second view, they would appear to meet the 
sufficiency condition (6). If, however, adequate understanding is supposed to amount to 
something more robust than grasp of meaning, then ethical intuitionists might have the 
following alternative picture in mind: the meaning of the Rossian principles can be grasped 
with some reflection, but in addition to this, some reflection – perhaps involving a deepening 
of understanding - is required in order to attain an adequate understanding and to see their 
truth. On this third interpretation, it would again seem that the Rossian principles do meet the 
sufficiency condition for substantivity.  
 
Although there is some textual evidence for thinking that the first option is correct
113
, I think 
that, on balance, we have good reason to think that one of the latter two interpretations is what 
ethical intuitionists are committed to. Furthermore, I think that they ought to hold this view. 
Consider the interpretative point first; the first reason for thinking this is due to the strong 
emphasis ethical intuitionists place on reflection on mediately self-evident propositions (of 
which the Rossian principles are examples) in order to see that they are true. Also, the 
following quotation from Audi suggests that we should think of the role of reflection as 
attaining an adequate understanding: 
 
[mediately self-evident propositions are] those (adequately) understood by 
them [rational agents] only through reflection on them, say on concrete 
instances that help bring out their content.
114
 
 
Furthermore, and significantly, I think that the sort of reflection ethical intuitionists have in 
mind is of the sort which outstrips the attainment of what might be called a grasp of meaning 
(note that this is compatible with saying that some reflection might be required in order to 
attain a mere grasp of meaning). Consider the following remarks from Klemmens Kappel 
(2002): 
                                                 
113
       Evidence for something like this interpretation can be found in Audi’s (2004), p. 51 Something like this 
view can also be found in Hooker (2002). 
114
        Audi, R. (1999), p. 214 
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mediately self-evident propositions are those that although one may be able to 
understand them immediately, they can only be justifiably accepted as true 
after some reflection. One can be justified in accepting them as true only after 
some thinking about the matter.
115
 
 
Note also the following from Robert Audi (2008) on the nature of adequate understanding: ‘a 
central point here is that adequacy of understanding goes beyond basic semantic 
comprehension’116. And, 
 
I should add here that we might also speak of full understanding to avoid the 
suggestion that adequacy implies sufficiency only for some purpose. Neither 
term is ideal, but ‘full’ may suggest maximality, which is also inappropriate.117  
 
Given all of this, I think we have reason to think that ethical intuitionists are committed to the 
claim that merely grasping the meaning of some or all of the Rossian principles does not put 
one in a position to see that they are true, ceteris paribus. Given this, and on my account of the 
substantive/non-substantive distinction, they fulfill a sufficient condition for substantivity. As 
stated, in addition to this, I think that there are very good reasons for thinking that a more 
robust conception of adequate understanding is required in order to be in a position to see that 
a Rossian principle is true
118
; for one, it simply seems intuitively plausible that more than a 
grasp of meaning is required in order to see that the Rossian principles are true. One could 
imagine individuals who understand a sentence expressing a Rossian principle without having 
any idea as to the truth-value of the proposition expressed by it. For example, it seems possible 
that someone could understand what a Rossian principle means without having had any moral 
experience, i.e., one might have a purely theoretical understanding of what, e.g., promising is, 
what a moral reason is etc. In this sort of case, it is far from obvious that the individual would 
be in a position to see that the principle is true. Secondly, it is not at all obvious that the 
Rossian principles are analytic or conceptual truths, and hence it seems plausible that in order 
to see that they are true, this will require more than mere conceptual competency. 
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         (2002), p. 394 
116
        Audi, (2008), p. 488 
117
        Audi, (2008), footnote, p. 478 
118
      Perhaps with the exception of the Rossian justice principle (g). Admittedly, I am not entirely sure what to 
say about this example. 
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Furthermore, even if they are conceptual truths of some sort, the apparently unobvious nature 
of their truth sits uncomfortably with the thought that simply understanding them puts one in a 
position to see that they are true. Thus I think we have excellent reasons for thinking that P1 of 
the Understanding Objection is true. 
 
Before proceeding, consider briefly the other sufficient condition for substantivity suggested: 
 
(7) If a proposition, p, is made true by features of the world (where the ‘world’ 
picks out something like the mind-independent world) and is non-trivially true, 
then p is a substantive proposition.  
 
Given the previous interpretation of the relationship between adequate understanding and 
grasp of meaning, it seems to me that the Rossian principles are likely to fulfill the conditions 
in (7). There are of course ambiguities as to what exactly constitutes a non-trivial truth, but it 
seems right to say that a truth which requires reflection over-and-above mere understanding is 
non-trivial. Also, it seems correct to say that the Rossian principles are in some sense 
explanatory, i.e. they purport to explain and justify our everyday moral practice. Again, this 
might lead us to want to say that the Rossian principles are non-trivial and hence, according to 
(7), substantive. 
 
I will proceed on the assumption that the Rossian principles are in fact substantive whilst 
noting that substantivity might come in degrees, i.e., it seems correct to say that the Rossian 
principles are perhaps less substantive than propositions (d) and (e). Given that P1 of the 
Understanding Objection is therefore true, ethical intuitionists will have to reject P2 or P3 in 
order to avoid its conclusion. In the following section I will consider whether they can 
plausibly deny the supposed link between the substantive and the synthetic. In what follows I 
will briefly consider and reject the proposal that the Rossian principles could constitute 
substantive epistemically-analytic truths. However, I will then go on to suggest that they could 
constitute examples of substantive Kantian-analytic truths, even if they assume a robust 
conception of adequate understanding (a concept which I will fully explicate in §4). 
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3. The Rossian Principles, Analyticity and the Understanding Objection 
In this section I will consider whether it is plausible to regard the Rossian principles as 
substantive and analytic. This of course involves going against the grain of tradition, since 
ethical intuitionists have tended to assume that the Rossian principles are synthetic, e.g., 
 
what empiricists will find objectionable about the idea of self-evident moral 
propositions… is not the very idea of a self-evident proposition, but the idea 
that the sort of propositions intuitionists defend (synthetic ones) can be self-
evident.
119
 
 
However, in the current philosophical climate there is apparently a cloud hanging over the 
claim that substantive and synthetic truths could be self-evident.
120
 Hence, in order to defend 
the claim that the Rossian principles are self-evident, ethical intuitionists might be well-
advised to explore the possibility that they could be substantive and analytic, thus denying P2 
of the Understanding Objection. I will briefly discuss and reject the idea that they could 
constitute examples of substantive epistemically-analytic truths before going on to suggest that 
they could constitute substantive Kantian-analytic truths.  
 
To begin, consider the best-known contemporary account of analyticity; the epistemic 
conception. For proponents of epistemic-analyticity, e.g., Paul Boghossian, a statement is 
analytic just provided that ‘grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its 
truth’121. Hopefully one can see the obvious surface similarities between this account, and how 
intuitionists characterise self-evidence in SE. If it were the case that what ethical intuitionists 
meant by adequate understanding was the same as what proponents of epistemic-analyticity 
mean by grasp of meaning, then self-evidence and epistemic-analyticity would be effectively 
equivalent. However, when we consider epistemic-analyticity, we might think that the 
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  Stratton-Lake, (2002), Introduction, p. 19 
       Also note the following from G.E. Moore (note, however, that Moore is not discussing the Rossian 
principles):‘such propositions are all of them, in Kant’s phrase, “synthetic”: they all must rest in the end upon 
some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected… This result may be otherwise expressed by saying 
that the fundamental principles of Ethics must be self-evident.’ Principia Ethica, p.  143 
      120      Admittedly, I am not completely sure about this claim.  
121
     Boghossian, P.A., (1996), p. 363 
 Note that the epistemic conception of analyticity has come in for heavy philosophical criticism in recent years, 
e.g. see Jenkins (2008) and Bonjour (1998). Also, on one interpretation of epistemic-analyticity and the 
associated concept of implicit definition, (Jenkins (2008), justified belief in an epistemically-analytic truth will be 
inferential. So even if it were somehow able to be shown that the Rossian principles were epistemically-analytic, 
intuitionists would face these problems in providing a satisfactory defense of their epistemological claims.  
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explanation for why grasping the meaning of an epistemically-analytic truth suffices for 
justified belief, is that grasping its meaning puts one in a position to see that it is true. In other 
words, it seems that the following might constitute a plausible necessary condition for 
epistemic-analyticity: 
 
(8) If a statement, T, is epistemically-analytic, then, ceteris paribus, understanding 
T (or grasping the proposition, p, expressed by T) puts one in a position to 
recognize that the p expressed by T is true, ceteris paribus. 
 
If this is a plausible condition, then it seems that the Rossian principles will fail to meet a 
necessary condition for falling under the concept EPISTEMICALLY-ANALYTIC TRUTH. This is 
because it was argued in the previous section that more than a grasp of meaning is required in 
order to see their truth. Hence, under this conception and my characterisation of substantivity, 
they could not be substantive and epistemically-analytic. As a brief aside, despite claiming that 
the Rossian principles fail to meet a necessary condition for epistemic-analyticity, it is worth 
noting that my account of substantivity and non-substantivity does not rule out the possibility 
of substantive epistemically-analytic truths. How? Recall that conditions (5) and (6) are only 
sufficient conditions for substantivity. It just so happens that fulfilling these sufficient 
conditions disqualifies a proposition from getting to be epistemically-analytic. This seems to 
be the case for the Rossian principles under the current interpretation. However, there could be 
other sufficient conditions for substantivity which are compatible with the necessary 
conditions I have laid down for epistemic-analyticity. Hence, on my view there could be 
substantive epistemically-analytic truths.  
 
I would now like to consider the possibility that the Rossian principles could be substantive 
Kantian-analytic propositions (denying P2 of the Understanding Objection). The Kantian 
conception of analyticity (so-called due to its originating with Kant in the Critique of Pure 
Reason) classes a proposition
122
 as analytic just in case the predicate concept of the 
proposition is contained in the subject concept. To illustrate by way of a hackneyed example: 
the proposition that all bachelors are eligible unmarried men is said to be analytic on the 
Kantian view because the concept BACHELOR in some sense ‘contains’ the concepts 
UNMARRIED and MALE and ELIGIBLE. A proposition is synthetic, just in case the predicate 
                                                 
122
   Strictly-speaking, Kant refers to analytic judgments. 
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concept lies outside the subject concept. This is apparently the case for the following example: 
all bodies are heavy. The idea here is that having a thought of BODY doesn’t entail having a 
thought of HEAVINESS. Instead, what is required is some sort of synthesis or ‘putting together’ 
of the concepts. In delineating the crucial idea of ‘containment’ of concepts, Kant said the 
following: ‘I need only to analyze the concept, i.e. become conscious of the manifold that I 
always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein’123. 
 
Elsewhere Kant claimed that we can understand the notion of conceptual containment in terms 
of contradiction, i.e. it would be contradictory to deny that the predicate ‘belongs’ to the 
subject. Although these two ideas, containment and contradiction, do not appear to be 
identical (i.e., denying a logical consequence of an analytic proposition is contradictory, but 
surely this is not what is meant by containment), it seems that if a concept, C1, is contained 
within another concept, C, then denying a proposition which directly links these concepts, e.g. 
all C’s are C1’s, will be contradictory.124  
 
As was suggested in the introductory section of the chapter, the traditional view of the Rossian 
principles is that they are synthetic propositions, which along Kantian lines would entail that 
there is no containment relation between the constituent concepts. However, Robert Audi 
(2008) has recently presented a view whereby the concepts constitutive of the Rossian 
principles exhibit the sort of containment relation just described, despite the possibility that no 
full analysis of MORAL REASON may be possible. So, to illustrate; the concept of MORAL 
REASON is said to contain (among other concepts), the concept of BEING THE KEEPING OF A 
PROMISE. Audi’s thought appears to be that the latter concept grounds the applicability of the 
concept MORAL REASON.
125
 Now, although Audi doesn’t speak as if the Rossian principles are 
analytic, it seems that thinking of the concepts in the Rossian obligations as exhibiting a 
containment relation, does commit Audi to the view that the Rossian principles are not 
synthetic, since synthetic propositions are defined as those for which there is no such 
containment relation. If they are not synthetic, then it seems reasonable to regard them as a 
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   Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, quoted indirectly from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry 
on ‘The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.’ 
       http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ Last accessed, 14/04/11. 
124
   There are well-known difficulties with the Kantian conception of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Apart 
from its apparently being overly psychologistic, one other major difficulty is its apparent inability to deal with 
paradigm cases of the analytic, e.g. ‘If Gareth is taller than Ross, and Ross is taller than John, then Gareth is taller 
than John,’ where no such containment metaphor seems applicable. My use of the Kantian conception here is to 
facilitate a discussion of construing the Rossian principles, roughly, as conceptual truths.  
125
     See Audi, (2008), p. 479 
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special type of analytic proposition, or so I will assume. Hence, it seems appropriate to discuss 
Audi’s view in the context of a discussion about the prospects for construing the Rossian 
principles as substantive analytic self-evident truths (Hereafter I will refer to Audi’s view as 
the Kantian-analytic view, whilst acknowledging the subtleties of the account). 
 
Assuming the current interpretation of the Rossian principles, i.e., as meeting particular 
sufficient conditions for substantivity, could they constitute substantive Kantian-analytic 
truths? Initially, someone might think not because they hold the following necessary 
conditions for falling under the concept KANTIAN-ANALYTIC TRUTH: 
 
(9) If a proposition, p, is Kantian-analytic, then if an agent, S, fails to believe p, this 
constitutes either prima facie or conclusive evidence that S fails to grasp p. 
 
(10) If a proposition, p, is Kantian-analytic, then grasping p will one in a position to 
recognize that the p expressed by T is true, ceteris paribus. 
 
If (9) and (10) were indeed necessary conditions on Kantian-analyticity, then it would appear 
that the Rossian principles would straightforwardly fail to meet them. However, I think that 
we might reasonably doubt whether (9) and (10) really are correct. Instead, I think that it is 
reasonable to claim that whether a concept, C1, is contained within another concept, C, is a 
fact about those concepts that may be opaque to competent users of the concepts, and, is 
compatible with the idea that the truth of a Kantian-analytic proposition in which C and C1 
figure need not be obvious. If the truth of a Kantian-analytic proposition is unobvious even to 
those who understand it, then plausibly neither (9) nor (10) are correct necessary conditions. 
Given this, we might think that there is not necessarily a conceptual tension in the idea of a 
proposition fulfilling certain sufficient conditions for substantivity, whilst being Kantian-
analytic. 
 
What more can be said about such an account? Someone might argue that for certain Kantian-
analytic propositions (the substantive ones), coming to see that a proposition is true is 
something which requires a deeper understanding than what has been referred to thus far as a 
grasp of meaning. Indeed, one might think that, in the case of putative examples of self-
evident Kantian-analytic substantive propositions, adequate understanding denotes something 
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over-and-above grasp of meaning, i.e. a more robust comprehension is required in order to 
ground justification. If a deeper understanding or conceptual reflection is required in order to 
discern truth then the possibility opens up that there could be a true proposition, p, such that (i) 
denial of p is not prima facie evidence that one does not understand p, (ii) understanding p 
does not, ceteris paribus, put one in a position to recognize that p is true, and, (iii) there is a 
containment relation between the concepts, C and C1, which partially constitute p. Under my 
characterisation, such propositions would be examples of substantive Kantian-analytic 
propositions. 
 
As argued in the previous section, I think that given what Audi and other intuitionists say 
about adequate understanding, there is good reason for thinking that adequate understanding 
involves something more robust than a mere grasp of meaning, i.e. something akin to a deeper 
understanding which can only be attained by conceptual reflection. Also, as was suggested in 
§2, it seems that they ought to hold something like this view. In addition, it is not only ethical 
a priori intuitionists who have appealed to deeper understanding in providing an account of a 
priori knowledge. Consider the following from Christopher Peacocke (2005) (who is not an 
ethical intuitionist): 
 
sometimes a priori knowledge is hard to attain. Attaining it may require deep 
reflection on concepts in the proposition known. But deeper reflection, when 
successful, seems always to involve deeper understanding, rather than anything 
extraneous to understanding.
126
  
 
So the thought appears to be that by reflecting on the proposition we deepen our understanding 
of the proposition and thereby come to see that it is true.
127
 Assuming something like this 
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      Peacocke, C., (2005), p. 751 
127
    Another way of thinking about the idea of deeper understanding might be to consider what Michael Smith 
(1994) says about concept possession and conceptual reflection. Smith thinks that the judgmental and inferential 
dispositions possessed by a competent user of a concept, C, can be summed up in a list of what he terms 
platitudes. So for the concept MORAL RIGHTNESS, a plausible list of the platitudes might include things like: 
rightness has a close connection with motivation and reasons for action, acts are right or wrong in virtue of their 
everyday non-moral features etc. On a similar account, such platitudes would constitute non-substantive 
propositions (note that due to the distinction between know how with respect to a concept and know that with 
respect to a platitude which is propositional, some reflection might be required to understand these propositions, 
even for a competent user of the concept). On Smith’s account it is the purpose of conceptual analysis to attempt 
to provide plausible summaries of the platitudes surround a particular concept. Such conceptual analyses might 
be unobvious to even competent users of the concept in question. In addition, I think we can add to this that even 
competent users who understand and believe the platitudes surrounding the concept might fail to be able to see 
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account, it seems open for a priori ethical intuitionists to claim that the Rossian principles are 
a species of substantive Kantian-analytic propositions. If deepening understanding involves 
something like substantive thought, e.g., by considering hypothetical applications of the 
principle, then it seems that ethical intuitionists can potentially provide a plausible account of 
how a proposition could be known via conceptual reflection but also be substantive. Hence, 
ethical intuitionists can reject P2 of the Understanding Objection. 
 
Let me end this section by briefly considering two related objections to this claim. In a recent 
paper
128
 M.S. Bedke (2010) has suggested that the Kantian-analytic account of the Rossian 
principles is not very plausible because it 
 
generates conceptually necessary truths when there are none… While some 
might think substantive ethical propositions like this [the Rossian principles] 
can be conceptually necessary truths, many doubt it.
129
  
 
By themselves, these remarks won’t count as an objection, lest we commit something like the 
fallacy of majority belief. That said, one might think that there is something odd – prima facie 
– about the notion of a substantive conceptually necessary truth. The reason for this is that we 
might think that conceptually necessary truths are the sorts of truths that can be known on the 
basis of grasping their meaning, and are perhaps in some sense trivial. Given this, they would 
appear to fail to fulfill some sufficient conditions for substantivity (while fulfilling some 
necessary conditions for non-substantivity). However, in response to this problem I would say 
the following on behalf of the ethical intuitionist: firstly, my plausible account of sufficiency 
conditions for substantivity does not generally rule out the existence of substantive analytic 
truths. If, as seems plausible, we think that analytic truths are conceptually necessary then my 
account also doesn’t rule out the existence of substantive conceptually necessary truths. 
Secondly, if the Rossian principles are substantive, they perhaps aren’t as substantive as 
                                                                                                                                                         
the truth of successful conceptual analyses of the given concept since a summary of such platitudes might not be 
obviously true. Indeed, one might think that one will require something like a deeper understanding than a mere 
grasp of meaning in order to see that a successful conceptual analysis is true. On the account at issue, then, 
conceptual analyses of platitudes could be examples of substantive Kantian-analytic propositions (noting of 
course that we are ultimately interested in the special attenuated version of this), i.e. propositions which exhibit a 
containment relation but for which understanding does not put one in a position to see that it is true, and disbelief 
does not constitute evidence of lacking a grasp of meaning. 
128
       Bedke, M.S., (2010) 
129
       Ibid., p. 1072 
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paradigm substantive propositions such as (d) and (e). Hence perhaps the idea that they are 
substantive conceptually necessary truths is not so far-fetched after-all. 
 
Despite there being responses to the objection that substantive conceptually necessary truths 
are odd, there are further oddities thrown up by this view. A peculiar implication of the idea 
that the Rossian principles are Kantian-analytic truths is that those who deny them must be in 
some sense guilty of evincing a conceptual failing.
 
So a moral particularist like Jonathan 
Dancy is not only evincing a theoretical error when he denies that moral reasons, e.g., the 
moral reason to avoid causing injury, are univalent, but is in fact evincing a conceptual error. 
Indeed, if we think that containment relations between concepts are sufficient to ground 
contradictions, then to deny that promise-keeping is always sufficient to ground an 
ineradicable but overridable moral reason, is contradictory. This might seem like a heavy-
handed claim to make. Furthermore, thinking of the Rossian principles as substantive and 
Kantian-analytic threatens to misdiagnose the nature of the debate between Rossians and anti-
Rossians: although it doesn’t entail that the interlocutors are talking past one another, or that 
anti-Rossians lack an understanding of the propositions, it does entail that what is at stake in 
the debate is the very nature of the concept MORAL REASON, and not a substantive theoretical 
dispute between those who are broadly agreed upon conceptual matters. Although this doesn’t 
constitute anything like a knock-down blow against the position, in order to make this position 
plausible ethical intuitionists will have to say more about how precisely they understand 
ethical disagreement over the principles given the claim that they are Kantian-analytic 
truths.
130
  
 
Assume, then, that the ethical intuitionist can deny P2 of the Understanding Objection. Despite 
being able to deny its soundness, I think that ethical intuitionists face an amended 
Understanding Objection (Understanding*) which can be expressed in the following 
argument: 
 
P1: In order to see that the Rossian principles are true, a robust adequate 
understanding is required. 
                                                 
130
   Audi (2008) discusses disagreement (under the heading rational disagreement) but doesn’t address (i) the 
implication that, e.g. the moral particularist, is guilty of conceptual confusion, and (ii) how this is compatible 
with their having adequate understanding (Audi claims that they do have adequate understanding). 
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P2: If a robust adequate understanding of a proposition is required in order to 
see that it is true, then the claim that the proposition is self-evident is dubious. 
C: The claim that the Rossian principles are self-evident is dubious. 
 
I will argue in the following section, §4, that the account of adequate understanding/deeper 
understanding, which has so far only being gestured towards, is highly problematic vis-à-vis 
the claim for self-evidence, and that we have good reason to believe that the amended 
Understanding* is sound. Specifically, it will be shown that P2 of Understanding* is true. 
 
4. The Problems of ‘Robust’ Adequate Understanding 
In this section I will present some significant objections to the claim that the Rossian 
principles are self-evident. Specifically, I argue that given the relatively robust conception of 
adequate understanding that ethical intuitionists appear to be committed to, they are faced with 
the following dilemma: either it is doubtful whether knowledge of the Rossian principles 
could be anything other than inferential, or else, the account of adequate understanding 
offered by ethical intuitionists commits them to the implausible claim that all non-contingent 
ethical truths are self-evident.
131
 I will conclude that, in lieu of further argument, we have 
strong reason to doubt that the Rossian principles are non-inferentially knowable on the basis 
of adequate understanding as ethical intuitionists claim. 
 
The reader will have noticed that a lot of philosophical work was being done in the previous 
section by the notion of a deeper understanding, or a full understanding, i.e., a robust 
conception of adequate understanding. We will want to know more about what the process of 
attaining a deeper understanding actually amounts to and just how it is compatible with a 
proposition’s being self-evident. 
 
Generally-speaking, one plausible way in which we might make sense of the idea of a 
deepening of understanding of a Rossian principle, would be to claim that one comes to grasp 
the connections and relations between that proposition and others. Perhaps by attaining a 
deeper understanding, one comes to view the proposition in the context of the ‘big ethical 
picture’, according to which the Rossian principle is true. Although this won’t require that you 
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 I limit this to non-contingent propositions because it doesn’t seem that contingent propositions are plausibly 
candidates for self-evidence in the first place. See previous footnotes 8 and 28. 
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see all the connections and relations that obtain between the proposition and all the others, it 
seems that deepening understanding would involve something like seeing how the proposition 
fits into a wider propositional context. The idea that understanding is in some sense holistic 
can be found in the work of Jonathan Kvanvig (2009): 
 
To understand is to grasp the variety of such connections. It involves seeing 
explanatory connections, being aware of the probabilistic interrelationships, 
and apprehending the logical implications of the information in question.
132
  
 
Note also the following from Catherine Elgin (2007): 
 
understanding is primarily a cognitive relation to a fairly comprehensive, 
coherent body of information. The understanding encapsulated in individual 
propositions derives from an understanding of larger bodies of information that 
include those propositions.
133
  
 
The problem with this is that it is not clear how this conception of deepening understanding 
could be consistent with the claim that the propositions which are known via a deeper 
understanding are self-evident since on this picture one sees that a Rossian principle is true 
because one grasps how it connects to other propositions. This looks suspiciously like some 
sort of coherentist or inferential process of justification. If a deeper understanding of this sort 
is required in order to see that the Rossian principles are true, then it looks like their self-
evidence is in doubt. 
 
At this point, the ethical intuitionist might reach for the distinction that Audi makes between 
internal and external inferences,
134
where the former are semantic and comprehensional and 
apparently do not serve as premises for a conclusion. As Audi claims: 
 
any inferential dependence a self-evident proposition has is comprehensional: 
the inference serves to bring out the content of the original proposition, a 
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  Kvanvig, J., (2009), p. 3 
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 Elgin, C., (2007) p. 35 
134
    See his (1999) and (2004) for details. 
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content that, to someone who comprehendingly consider the proposition, is 
directly before the mind without any need to draw inferences.
135
 
 
Perhaps then, deepening of understanding simply involves drawing internal inferences. I must 
admit that I don’t find this response terribly plausible. However, it will, in any case, be 
objected that I have presented an uncharitable characterisation of what is involved in the 
deepening of understanding of an individual proposition, as opposed to the objectual 
understanding involved when we are talking about a body of information, e.g., my 
understanding of quantum physics. Instead, ethical intuitionists might claim that in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of a Rossian principle, one need only consider applications of 
that principle, e.g. hypothetical cases in which the principle is relevant, as opposed to 
considering how the principle relates to other more obviously extraneous propositions. 
Indeed, this seems to be what at least some ethical intuitionists have in mind.
136
 As W.D. Ross 
claimed, 
 
we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfillment of a 
particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another 
promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general 
terms, we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any 
fulfillment of promise. What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-
evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this 
we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima 
facie duty.
137
  
 
Ross thought that by reflecting on particular cases we come to see ‘the general in the 
particular’ via a process of intuitive induction.138 This process is also apparently reflective and 
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    Audi, (1999), p. 218 
136
   Evidence for this view can be found in Audi (1999), Stratton-Lake (2002). Both take this view from W.D. 
Ross. 
137
    Ross, W.D., (1967) [1930], pp. 32/33  Note that Ross’ use of self-evident is not the same as Audi’s. For 
Ross, self-evidence simply means, knowable without extraneous evidence. 
138
   This process apparently involves apprehending that a particular act has a certain (moral) property in a 
particular instance, and, as an intellectual outgrowth of this, apprehending that this holds in all cases where that 
particular act-type is tokened. So for instance, I apprehend or understand that my keeping my promise in scenario 
C is pro-tanto right, and then by intuitive induction, I somehow see the ‘general in the particular’ and come to 
apprehend or understand that in any scenario, Cn, my keeping my promise would be pro-tanto right. The idea 
appears to be that ‘understanding’ a particular cases allows us to see something general. 
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non-inferential. An objection here would be that it just does not seem plausible to claim that 
considering – and presumably forming judgments about - hypothetical cases merely involves 
drawing internal inferences from the general principle. Although it might somehow be argued 
that, in thinking about an individual hypothetical scenario, we sometimes form internal 
inferences, if adequately understanding a Rossian principle involves considering hypothetical 
examples, it seems a stretch to maintain that the inferences drawn do not play an 
epistemological role as premises for the overall conclusion.
139
 Indeed, we might reasonably 
think that this is an illegitimate conflation of comprehensional and substantive thought.  
 
One way of responding to this worry about inference might be to suggest that adequate 
understanding is something that most normally functioning moral agents simply ‘carry 
around’ with them. That is to say, normal moral agents with a sufficient stock of ethical 
experience will have a general adequate understanding of ethical propositions which is in 
some sense the ‘outgrowth’ of their ethical experience.140 So, if we assume that ethical 
experience involves reflection, attaining an adequate understanding does require reflection, but 
it needn’t involve the subject drawing inferences (internal or external) when they actually 
consider an individual ethical proposition – although presumably it requires the capacity to 
draw inferences.
141
 Indeed, perhaps this general adequate understanding allows one to have a 
content that is directly before the mind when one considers a self-evident proposition. 
Furthermore, on my preferred conception of non-inferential justification, if adequate 
understanding is in fact a non-doxastic state, then it seems likely that the beliefs formed on the 
basis of this adequate understanding are non-inferentially justified. Recall, 
 
A non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is based by some non-
inferential mechanism on some kind of reasons or evidence, where non-
doxastic states such as experiences and phenomenal and intellectual 
appearances are the relevant kind of reasons or evidence. 
 
                                                 
139
   The reader might be wondering where ethical understanding of particular cases is itself supposed to derive 
from. One bad answer would be to say that it depends on prior ethical experience. This seems to start a vicious 
regress with no obvious terminus. A better answer would be to say that we have an innate capacity for moral 
understanding which is perhaps triggered by our being exposed to certain features in the environment. I merely 
mention this in passing, although this sort of commitment might make the view a good deal less attractive for 
some philosophers. 
140
   Kirchin (2005) 
141
   This point is emphasized by Brad Hooker (2002). 
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On this account, someone who believes a self-evident proposition on the basis of their 
adequate understanding (construed as a non-doxastic state) could be said to non-inferentially 
know it. Certainly this might be thought to avoid worries about the drawing of internal and 
external inferences when considering the proposition. However, in response, I would firstly 
say that it is not obvious that this move avoids the previous objections about inference since 
there appears to be an epistemic dependency of the adequate understanding upon moral 
experience in a way which makes the claim for non-inferentiality look odd (I will return to this 
point at the end of chapter 2). Secondly, and more significantly, I think that we have yet to be 
given satisfactory reasons for thinking that an adequate understanding of p is in fact a non-
doxastic state, and not, e.g., a complex set of beliefs about p or a body of propositions related 
to p, perhaps allied with some abilities with respect to the proposition and its application. Thus 
it isn’t clear whether beliefs based on an adequate understanding really aren’t based on 
doxastic states in a way which, on the above conception of non-inferential justification, would 
appear to make them inferentially justified.  
 
Even if we were to ignore these worries and suppose that reflection on particular cases can 
somehow be characterized as merely involving internal inference, and/or that adequate 
understanding is in fact a non-doxastic state which can ground non-inferential justification and 
knowledge, another serious problem arises: given the robust concept of adequate 
understanding and given that it is supposed to be compatible with non-inferential knowledge, 
there appears to be no bar to propositions such as abortion is prima facie morally wrong or 
euthanasia is morally permissible (if true) getting to count as self-evident, i.e., either I reflect 
on hypothetical cases of abortion and come to the conclusion (non-inferentially?) that abortion 
is prima facie morally wrong or euthanasia is morally permissible, or else I have an adequate 
understanding based on previous moral experience such that I can come to non-inferentially 
believe that abortion is prima facie morally wrong upon considering it. To my mind this 
doesn’t seem very plausible. Recall that the justification one gets for believing a self-evident 
proposition, given an adequate understanding, is of a particularly strong variety. I do not see 
how it is plausible to attribute this sort of non-inferential justification for propositions of the 
sort in question. Furthermore, if we think that there is a distinction between basic and non-
basic beliefs as foundationalists claim (recall that ethical intuitionism is closely associated 
with foundationalism), then the propositions that abortion is prima facie morally wrong and 
euthanasia is morally permissible would presumably fall on the non-basic (non-self-evident) 
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side of the divide. If it doesn’t then I am left puzzled as to whether there are any non-
contingent non-self-evident ethical propositions. Indeed, on this view, it would appear that 
every non-contingently true ethical proposition is self-evident.
142
 This result strikes me as 
implausible. Indeed, I take the foregoing argument to establish the truth of P2 of 
Understanding*. 
 
In order to avoid this conclusion, the ethical intuitionist might appeal to the claim that the 
Rossian principles exhibit a Kantian containment relation, and that it is only propositions like 
this that can be known on the basis of a deeper understanding. After-all, deeper understanding 
is supposed to involve conceptual reflection, so perhaps only propositions exhibiting a 
conceptual containment relation can be seen to be true on the basis of this. Although this 
might seem like a way for intuitionists to respond, it remains unclear to me what work the 
containment relation is actually supposed to be doing vis-à-vis conceptual reflection. Surely 
we don’t want to say that conceptual reflection is to be construed literally, i.e., as involving a 
literal examination of our concepts (would this involve causal connection with our concepts? 
Some sort of Gödelian perception?). Instead, conceptual reflection or deepening of 
understanding is plausibly understood as simply involving the guidance of our reflection by 
our concept possession
143
 i.e., considering instances in which the relevant concepts are 
applicable. So, the point here is that I have yet to see a good reason for thinking that there is 
something special about the possession of a containment relation vis-à-vis the claim for self-
evidence.  
 
Alternatively, it is also worth pointing out that it is unclear why propositions such as abortion 
is prima facie morally wrong (if true) couldn’t also exhibit a non-reductive conceptual 
containment relation of the sort Audi posits for the Rossian principles. This seems especially 
plausible when we consider that Audi thinks the crucial point about the idea of non-reductive 
containment is that certain non-moral facts ground the applicability of the concept MORAL 
REASON. Given this, the idea that abortion is prima facie wrong, could also exhibit a 
containment relation does not seem so far-fetched. Yet it is surely not self-evident in the way 
Audi has in mind, i.e., capable of being believed with strong non-inferential justification on 
                                                 
142
       In his (2004), pp. 55 & 59, Audi appears to suggest that only the Rossian principles are self-evident. 
143
       See Jenkins, (forthcoming) for a similar view. 
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the basis of an adequate understanding. Again, the burden of argument falls upon the ethical 
intuitionist to show why these objections don’t make their view implausible.144 
 
In addition to all of this, it is worth noting that it seems highly plausible that the same sort of 
account of deeper understanding would have to be given if the Rossian principles were 
regarded as substantive synthetic propositions. A potential benefit for ethical intuitionists of 
adopting this approach might be that they can avoid the supposedly problematic claim that the 
principles are substantive and conceptually necessary.
145
 Suffice to say, however, I think that 
the same problems vis-à-vis the account of a robust adequate understanding and self-evidence 
will arise if the ethical intuitionist were to adopt this strategy.  
 
Given the problems associated with the more robust conception of adequate understanding, 
perhaps ethical intuitionists who think that the Rossian principles are substantive might be 
well-advised to retreat to the view that an adequate understanding is equivalent to a grasp of 
meaning. Note, however, that this would entail that the Rossian principles are substantive and 
epistemically-analytic, and as was argued in §3, this is a highly problematic notion (at least 
given the fulfillment of certain sufficient conditions for substantivity). Given this, ethical 
intuitionists who want to reject the robust conception of adequate understanding would either 
have to argue that the Rossian principles are non-substantive or else they would have to deny 
epistemic-accounts of analyticity in favour of some alternative conception, e.g. the 
metaphysical conception.
146
 On this latter sort of account, ethical intuitionists could then 
maintain that an adequate understanding is equivalent to a grasp of meaning, and that a grasp 
of meaning somehow suffices to confer justification for believing the Rossian obligations, 
whilst denying that this entails that they are analytic. Another alternative, somewhat similar to 
this, which the ethical intuitionist could possibly adopt, would be to agree with Quine and 
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      Another line of response which I think is also unsuccessful is the claim that, for the Rossian principles (and 
not propositions like abortion is prima facie wrong), there is some special relationship between belief and 
understanding. See the introductory section of this chapter for an argument against this claim. Also, even if it 
could be shown that there is some connection between belief and understanding for the Rossian principles that 
does not obtain for abortion is prima facie wrong, it is not at all clear what bearing this would have on the claim 
that the principles are self-evident. 
145
   This might not be the case: note that Audi appears to regard synthetic a priori truths as ‘conceptual synthetic 
truths: non-analytic, yet true by virtue of (“synthetic”) relations of the relevant concepts.’ From his ‘Justification, 
Truth, and Reliability’ p. 312 in his (1993). 
146
   Again, this is the view that a statement is analytic just in case it is true in virtue of its meaning. Under this 
conception a synthetic statement would simply be one for which it is made true by features of the world. This 
move seems reasonable, since there is no obvious entailment from a statement’s expressing a proposition is 
knowable in virtue of grasping its meaning to that statement therefore being true in virtue of its meaning. 
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simply reject the analytic-synthetic distinction altogether, i.e., reject all conceptions of 
analyticity, epistemic or otherwise. Admittedly, ethical intuitionists and Quineans make 
somewhat awkward philosophical bed-fellows,
147
 but it is worth noting that this sort of move 
could be made by the intuitionist in order to avoid the problems associated with endorsing 
epistemic-analyticity. If, however, a priori ethical intuitionists seek to adopt this line, then they 
owe us an account of how adequate understanding (conceived as grasp of meaning) could 
ground knowledge and justified belief in the substantive Rossian principles. This is especially 
pressing given that they plausibly fulfill the sufficient conditions (5) and (6) for substantivity. 
In the following final section, §5, I will consider an account of the Rossian principles as 
substantive and synthetic self-evident truths which apparently isn’t dubious in the way P3 of 
the original Understanding Objection claims, and, in a way which doesn’t involve an appeal to 
a potentially problematic ‘robust’ conception of adequate understanding. This is the view that 
the Rossian principles could be regarded as default reasonable to believe. 
 
5. The Rossian Principles and Default Reasonableness 
Ethical intuitionists who accept P1 and P2 of the original Understanding Objection could 
attempt to resist its conclusion by rejecting P3, i.e., the claim that if a proposition is 
substantive and synthetic, then the proposition’s self-evident status is dubious and/or 
mysterious. In order to do so they could potentially appeal to the idea of default 
reasonableness; roughly, this would be the idea that the Rossian principles (propositions (f)-
(k) above) are among those propositions that it is default reasonable to believe, i.e., which we 
have some presumptive justification for believing without empirical evidence.
148
 A non-ethical 
example of such a proposition would be that there is an external world.
149
 If the Rossian 
principles were default reasonable to believe an understanding or grasp of their meaning 
would be all that is required in order to form beliefs about them which are default reasonable; 
hence, they could potentially evade the problems associated with the robust conception of 
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   Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists, e.g. Audi, Stratton-Lake, seem to think that there is indeed a 
cogent distinction to be made between the analytic and synthetic.  
148
   See Hartry Field (2000) on the notion of the weak a priori. See also Copp (2003) for discussion.  Note that 
Copp thinks that default reasonable beliefs/weakly a priori beliefs are ultimately answerable to experience, i.e. 
they are empirically defeasible. In this sense, he thinks that the existence of the synthetic a priori (in the weak 
sense) can be made compatible with naturalism. 
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   One possible problem here that I won’t discuss in detail is that default entitlements appear to have been 
conceived primarily to deal with the threat of scepticism, i.e. in a scenario where it is not at all obvious that we 
can reason or reflectively arrive at a justified conclusion. Given that ethical intuitionists think that we can 
reflectively come to see that the Rossian principles are true, we might think that they lack the sorts of 
characteristics typical of putatively default reasonable beliefs. 
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adequate understanding outlined in the previous section. The motivation for the default 
reasonable view is that 
 
while non-basic beliefs and rules can be justified non-circularly by appeal to 
other, more basic beliefs and rules, this process cannot go on forever. 
Eventually we will arrive at our most basic beliefs and rules, and to them we 
must be entitled to ‘by default’ or not at all.150 
 
Some proponents of this view, e.g. Field (2000), take ‘reasonableness’ or ‘default entitlement’ 
to be non-factual, and a mere expression of our positive attitudes towards the propositions in 
question; a sort of ‘epistemological evaluativism’ somewhat similar to non-cognitivism in 
ethics. However, the evaluative non-factualist component of the view is not 
necessary.
151Instead, someone could be a ‘factualist’ about default reasonability, perhaps 
pointing to some ‘objective’ property which default reasonable beliefs share. I will return to 
the issue of what sort of properties these might be shortly.  
 
It seems that adopting a factualist version of the default reasonable view could be open to 
ethical intuitionists. Notice that it would enable them to stake out a firm claim for naturalistic 
respectability while holding on to the traditional view that the propositions which they regard 
as being self-evident are also substantive and synthetic. In this regard, note the following from 
Copp (2003): 
 
[given the notion of default reasonableness] a naturalist can agree that some 
substantive moral propositions can be reasonably believed without empirical 
evidence.
152
 
 
Moreover, ethical intuitionists might be attracted to the default-entitlement view because of its 
apparent consistency with the view that our default reasonable beliefs are non-inferentially 
justified,
 153
 although just in what sense they are ‘justified’ is something I will address below. 
Also, notice that appealing to the property of default-reasonableness would apparently enable 
                                                 
150
     Jenkins, C., (2008), p. 440  
151
    David Copp appears to sign up to something like Field’s view in his (2003) although it is unclear whether he 
endorses evaluativism. 
152
    Copp, D., (2003), p. 188 
153
    See Boghossian (2000) for this point. 
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ethical intuitionists to resist P3 of the Understanding Objection and defend the view that we 
have a priori knowledge of synthetic and substantive truths in a way that is naturalistically 
respectable. 
 
Despite its attractions, I think that there are problems with the view such that a priori ethical 
intuitionists will be unlikely to want to adopt it. Firstly, note that this sort of account would no 
longer be an understanding-based account of a priori knowledge, since it isn’t our 
understanding per se which is providing the grounds for positive epistemic status. Rather, our 
understanding simply enables us to form default reasonable beliefs about propositions for 
which we have an understanding-independent default entitlement to. So, it would not 
necessarily be true that if one based one’s belief on one’s understanding of, e.g., a Rossian 
principle, one would thereby have knowledge of it (because one’s belief wouldn’t be based on 
a justification or entitlement for the belief).
154
 At the very least, the characterization of self-
evidence (see SE above) would need to be jettisoned. In order to avoid such revisions, a priori 
ethical intuitionists could possibly make an emendation to the account such that one’s 
understanding could somehow ground the propositional default entitlement. However, they 
would then have to explain what the relationship is between understanding – construed as a 
mere grasp of meaning - and default reasonableness, and how exactly understanding can 
ground entitlement in the way claimed. I do not at present know how exactly such an account 
might look, especially given that I think grasping the meaning of the Rossian principles does 
not place an individual in a cognitive position to see that they are true. 
 
If ethical intuitionists eschew this revisionary account of default entitlements there is a more 
general problem which proponents of the view will have to face up to: if understanding isn’t 
playing a justificatory or entitling role then there doesn’t appear to be anything which is 
conferring the positive epistemic status, except for the claim for default reasonability. As 
Jenkins (2008) has remarked: 
 
                                                 
154
       It also isn’t clear how this fits with my conception of non-inferential justification as paradigmatically 
involving justification conferred by non-doxastic states. 
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on discovering that someone holds a belief without supporting grounds of any 
kind, it is extremely tempting – for me anyway, and I expect I’m not alone here 
– to withhold the application of words like ‘entitled.’155 
 
Proponents of the view that some propositions are default reasonable to believe might claim 
here that there are good epistemic reasons for thinking that we are entitled to such beliefs. For 
example, with the threat of external world scepticism it might appear that appeal to something 
like default reasonability is the only plausible way of vindicating the epistemic practices of 
ordinary epistemic agents. In the moral case, proponents of the view might claim that, given a 
particular moral outlook, we have a default entitlement to believe – justifiably – certain 
propositions,
156
 e.g. given a certain widely-held moral view, the proposition friendship is good 
might be default reasonable without empirical evidence. However, an opponent here will 
likely find such claims unsatisfactory since it is not at all clear where exactly the positive 
epistemic status is supposed to be coming from
157
. 
 
Indeed, quite generally, it is not clear how epistemic agents could have any epistemic reason 
to believe a proposition which is putatively default reasonable given the absence of supporting 
grounds. In this context it is worth noting that Crispin Wright (2004) holds a (factualist) view 
that a default entitlement in this sense is a (rational) entitlement to accept rather than believe a 
proposition. In other words, it is rational for individuals to act or behave as if the proposition 
were true without them having justification or evidence for believing it. If this were the most 
plausible account of what we can be default entitled to then this might not be attractive for a 
priori ethical intuitionists who claim that we can have non-inferential understanding-based 
knowledge of the Rossian principles. Having said that, if appeal to default entitlements to 
accept rather than believe could vindicate the everyday moral practices of ordinary moral 
agents, then perhaps ethical intuitionists would be happy to settle with the view. Note 
however, that adopting such a view would not in any way constitute a denial of P3 of the 
Understanding Objection. 
 
In addition to this, however, there is a more serious worry that the Rossian principles are 
simply not plausible candidates for the sorts of propositions we have default entitlement to 
                                                 
155
     Jenkins, C., (2008), p. 441  
156
     This view can be found in Copp (2003). 
157
    Also, as a response to scepticism it seems to be too easy to simply label certain beliefs as default reasonable. 
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accept or to trust. The reason for this is that Wright (2004) holds quite a specific view about 
what sort of proposition gets to be one for which we have a default entitlement to accept.
158
 
One such condition is that the proposition must be a presupposition of a cognitive project, 
such that the cognitive project as a whole would be in doubt if we were to doubt the 
proposition (presumably the cognitive project has some importance for human life). Wright 
has in mind here a proposition like there is an external world. Certainly, it seems that this 
proposition is a presupposition of many cognitive projects, e.g., the natural sciences, and that 
the significance of those projects would be seriously in doubt if we were to seriously doubt 
that there is an external world. Perhaps in virtue of this and further properties, we have some 
sort of default entitlement to believe it.  
 
Although appealing to the notion of a presupposition would appear to enable ethical 
intuitionists to avoid the charge from the previous section that all true ethical propositions are 
self-evident (or, in this case, default reasonable), it seems unlikely that the Rossian principles 
are central to the ‘cognitive project’ of ethics in the way defined. Although I can imagine 
someone arguing that something like the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive 
expressed in (c) occupies something like this sort of central position in the cognitive project of 
ethics, I see no reason for thinking that seriously doubting the truth of the Rossian principles 
would undermine the significance of the cognitive project of ethics itself. Even if we were to 
weaken Wright’s condition such that we could have a default entitlement to accept a 
proposition if it occupies a central place in our ethical world view (construed loosely as a 
cognitive project), it is far from obvious that the truth of the Rossian principles is central to 
our ethical world view in the relevant sort of sense. A brief consideration of the literature on 
ethical particularism and utilitarianism should suffice to cast serious doubt upon such a claim. 
 
Given the foregoing arguments I contend that we ought to reject the claim that the Rossian 
principles are default reasonable to believe. At the very least, ethical intuitionists owe us an 
explanation as to what we ought to think that they could be candidates for default 
reasonableness. 
 
             
 
                                                 
158
 See Jenkins (2007) for criticism of Wright’s view. 
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         Conclusion 
This concludes my discussion of the claim that the Rossian principles are self-evident. I hope 
to have shown that we have good reason to believe that there are serious problems associated 
with this claim. Specifically, I think that either the original or the amended Understanding 
Objection are sound, and hence, in lieu of further argument, we have good reason to think that 
the Rossian principles are self-evident in the way contemporary ethical intuitionists claim.  
 
In the following chapter I will go on to discuss the other extant a priori account of our putative 
intuitive knowledge and justified belief; the seemings account. At the end of that chapter, and 
in light of both the seemings account of justification and my own proposed account of non-
inferential justification, I will return to briefly re-consider our putative justified belief in the 
Rossian principles. 
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Chapter 2: Ethical Intuitionism and Intellectual Seemings 
In this chapter I will discuss and assess what I am denoting the Seemings-Account (hereafter, 
the S-Account) of ethical intuitionism whose main proponent is Michael Huemer (see his 
(2001), (2005), (2007), (2010)). Roughly, the view is that our ethical intuitions can be 
characterized as initial intellectual seeming states, i.e., S’s ethical intuition that p can be 
understood as p’s intellectually seeming true to S prior to engaging in reasoning or inference. 
Furthermore, ethical intuitions get to justify in virtue of being a member of the class of 
seeming states. According to the S-Account, all types of seeming, e.g., perceptual, mnemonic, 
introspective and intellectual, confer at least some degree of justification for belief in their 
contents. Indeed, this epistemological claim can be summed up in the principle of Phenomenal 
Conservatism: 
 
Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of 
defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that 
p. 
 
Absent defeaters, beliefs based upon seeming states are justified. Hence, the S-account holds 
that all of our ethical intuitions have some initial or prima facie justification. Their view thus 
promises to provide a comprehensive epistemology of ethical belief. 
 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to assess the prospects for the S-Account, with a 
particular interest in the implications for ethical intuitionism. Roughly, I will argue that, as it 
stands, the prospects for the S-Account are quite bleak and hence ethical intuitionists ought 
not to rely on it to supply an ethical epistemology. However, I will end by suggesting that 
ethical intuitionists might have good reason to explore the possibilities of something like a 
restricted version of PC.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: 
 
In §1 I will outline the S-Account of ethical intuitionism; roughly, that ethical intuitions can be 
understood as initial intellectual seemings, and that our non-inferential ethical knowledge and 
justified belief is grounded in these seemings. This will involve discussion of what seemings 
are and the S-Account’s epistemological principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I will 
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also consider the claim made by proponents of the S-Account that denial of PC is self-
defeating (in a way to be explained). A discussion of this latter feature will be important since 
the S-Account’s epistemology of ethical belief is entailed by the truth of PC. If denial of PC is 
self-defeating then it appears that ethical intuitionists can simply rely on PC in order to ground 
their epistemological claim for ethical intuition. 
 
Following from this, in §2, I will advance some objections to the S-Account with a view to 
showing that restricted versions of PC, i.e. versions of PC that deny the justificatory power of 
at least some seemings, do not face self-defeat. I will begin by challenging the view that there 
is a unified category of seeming states of which ethical intuitions are a member. Establishing 
this is significant because if ethical seemings can be shown to be different in kind from other 
seeming states, then scepticism about the justificatory powers of the former need not lead to a 
far more wider-ranging (and less plausible-sounding) scepticism about seeming states 
generally. After this I will go on to argue that it is possible for restricted versions of 
Phenomenal Conservatism to avoid self-defeat. This is significant because, as I will explain, 
the ethical intuitionist who is a proponent of the S-Account will now have to provide a full 
account as to why we should think that ethical seemings – particularly those with substantive 
contents - do indeed justify. I will end by suggesting that it is not at all obvious how ethical 
intellectual seemings with substantive contents do indeed get to justify belief. 
 
In §3, I will go on to present a further, and in my view, more serious objection to the S-
Account. Specifically, I will show that, given some plausible-sounding accounts of non-
inferential justification and justified belief, the S-Account is committed to the following 
implausible claim: every justified belief held by anyone, anywhere, is or has been non-
inferentially justified (this of course includes ethical beliefs). I will then show that the most 
plausible available responses to this either lead to further problems or involve giving up 
central claims of the S-Account. Hence, the prospects for the S-Account are significantly 
bleaker than has so far been thought. 
 
In the final section, §4, I will go on to suggest that, given the arguments of the previous 
sections, ethical intuitionists would be well-advised to adopt something like a restricted PC. 
However, in addition to the philosophical work required in order to show that substantive 
ethical seemings do get to justify belief, I will show that ethical intuitionists ought to adopt a 
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new conception of non-inferential justification and justified belief. After outlining my 
preferred conception, I will consider some applications of my account. Notably, I will apply 
the account to the case of the Rossian principles. As will be shown, my account brings out 
more clearly why, on understanding-accounts of justification (see previous chapter), the 
Rossian principles ought not to be regarded as non-inferentially justified or basic.  
 
1. The Seemings Account 
The principal exponent of the S-Account of ethical intuition and intuitive justification is 
Michael Huemer (see his (2001), (2005), (2007), (2010)). Huemer’s S-account relies on two 
main assumptions: firstly, that there is a sui generis intentional mental category which he calls 
a seeming, and secondly, an epistemological principle he denotes Phenomenal Conservatism. 
Let us consider these in turn. According to Huemer, the existence of seemings is supposedly 
evidenced when one says that it ‘seems to me that p’ or ‘it appears to me that p.’ There are, 
according to Huemer, several types of seeming: perceptual, mnemonic, introspective and 
intellectual.
159
 The different types of seeming can be individuated on the basis of the sort of 
experience or mental state which they are typically a response to/are based upon, e.g., 
perceptual seemings are responses to sensory experiences
160
; mnemonic seemings are based-
upon/are responses to memory-beliefs. For our purposes we will be concerned with Huemer’s 
notion of intellectual seemings, a sub-class of which is that of initial intellectual seemings, 
which are said to be responses to concept apprehension. Initial intellectual seemings are 
Huemer’s gloss on what intuitions are: intuitions are initial intellectual seemings or the way 
things intellectually appear to us prior to reasoning or inference. Ethical intuitions, then, are 
initial intellectual seemings which have an ethical content.
161
 
 
Intuitions,
162
 so construed, are distinguished from belief. This is because there are occasions 
wherein (i) one can have a seeming that p without believing that p, and (ii) one can have a 
belief that p without its seeming to one that p. To illustrate the former, Huemer points to the 
                                                 
159
      Presumably testimonial seemings are subsumed under these categories. 
160
    On this account our perceptual beliefs are indirectly based upon perceptual experiences. Lurking in the 
background here are questions about the relation between perceptual experiences and the seemings we apparently 
have on that basis. This issue is at least partly related to the question of whether perceptual experiences have 
contents. 
161
    Note that Huemer does not distinguish ethical seemings from other intellectual seemings except for their 
ethical content. 
162
    What I say here with regard to intuitions is true of seemings generally. Indeed, what I say here is true of 
intuitions because they are – on the S-Account - seeming states. 
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case of utilitarians who may find counterexamples to utilitarianism intuitive (i.e., it 
intellectually seems to them that the non-utilitarian judgment is correct), yet adopt utilitarian-
affirming beliefs about the examples all the same. Instances where one can believe something 
without a seeming are apparently to be found in the case of beliefs based upon self-deception 
or leaps of faith.
163
 In addition to these distinguishing features, we might also think that 
seemings can be thought of as distinct from beliefs given the possibility of cases where an 
individual holds consciously contradictory seemings, while the analogous sort of case for 
belief does not seem possible. So, for example, it might perceptually seem to one that the 
Müller-Lyer lines are of different lengths, but it intellectually seems to you that they are the 
same (because you have measured them with a ruler)
164
, whereas it is plausibly impossible that 
one could (consciously) believe of the Müller-Lyer lines that they were and were not the same 
length.  
 
Intuitions, understood as initial intellectual seemings, are also to be distinguished from 
dispositions to believe, although they may often give rise to and explain such dispositions.
165
 
This is due to the possibility of cases where one has become so convinced that an intuition is 
inaccurate (e.g., an intuition that the naïve comprehension of axiom of set theory is true) that 
one wouldn’t be disposed or inclined to endorse it (contrast this with Audi’s account of the 
relationship between adequate understanding and a disposition to believe).  Also, in the case of 
wishful thinking that p, one could plausibly have a disposition to believe p – perhaps based on 
a desire or hope – without its seeming to one that p. For the purposes of this chapter I will 
assume, not unwarily, that there is indeed a distinctive mental category of intellectual 
seemings.
166
  
 
The second assumption upon which Huemer’s S-Account of intuitions and intuitive 
justification rests is the epistemological principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: 
                                                 
163
    It has been suggested to me by Michael Brady that it is not obvious that things don’t seem to us a certain 
way in the cases of self-deception and leaps of faith. If correct, then this would mean that, by the lights of PC, 
there are some cases of prima facie justified beliefs based on seemings which are the result of self-deception and 
leaps of faith. Certainly, it is plausible that there will be some cases of these phenomena that involve seemings. 
164
     Of course, the seeming based upon the measurement might lead one to adopt a belief. However, proponents 
of the S-Account will claim that these are distinct states. 
165
      Audi appears to agree with this characterization. See his (2010). 
166
    Not all philosophers agree that there is such a thing as a seeming. Note the following from Timothy 
Williamson on the alleged existence of intellectual seemings: ‘For myself, I am aware of no intellectual seeming 
beyond my conscious inclination to believe Naive Comprehension, which I resist because I know better.’ From p. 
217 of his (2007). 
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PC: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at 
least some degree of justification for believing that p.
167
 
 
A few things are worth noting here about PC as it stands; firstly, it is not restricted to a 
particular type of seeming. All seemings confer some degree of prima facie justification. 
However, the degree of justification will depend upon the strength of the seeming, e.g., if a 
seeming is weak and wavering then it will only confer some justification (perhaps not enough 
for outright justified belief). Also, Michael DePaul (2009) has highlighted that there is an 
ambiguity as to whether the role of defeaters in PC ought to be understood synchronically or 
diachronically. However, if initial intellectual seemings are supposed to confer non-inferential 
justification, then it would appear that the absence of defeaters must be understood 
diachronically, i.e., we have some non-inferential justification which can then be defeated by 
rebutting or undermining evidence. I will have a good deal more to say about how exactly PC 
relates to non-inferential justification in §3. For now it is worth noting that on some recent 
conceptions of non-inferential justification, if a belief is based upon and justified by a seeming 
state, and if seeming states are not beliefs, then it would seem that all seemings-based beliefs 
will be non-inferentially justified. The implications of this will be discussed in detail in §3. 
 
Given my overriding interest in ethical intuitions and their epistemology it is important to note 
that the truth of PC entails the following epistemological principle: 
 
PC*: If it initially intellectually seems to S that p (and p is an ethical 
proposition), then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some degree of 
justification for believing that p. 
 
Note that the ethical propositions which could become the object of an initial intellectual 
seeming are not restricted to any particular class of ethical propositions, e.g., they are not 
constrained to propositions about general or mid-level principles, e.g., the Rossian principles, 
and PC* can thus potentially provide a reasonably comprehensive epistemology for our 
intuitive ethical beliefs. So, for example, PC* commits us to saying that my initial intellectual 
                                                 
167
  Taken from his (2007). 
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seeming that it would be permissible to unplug myself from the famous violinist
168
 (a 
proposition about a particular case) confers some degree of prima facie justification on my 
belief that such an action would be ethically justified. Also, note that Huemer thinks that if it 
intellectually seems to me that p, (where, e.g., p is an ethical proposition), then I gain some 
degree of justification for the belief that p, no matter what the content of p happens to be. So 
an implication of the view is that if, upon considering the proposition, it intellectually seems to 
me, e.g., that torturing children for fun is morally required, then in the absence of defeaters 
(presumably these will either be other appearance states, or beliefs based upon other 
appearance states), I will have some degree of justification for that belief. As stated, I will 
consider in detail what the nature of the justification in PC and PC* is supposed to be in §3, 
i.e. whether it is inferential or non-inferential. 
 
Although our interest is in the S-Account of ethical intuitions, it is arguably at least partly in 
virtue of being a member of a general class of seeming states that ethical intuitions gain 
epistemic respectability. Given this, it is therefore important to note some other significant 
claims that Huemer makes about the role of seemings with respect to our normally held 
beliefs. In addition to positing an intentional seeming mental state and a commitment to 
Phenomenal Conservatism (see PC and PC* above), Huemer also makes the following 
striking claim regarding the causal role that seemings play in our everyday belief formation: 
 
(1) All of our beliefs held in normal circumstances are held on the basis of the way 
things seem to us, i.e., on the basis of seeming states.
169
 
 
Huemer claims that we have good reason to think that the way things seem to us – in normal 
cases, i.e., all cases except where beliefs are formed on the basis of self-deception or leaps of 
faith – is the only proximate causal factor in one’s belief formation. He also claims that 
whenever one points to some other possible causal basis for belief formation, e.g. the fact that 
p, these belief forming bases are only plausible candidates insofar as they cause us to be in a 
state of its seeming to us that p. Consider the following example from Huemer (2007): 
 
                                                 
168
     See  J.J. Thomson’s much-discussed paper (1986). 
169
    Note that the idea that seemings are typically the basis of our beliefs neither entails nor is entailed by the 
idea that seemings typically cause the formation our beliefs. 
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the fact that there is a cat here might causally explain my belief that there is a 
cat here… what I maintain is that the cat’s presence causes me to believe that 
there is a cat here only by causing it to appear to me that there is a cat here. 
Furthermore, the appearance probabilistically screens off my belief from the 
external fact. That is, given that I experience exactly the same sort of 
appearance I am now experiencing, the probability of my forming the belief 
that there is cat is unaffected by the actual existence or non-existence of the 
cat.
170
 
 
Huemer’s point here appears to be that if we hold the way things seem to the subject constant, 
then changes in other potential bases for belief formation, e.g., the facts, don’t make a 
difference to belief formation or the probability of belief formation. More generally, Huemer’s 
argument against the existence of alternative bases for belief formation, seems to rest on his 
belief in the truth of the following counterfactuals: 
 
(i) if it seemed to S that p, but alternative belief-base x did not obtain, then S 
would, ceteris paribus, believe that p. 
(ii) if alternative belief-base x obtained, but it did not seem to S that p, then S 
would, ceteris paribus, not believe that p. 
 
I take it that Huemer’s thought here is that there is a counterfactual dependence between its 
seeming to S that p, and S’s forming the belief that p, whereas there is no such dependence 
between alternative causal bases, e.g., the fact that p, and S’s believing that p (assuming that 
we hold facts about the presence of the seeming state constant). It should be clear from this 
that Huemer thinks that in normal conditions, appearances determine beliefs by inclining 
subjects towards endorsing the content of their seemings. Given all this, Huemer thinks that 
the best explanation for belief formation – in normal cases – is that it seems to S that p, and 
not some alternative causal base.  
 
To link (1) directly to the ethical case, Huemer’s point here is that all of our ethical beliefs are 
held on the basis of the way things seem to us. So this rules out the idea that, e.g., one could 
base one’s ethical belief about the rightness of promise-keeping solely on the basis of a 
                                                 
170
  Huemer, M., (2007), pp. 39/40 
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process of reasoning which employed the categorical imperative. According to Huemer, there 
are no beliefs held in normal circumstances which are based directly on the categorical 
imperative or any other decision procedures. Instead, all ethical beliefs are based upon the way 
things seem to us, although appearance states may themselves be produced by a process of 
reasoning such as that involved in the consultation of the categorical imperative. With respect 
to our justified ethical beliefs, Huemer would claim that these will all be based upon 
intellectual seemings with ethical content.
171
 
 
In addition to (1), Huemer also holds the following general epistemological principle as true: 
 
(2) If one’s belief that p is based on something that does not constitute a source of 
justification for believing that p, then one’s belief that p is unjustified. 
 
The epistemic principle expressed in (2) depends upon the cogency of a distinction Huemer 
makes – and which is made elsewhere172 – between justification for belief and justified belief. 
To get a grip on these two notions and how they can come apart, consider the following case. 
In his youth, Peter was taught the theory of evolution by several competent and enthusiastic 
science teachers. Being bright and attentive, Peter understood and internalized the strong 
supporting evidence for believing the theory of evolution. In such a case one might reasonably 
say that Peter has justification for believing the theory to be true. However, suppose that Peter 
believes the theory of evolution, but holds this belief on the basis of the say-so of a fairground 
guru and not on the basis of the testimonial evidence he acquired at school. In such a case we 
are inclined to say that the Peter’s belief is unjustified since it is based on an unreliable and 
epistemically inappropriate source. In this case, and others like it, Huemer wants to say that 
although Peter has justification for his belief, his belief is itself unjustified. Hence, Huemer 
thinks that one can have a justified belief only if one’s belief is based on a justification for the 
belief. 
 
Taken separately, the import of (1) and (2) may not be immediately obvious. However, 
Huemer claims that in conjunction, the truth of propositions (1) and (2) entails the following: 
                                                 
171
    One might wonder whether there isn’t a role for ethical perceptual seemings here. Huemer is, however, 
explicit in his rejection of the idea that we can observe or perceive moral properties. Hence he is restricted to 
intellectual seemings/intuitions in his account. 
172
   The distinction made is usually between propositional justification and doxastic justification. See, e.g., 
Fumerton (1995), pp. 91-92. 
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(3) No belief is justified unless one may have justification for believing that p in 
virtue of its seeming that p. 
 
For Huemer (1) and (2) become premises in what he calls the Self-Defeat argument, the 
conclusion of which is proposition (3). Once we accept that our normally-formed beliefs have 
their proximate causal basis in the way things seem to us, and if we assume premise (2), then it 
follows that we can only have justified beliefs if it is true that things seeming to us a certain 
way can – sometimes - confer justification. Otherwise, we would have no justified beliefs 
(although note that we could still have justification for beliefs if seemings don’t justify). The 
Self-Defeat argument is so-called because, if accepted, it appears to follow that any 
epistemological theory which claims that seemings never justify will entail that we have no 
justified beliefs. This appears to follow from the fact that, given the truth of (1), the opponent 
of seemings will reject the existence of seemings and their justificatory efficacy on the basis of 
the way things seem to them. Combine this with (2) and it suggests that their denial will itself 
be unjustified. The same can be said of beliefs like PC is false or alternative epistemic theory, 
x, which rejects the justificatory power of seemings, is true. Indeed, according to Huemer’s 
argument there is an obvious sense in which someone who either (i) denies the existence of 
seemings, or (ii) denies that they can/would have justificatory power, is committed to there 
being no justified beliefs. So, to illustrate by use of one of Huemer’s own examples, the 
following comprehensive theory of epistemic justification, the Acquaintance Theory (held by, 
among others, Russell
173
 and, more recently, Fumerton
174
), is apparently condemned to self-
defeat: 
 
Acquaintance Theory: S has defeasible non-inferential justification for belief 
that p, iff S is acquainted with the fact that p.
175
 
 
Commitment to the Acquaintance Theory is apparently self defeating since it rules out the 
ability of seemings to confer justification for belief. Now, if one accepts premises (1) and (2) 
                                                 
173
  See his (1997) [1912], esp. Chs. 9 & 10. 
174
  See his (1995), esp. Ch. 3 
175
  Huemer, M., (forthcoming). Note that Fumerton holds a more sophisticated version of AT, what 
Huemer calls the ‘Triple Acquaintance Theory’: one is non-inferentially justified in believing that P when and 
only when one is acquainted with all three of the following: (i) the fact that P, (ii) the thought that P, and (iii) the 
relation of correspondence between (i) and (ii). I focus on the ‘Simple Version’ for clarity. 
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of Huemer’s self-defeat argument the Acquaintance theorist is stuck in an unfortunate 
position: if their theory is correct, then their belief in the Acquaintance Theory (and the 
negation of PC and PC*) is unjustified. Indeed there will be no justified beliefs. Why? Well, 
the Acquaintance theorist’s belief in, e.g. the negation of PC, will (given premise (1)) be based 
upon the way things seem to them, but they claim that seemings cannot confer justification. 
Thus, given the plausible-looking premise (2), the Acquaintance theorist seems committed to 
there being no justified beliefs. Unless this was their original aim it looks as though holding 
the Acquaintance theory (and thereby denying any justificatory role for seemings) is self-
defeating.
176
 
 
At this point the reader will perhaps be thinking that the self-defeat argument does not, on the 
face of it, rule out all epistemological views which reject PC. For instance, it does not appear 
to entail as self-defeating an alternative epistemic view which rejects PC but still allows that 
some seemings can confer justification on belief. Indeed, all that follows from the conjunction 
of (1) and (2) is that unless seemings sometimes justify then no-one has a justified belief. Or 
alternatively: if seemings never justify, then there are no justified beliefs. PC, however, is a 
general sufficiency claim about the epistemic relation between its seeming to S that p and S’s 
having justification for believing that p, and surely one could hold a restricted version of PC 
which allowed that some, but not all, seemings can justify. Hence, so long as the opponent of 
PC’s beliefs in either the negation of PC or in their own epistemic account were based on a 
seeming which can justify, then it is not at all obvious why their rejection of PC need be self-
defeating. 
 
So, even if PC is false (i.e. it is false that a seeming of any sort is always sufficient for prima 
facie justification), it still might be the case that we have justified beliefs due to there being a 
certain class of seemings that do confer prima facie justification. Membership of the class of 
justification-conferring seemings might be contingent on (i) the content of the seeming, e.g., 
limited to propositions that it would not be objectively crazy to believe, or, (ii) the type of 
seeming in question, e.g., the way it justifies or some other epistemological property. If true, 
this could have significant consequences for ethical intuitionism since PC* is entailed by the 
                                                 
176
     Someone might think that Huemer’s point against the Acquaintance Theory depends upon an uncharitable 
interpretation of it. This is because it might be natural for an Acquaintance theorist to claim that for a subject, S, 
to be acquainted with p just is for it to be the case that S is in a state of its seeming to them that p. On this 
reading, the Acquaintance theory would simply amount to a restricted PC.  
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truth of PC, i.e. if there turn out to be good reasons for adopting a more restricted version of 
PC then ethical intuitionists will have philosophical work to do in order to show that PC* (or 
something sufficiently robust) is true. 
 
Despite this threat, Huemer has what he takes to be a more subtle way of pinning the charge of 
self-defeat onto this type of opponent who rejects PC in favour of a more restricted version. 
According to Huemer, all accounts of this sort will have the following sort of structure: 
 
RPC: S has defeasible justification for believing that p iff (i) it seems to S that 
p and (ii) R(S, p).
177
 
 
Note here that R is supposed to stand for some relation that S stands with regard to the relevant 
proposition, p,, e.g. S has given careful consideration to the proposition p, or, p is a 
proposition which S is infallible about
178
 etc. As stated, on the face of it, it would appear that 
someone who held a version of RPC could evade Huemer’s charge of self-defeat, just so long 
as the basis of their belief in RPC was based upon the class of seemings which they take to be 
justification-conferring, e.g. belief in their theory is based upon a seeming which is the result 
of careful consideration of p. 
 
Despite this, Huemer thinks that all versions of RPC will indeed face self-defeat. He makes 
two claims in this regard; firstly, that the condition (ii) of RPC must be epistemologically 
relevant, i.e. it must identify a feature which really does separate good seemings from the bad. 
Secondly, in order for RPC to avoid self-defeat, condition (ii) must be a part of the causal 
basis for the production of belief, e.g. S’s having given careful consideration to the 
proposition, p, must be part of the basis of the belief that p.  
 
With regard to the first claim, Huemer thinks that it is not possible to come up with a non-
arbitrary feature that really does distinguish the good seemings from the dubious ones. He 
thinks that all attempts to do so will either be implausible or ad hoc. Let me say for now that 
this claim strikes me as odd. It doesn’t seem terribly difficult to come up with candidates for 
distinguishing features which don’t – prima facie – seem obviously implausible or ad hoc, e.g. 
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    Huemer, M., (2007), p. 42 
178
    These are the views of Lawrence Bonjour who privileges intellectual and introspective seemings. 
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reliability; more on this later. With regard to the second claim, as was noted in (1), Huemer 
claims that all our beliefs – formed in normal conditions - will be based upon the way things 
seem to us, not on the way things seem to us plus some other factor, e.g. that S is infallible 
about the proposition in question. According to Huemer, its seeming to S that p 
probabilistically screens off the belief from other factors, i.e. if it seems to S that p and if we 
hold the seeming state constant, then the fulfillment of whatever condition (ii) is in RPC will 
make no difference to the probability of the belief that p being formed. Therefore, the 
additional feature is not causally relevant to belief production, and cannot be part of the causal 
basis. Hence no belief will be based upon its both seeming to S that p and, e.g., S being 
infallible about p, in which case any version of RPC will entail that no belief will be based 
upon an adequate justification for belief, and therefore that no beliefs will be justified. Put 
another way, by the lights of RPC (of any type), whenever a belief is formed under normal 
conditions, the basis for the belief will be inadequate as a justification for the belief since only 
one of the conditions of its epistemic principle will constitute the causal base (its seeming that 
p) for the belief. 
 
So to re-cap: the S-Account holds that there is a distinctive mental category, a seeming, which 
is evidenced when one says that ‘p seems a certain way’, or ‘p appears true.’ Secondly, the S-
Account holds that all seemings of whatever kind, be it perceptual, mnemonic, intellectual, or 
introspective, confer some degree of justification, no matter what their content.
179
 
Furthermore, the S-Account claims that all of our beliefs are based upon the way things seem 
to us, and as a result, alternative views which deny the justificatory clout of all seemings are 
doomed to self-defeat.  In the context of providing an epistemology for ethical belief, 
Huemer’s account implies that ethical intuitions get to justify in virtue of (i) being a type of 
seeming state, and (ii) the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism. Since ethical intuitions are 
a type of seeming-state, this is sufficient for them to generate some degree of prima facie 
justification for belief. From this it is perhaps apparent that ethical intuitionists might be 
attracted to defending something like PC since it neatly affords them an epistemology of ethics 
by associating, e.g. ethical intellectual seemings about substantive propositions, with a broader 
class of seemings which (arguably) have more epistemic credibility. Furthermore, they might 
want to defend the self-defeat argument since if the denial of PC is self-defeating and PC 
                                                 
179
   Huemer thinks that weak or wavering seemings or appearances don’t confer full-blown justification, but 
presumably he thinks that all non-weak and non-wavering seemings can confer some measure of prima facie 
justification such that, absent defeaters, the subject has a justified belief. 
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entails PC*, they are – bracketing scepticism - guaranteed an epistemology of intuitive 
justification. 
 
In the following section, §2, I would like to suggest ways in which opponents of Huemer’s S-
Account might resist the claim that all principles that fall short of PC are self-defeating. 
Specifically, I want to suggest that some versions of RPC could indeed avoid self-defeat. I will 
begin by casting doubt upon the idea that all of our beliefs are based on seemings, where this 
is understood as the claim that there is a unified category of mental state called a seeming state 
upon which all our beliefs are based (in normal circumstances).
180
 This is worth considering 
since if it could be shown that there are qualitative differences between different sorts of 
seeming state, then it opens up the possibility that one could deny that, e.g., many or most 
ethical seemings justify, without entailing some sort of general scepticism about the ability of 
seeming states to justify. Furthermore, it opens up the possibility for restricted versions of 
RPC. Following from this it will be suggested that there are ways in which a proponent of 
RPC could avoid self-defeat and that this opens up the possibility for a restricted version of PC 
that excludes seemings about, e.g., many or most substantive ethical propositions. Finally, I 
will suggest that it is not obvious how seemings about substantive propositions are supposed 
to justify belief in their contents. Thus, the conclusion of this section will be that ethical 
intuitionists have work to do in order to demonstrate that our ethical intuitions typically confer 
prima facie justification. 
 
2. Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument 
A key part of Huemer’s S-Account of the justificatory power of ethical intuitions is that 
ethical intuitions are members of a more general class of mental state, namely, seeming states. 
Given this, someone who is sceptical of the ability of ethical intuitions to justify beliefs, will 
be in danger of committing themselves to a general scepticism about the justificatory power of 
seemings. This appears to follow since if ethical seemings are no different from other sorts of 
seemings (except for their having an ethical content), then presumably they will justify belief 
in their contents in the same sort of way. So if someone denies that ethical seemings can 
justify, it seems to follow that they will be in danger of committing themselves to the claim 
                                                 
180
  Another way to resist this would be to claim that we can imagine beings (perhaps not human beings), who 
typically form their beliefs on the basis of other mental states, e.g. acquaintances with things. See DePoe 
(forthcoming) for a recent argument to this conclusion. 
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that all seemings fail to justify. This sort of general scepticism won’t strike many people as 
very plausible or attractive.  
 
Is there a way of resisting the claim that ethical intellectual seemings justify in the same way 
as other seemings, e.g. perceptual seemings? In a recent paper, M.S. Bedke (2008) has 
suggested that it is in fact possible to draw distinctions between kinds of seemings in a way 
that suggests they justify belief in their contents in different ways. Recall that Huemer’s view 
is that all seemings are a sui generis intentional attitude taken towards some content, e.g. a 
perceptual seeming is taken towards a perceptual content
181
, an intellectual seeming is taken 
towards an intellectual content etc. According to Bedke, Huemer has failed to make important 
distinctions between types of seeming state. Most notably, Bedke argues that perceptual 
seemings can be distinguished from intellectual seemings by virtue of the following sort of 
feature: for perceptual seemings the seeming is in the content of the perceptual experience, i.e. 
it is not some attitude taken towards a perceptual experience. Bedke offers the following 
illustrative example: 
 
consider a case where a representative agent, Abraham, looks at a stick that is 
placed in some water causing in him a sensory experience whereby it seems to 
Abraham that the stick is bent… the question is whether the seeming is in some 
special attitude taken toward the content, or in the content itself. A little 
reflection reveals the second option as the natural way to think about the case. 
If the seeming were in the attitude then it should be possible for Abraham to 
have the very same bent-stick experiential content before his mind without it 
seeming that the stick is bent. Just toggle the seeming attitude off and place 
some other attitude in its stead. Yet this is not a genuine possibility.
182
  
 
Bedke contrasts the perceptual case with that of intellectual seemings, e.g., the seeming that 
2+2=4. According to Bedke, it doesn’t make sense to say that the seeming is in the content in 
the same way as it is in the perceptual case, i.e., it does seem possible to consider the content 
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    Note that I am tentatively assuming that perceptual experiences do have contents but not that such contents 
are propositional. 
182
     Bedke (2008),  p. 259 Contra-Bedke, someone might argue that seeming isn’t built into the content in 
perceptual experience, but rather, is the attitude one takes towards the content. One could hold that perception, 
perceptual imagination and perceptual memory all could potentially involve the same phenomenal character (and 
hence content), yet differ in attitude, e.g., in perception: it seems now; in imagination: it seems possible; in 
memory: it seems that it was. Thanks to Fiona Macpherson for this suggestion. 
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2+2=4 without its seeming to you to be true. If this doesn’t sound right – perhaps because 
2+2=4 is so obviously true - think of a more complex and less obvious a priori proposition, 
e.g. knowledge requires true belief. In this case it seems uncontroversial that a subject could 
have that content before their mind without it seeming to them to be true. Bedke’s point is that 
this isn’t the case for perceptual seemings where the seeming is in some sense built in to the 
content of the perceptual experience and is not some attitude taken towards it. If we think that 
this is reasonable then it might also seem appropriate to extend this point about perceptual 
seemings to some cases of introspective seemings, e.g., the seeming that I am in pain. Again, it 
is not obvious that it makes sense to say that we can toggle the presence of the seeming on and 
off whilst experiencing pain. 
 
In addition to this, someone might also reasonably argue that there are qualitative differences 
between kinds of intellectual seeming. For example, Bedke claims that we can make 
distinctions amongst intellectual seemings, namely, between those that are competence-driven 
and those which are not. Bedke’s distinction between competence driven and non-competence 
driven intellectual seemings appears to map on to, or is at least closely related to, the 
distinction between non-substantive and substantive propositions. Roughly, competence-
driven seemings will typically be had for non-substantive propositions. Bedke’s claim is that 
there is a qualitative difference between these kinds of seeming: in the first case, there is 
something like a felt-veridicality or felt-appropriateness plus a feeling that judgment is 
required by the concepts figuring in the proposition, whereas in the second case there is 
simply the phenomenology of felt-veridicality or appropriateness.
183
 Given these putative 
phenomenological differences Bedke thinks that we have reason to believe that these sorts of 
seemings belong to distinct kinds. In addition to what Bedke claims, some philosophers might 
also think that ethical seemings quite generally can be distinguished from non-ethical 
intellectual seemings in virtue of their connection to the will, i.e., ethical seeming states have 
some necessary connection with motivation. If this were correct then it might provide an 
alternative way of distinguishing between ethical seemings and other intellectual seemings, 
e.g., the seemings that are apparently evinced in response to non-ethical philosophical 
thought-experiments. 
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    This might be similar to Lawrence Bonjour’s thought that the phenomenology of considering a conceptually 
necessary proposition involves a feeling that the propositions must be true and could not be false. I admit that the 
phenomenological difference between competence driven and non-competence driven seemings is likely quite 
subtle, if indeed there is one at all. 
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If we suppose that Bedke is correct in his general claim that there are important differences 
between seeming states, then this makes Huemer’s claim that all our beliefs are based on a 
unified category of mental state look dubious. Moreover, it also goes some way to neutralizing 
the worry that denying the justificatory powers of, e.g. intellectual ethical seemings about 
substantive propositions, commits us to making similar – less plausible – claims about the 
justification-conferring power of, e.g., perceptual or introspective seemings. Since these 
seemings are plausibly regarded as belonging to distinct kinds, doubting the epistemological 
credentials of one need not cast doubt – even prima facie - on the epistemic credentials of all 
types of seeming.  
 
Presumably, Huemer could agree with all that has been said thus far whilst still denying that 
any restricted version of his Phenomenal Conservatism is plausible. Recall from §1 that 
Huemer believes that all restricted versions of his Phenomenal Conservatism will fall foul of 
his self-defeat argument. According to Huemer, restricted versions of PC will have the 
following general structure: 
 
RPC: S has defeasible justification for believing that p iff (i) it seems to S that 
p and (ii) R(S, p). 
 
Huemer thinks that any version of RPC will be self-defeating since (i) it is not possible to 
identify some plausible and non-ad-hoc epistemological property that distinguishes some 
seemings from others, and (ii) it is never the case that a belief held in normal circumstances is 
based upon the fulfillment of its seeming to an S that p and the additional feature of seemings 
that versions of RPC identify. So, e.g., no S bases her belief on its seeming to her that p and 
p’s being a necessary proposition. For Huemer, the seeming state that p probabilistically 
screens off the belief that p from any other factor, such as, e.g., the proposition p’s being 
necessary. So any restricted version of RPC with this form will entail that all beliefs are 
unjustified since, by their own lights, no beliefs will be based upon an adequate justification 
for a proposition.  
 
So even if it is true that there are distinct kinds of seeming, any epistemological theory that 
seeks to restrict the class of seeming states that can justify is, according to Huemer, doomed to 
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do so in an ad hoc way and will, in any case, be self-defeating. The task for the opponent of 
PC is to come up with a good reason for thinking that there are plausible epistemological 
distinctions to be made and to then show that their RPC is not self-defeating. I think that it is 
possible to do so, but before explaining how and why, I would briefly like to mention one 
good reason for thinking that PC isn’t plausible as an epistemological theory. Consider the 
following, which I take to constitute a counter-example to the sufficiency claim of PC
184
 (and 
a counter-example to the idea that the causal etiology of a seeming has no impact on its ability 
to confer justification): 
 
Wishful-Thinking: For some reason David really wants it to be true that he is 
a Jedi Warrior. His desires are such that whenever he considers the proposition 
that I am a Jedi Warrior it seems (intellectually, let’s say) to him to be true, 
although the proposition wouldn’t seem to him to be true if he lacked these 
desires. According to PC, David has some degree of justification for his belief.  
 
The opponent of PC should agree that this simply isn’t plausible. An epistemological theory 
that countenances any degree of justified belief on the basis of wishful-thinking appears to 
have gone seriously wrong – this holds even once we allow that David’s belief will likely be 
defeated very quickly.
185
 Of course, Wishful-Thinking will likely not impress the staunchest 
defenders of PC, but it is not my purpose here to try to persuade adherents to the view. 
Instead, I simply present Wishful-Thinking as the sort of example which should make us think 
twice about holding the view that seemings are always sufficient for some degree of prima 
facie justification. 
 
By considering examples like this, I think we can begin to identify the sorts of epistemological 
properties that defenders of RPC could identify in order to distinguish some seeming states 
from others (contra Huemer’s odd claim that this is not possible). I do not wish to commit 
myself to any particular view here, but will merely suggest what I take to be one plausible-
sounding account. One thing that seems problematic about Wishful-Thinking is that if one 
simply believes what one desires to be the case, it is unlikely that one’s beliefs are going to be 
true, and hence simply believing on the basis of desire-based seemings will be unlikely to 
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    Huemer’s account also entails that it is a necessary condition on an S having a justified belief that S’s belief 
is held upon the basis of a seeming. 
185
   Although I think it is possible to come up with scenarios whereby David’s belief would go on undefeated. 
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constitute a reliable way of forming beliefs.
186
 Contrast this with the case of perceptual 
experience; it seems that once we bracket scepticism, there is widespread agreement that 
perceptual experience constitutes a reasonably reliable way of forming beliefs about the 
world.
187
  
 
Similar points could plausibly be made for introspection and memory, and what Bedke calls 
competence-based intellectual seemings. With regard to the latter, if one has adequate grasp of 
certain concepts then this plausibly might make one reliable with respect to certain non-
substantive (and perhaps some substantive) propositions in which those concepts figure.
188
 
The thought here is that grasping
189
 certain concepts puts one in a position to form true beliefs 
(based on seemings, which will in turn be based on understanding) about propositions in 
which those concepts figure. What of substantive ethical seemings? If it is indeed the case that 
substantive ethical seemings are different in kind from competence-based intuitions, and if this 
entails that they are not based simply on a grasp of concepts, then this might be some reason 
for thinking that an alternative process is being employed.
190
 Hence, substantive ethical 
seemings may not be able to legitimately piggy-back on the alleged reliability of competence-
based seemings. Indeed, Huemer himself (2008) appears to be somewhat sceptical of the 
reliability of substantive ethical intuitions (although he would of course say that they still have 
some initial prima facie justification which is then defeated once, e.g., their dubious origins 
are discovered).  As a result, different epistemological conclusions might be reached with 
regard to both of these types of intellectual seeming. I will have a little more to say on this 
issue at the end of the section. 
 
Even if Huemer accepts this, he will still claim that restricted versions of RPC are doomed to 
self-defeat. This is because he thinks that  
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     I loosely discuss reliability here, but I think that similar points could be made in terms of proper function, 
see Plantinga or along virtue epistemological lines. 
187
    Plausibly this might have something to do with the fact – if it is a fact - that perceptual seemings are in the 
content of perceptual experience. The reason for thinking this is that if there are less intermediaries between the 
world and belief, then, ceteris paribus, it seems right to say that there are less opportunities for error to arise.  
188
   Huemer (2005) suggests something like this view. Although note that he thinks it applies in the case of all 
ethical intuitions, substantive and non-substantive. 
189
   In order to avoid this sounding like Gödelian perception, the grasping of concepts had better not involve 
causal relations. 
190
   If substantive ethical intuitions do not simply flow from conceptual competence, then it is not altogether 
obvious what process is being employed. 
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one who would avoid the self-defeat argument by proposing a restricted 
phenomenal conservatism, then, must argue not only that there is some 
epistemically relevant difference between some appearances and others, but 
also that this difference makes a difference, causally, to what we believe. It is 
unlikely that this constraint is satisfied.
191
 
 
Versions of RPC involve ruling out that certain types of seeming can provide any 
justification.
192
 So, e.g., a radical empiricist might argue that only perceptual, introspective 
and mnemonic seemings can justify, and that no intellectual seemings can confer justification. 
Alternatively, someone might deny that perceptual seemings justify their contents, e.g., 
because there is an inappropriate relation between the contents of perceptual experience, 
perceptual seemings and perceptual belief. According to Huemer, it will then be up to them to 
show that whatever epistemologically relevant characteristic they identify as setting these 
states apart from intellectual seemings plays the requisite causal role in belief-formation. As 
was stated earlier, Huemer appears to think that this additional characteristic must be some 
sort of relation holding between the individual and a proposition, however, I am not clear on 
why this has to be the case. Instead, it seems better to characterize versions of RPC as 
claiming the following: 
 
RPC: S has defeasible justification for believing that p iff (i) it seems to S that 
p and (ii) the seeming that p has epistemological property, F. 
 
Huemer’s claim is that in order to avoid self-defeat, it must be possible for a belief to be based 
on both (i) and (ii), i.e. that it seems to S that p, and that the seeming has property, F. 
Otherwise, S’s belief would only be based upon a partial condition for justification. Put 
another way; given the claim that a belief is justified only if it is held upon an adequate 
justification for it, Huemer thinks that since all our beliefs – in normal circumstances - are 
based upon seemings (and nothing else), no beliefs will be based upon the conjunction of (i) 
and (ii), i.e. no beliefs will be based upon a sufficient justification for belief. Hence any 
version of RPC will be self-defeating. 
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    Huemer, M.,(2007),  p. 43 
192
   Of course they don’t entail this. Someone could hold a view that excludes, e.g., intellectual seemings from 
the class of seemings that confer prima facie justification but yet claim that they can confer some justification 
which would be insufficient for justified belief even in the absence of defeaters. 
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Before proceeding to a response to this, I would like to make two points about Huemer’s 
argument. Firstly, it is not altogether obvious that Huemer’s PC isn’t itself in danger of facing 
self-defeat. The reason for thinking this is due to the following: Huemer claims that some 
beliefs can be formed without a seeming state, e.g., in cases of self-deception, leaps of faith 
etc (there are bound to be others, e.g., he might claim that beliefs held on the basis of emotions 
don’t involve seemings). Call all the possible bases for belief that Huemer allows for 
scheeming states. Given this, it appears to be open for someone to claim that, as a matter of 
fact, all of our beliefs are formed on the basis of scheeming states and not on seemings. Of 
course, seeming states are members of the class of scheeming states but a belief’s being a 
scheeming, in some sense, probabilistically screens off the relevant belief, i.e., in some cases, 
if it scheemed to S that p but it did not seem to S that p, S would still, ceteris paribus, form the 
belief that p. If this is correct, then it is not obvious that Huemer’s PC doesn’t itself face self-
defeat, given that it is seemings that justify and no belief is formed on the basis of a seeming 
(but are instead based upon scheemings). In response, Huemer will likely claim that the notion 
of a scheeming state is gerrymandered and, unlike seemings, is not a natural kind. Perhaps he 
would be correct in claiming this (although similar points might be made about the notion of a 
seeming). However, I think that Huemer will have to say a good deal more about just why his 
own account doesn’t face self-defeat.193  
   
The second point I want to make is that a defender of RPC could concede Huemer’s point 
about justified belief but still hold fast to their belief in RPC. That is to say, a defender of RPC 
could claim that only certain seemings can confer sufficient justification for belief, and admit 
that no belief is based upon both (i) and (ii). However, they could potentially evade the charge 
that their account is self-defeating by allowing that all beliefs based upon seemings (of any 
sort) can confer some degree of justification, but where this degree of justification is 
insufficient – even if undefeated – for outright reasonable belief. Such a view would of course 
be odd, but it is not entirely obvious that it would be self-defeating to hold such a view. It 
might be self-defeating if it entailed that it was epistemically inappropriate for the proponent 
of such a view to hold belief in their version of RPC. However, it is not obvious that 
justification and epistemic appropriateness necessarily go hand in hand, e.g., there may be 
cases where it is epistemically appropriate to form a belief without justification such as might 
be the case for beliefs about the existence of the external world. 
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 Thanks to Martin Smith for suggesting this line of argument. 
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Even if this strikes the reader as an unattractive option, I think that the adoption of such a 
position is in all likelihood unnecessary since there is a way in which defenders of a version of 
RPC can deflect the charge of self-defeat. Demonstrating this will open up the possibility for 
restricted accounts of PC that do not include all ethical intellectual seemings amongst the class 
of seeming states that are capable of conferring justification. Hence the conclusion of this 
section will be that ethical intuitionists cannot rely on the claim that denial of PC (which 
entails PC*) is self-defeating in order to defend their epistemological claim. 
 
I think that the best way for defenders of RPC to respond to Huemer’s self-defeat argument 
would be to deny Huemer’s supposition that, in order to be justified by the lights of RPC, a 
belief would have to be based on conditions (i) and (ii). Instead, the proponent of RPC ought 
to claim that, although only some seemings bear their favoured epistemological property, F, so 
long as the subject’s belief is formed on the basis of a seeming that p which does bear this 
property, then it is based upon an adequate justification for p and is hence justified.
194
 Notice 
that such a position is consistent with Huemer’s claim that seemings are always the proximate 
cause of our beliefs formed in normal circumstances. It need not be the case that any S has a 
dual basis for their belief, i.e. its seeming that p plus the fact that the seeming has property F 
in order for it to be justified, where this is understood as the claim that two competing causal 
bases are providing a joint-basis for belief. To illustrate these points, consider the following 
version of RPC (which I merely use as an example): 
 
RPC*: S has defeasible justification for believing that p iff (i) it seems to S that 
p and (ii) the seeming that p is either built into the content of experience or is 
the intellectual outgrowth of conceptual competence.
195
 
 
What I think a defender of RPC* should say in response to Huemer is that it need not be the 
case that a subject’s belief is based upon a conjunction of (i) and (ii). Rather, so long as S’s 
belief is based upon a seeming that does in fact fulfill one of the disjuncts in condition (ii), 
then if they believe on the basis of that seeming their belief is justified.  
 
                                                 
194
    See Depaul, M., (2009) for a similar point. 
195
    I can imagine someone plausibly arguing that these features are epistemological relevant. 
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Indeed, it is worth pointing out there is something odd about Huemer’s claim that subjects 
would have to base their belief on a conjunction of (i) and (ii) and the claim that no S would 
base their belief on such a conjunction. The oddity lies in the fact that it seems to treat (i) and 
(ii) as if they were alternative or competing bases for belief, and that opting for one is 
exclusionary of the other. My claim is that it doesn’t always make sense to say this. Although 
it might make some sense if we were - to take an example of Huemer’s - choosing between the 
fact that p and the seeming that p as being the proximate cause of belief, I don’t see how it 
could apply in the case of, e.g., RPC*. To illustrate, consider the following counterfactuals, 
the putative truth of which Huemer presumably thinks demonstrates that no S bases her belief 
on (i) and (ii): 
 
(iii)   if it seemed to S that p, but the seeming that p was neither built into the 
content of experience nor the intellectual outgrowth of conceptual competence, 
then S would, ceteris paribus, believe that p. 
(iv)  if it seemed to S that p where the seeming was either built into the content of 
experience, or the seeming that p is the intellectual outgrowth of conceptual 
competence, but it did not seem to S that p, then S would, ceteris paribus, not 
believe that p. 
 
Now, if we assume that there exist seemings besides perceptual and intellectual seemings then 
counterfactual (iii) looks to be true. Notice, however, that the antecedent of (iv) is impossible, 
e.g., it would be impossible for it to perceptually or intellectual seem that p to S and at the 
same time it not seem that p to S. Something has clearly gone awry here. I suggest that the 
problem is in thinking of conditions (i) and (ii) as competing or exclusionary bases for belief. 
An S can base her belief on a seeming which is, e.g., the intellectual outgrowth of conceptual 
competence, and that belief be justified in virtue of it being a seeming with that property. This 
is consistent with claiming that if the seeming that p did not fulfill one of the conditions in 
RPC*, then it would not be justified.
196
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 An alternative way of attacking Huemer’s self-defeat argument against RPCs, in the vicinity of the 
suggestions outlined, is to question why we should think that the second condition of RPC (i.e. the special 
epistemological property) has to be thought of as an additional justifier for belief, rather than an enabling 
condition on a seeming being able to be justification-conferring. Thanks to Martin Smith for suggesting this. 
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I find this response to the self-defeat argument highly plausible. Hence there is much 
philosophical work to do for ethical intuitionists who are attracted to the S-account. I have 
shown in this section that they can no longer rely on PC and the self-defeat argument to 
support their epistemological claim. Given that versions of RPC are not necessarily self-
defeating, defenders of the S-account will either have to show that my arguments against the 
self-defeat argument are unsound or provide some plausible-sounding story as to why ethical 
intuitions (or ethical intellectual seemings) are to be included amongst the class of seemings 
that do provide justification. To put further pressure on ethical intuitionists consider the 
following ethical RPC: 
 
ERPC: S has defeasible justification for believing ethical proposition p iff (i) it 
seems to S that p, and, (ii) S’s seeming that p is competence-driven. 
 
Someone could hold ERPC and claim that seemings about substantive ethical propositions are 
not justified. One reason for thinking that it is plausible is that we have a potentially good 
explanation for why competence-driven seemings about non-substantive propositions are 
justified: they are the upshot of concept possession. So long as we have some story as to how 
our concepts are adequately hooked up to the world then it seems that we thereby have a 
decent story to tell vis-à-vis the justificatory power of competence-driven seemings. However, 
it is not at all obvious that anything like this story is available to those seeking to defend the 
justification-conferring powers of non-competence driven ethical seemings about substantive 
propositions, i.e. it would take a lot of argument to show that they are somehow the result of 
conceptual competency in the same or similar sort of way. Hence, the defender of the S-
Account of ethical intuitions will need to say a lot more about why we should think that, e.g., 
non-competency based ethical intuitions about substantive propositions, do indeed get to 
confer justification for belief.
197
  
  
In the following section I will apply more pressure on the S-Account by arguing that, given 
some plausible-sounding conceptions of non-inferential justification, it is committed to the 
                                                 
197
   Ralph Wedgwood (2007) attempts to give an account of this by appealing to the notion of the primitive 
rationality of some ways of forming beliefs; roughly, that being capable of a given type of attitude (such as a 
substantive ethical seeming ) requires having at least some rational dispositions with respect to that attitude. He 
illustrates by reference to sensory experience ‘[i]t may be that it is essential to sensory experience that any subject 
who has such experiences has some disposition to have experiences that veridically represent certain aspects of 
her environment’, p. 231. Wegdwood claims that we can make similar claims about our normative/ethical 
intuitions (in this context, ethical seemings). However, see Lenman (2010) for an argument against this strategy.    
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implausible claim that all of our justified beliefs – formed in normal circumstances - are non-
inferentially justified.
198
 I will then show that the most plausible available responses to this 
either lead to further problems or involve giving up central claims of the S-Account. Hence, 
the prospects for the S-Account are significantly bleaker than has so far been thought. Ethical 
intuitionists should therefore think twice about pinning their hopes on the S-Account to deliver 
an ethical epistemology.  
 
3. An Implausible Conclusion 
Recall Huemer’s account of Phenomenal Conservatism: 
 
PC: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at 
least some degree of justification for believing that p. 
 
PC claims that no matter what the content or the etiology or the type of seeming that is 
involved, if it seems that p to S then that seeming confers some degree of propositional 
justification for S’s believing p. I have so far focused on whether we are necessarily 
committed to something like PC (or else face self-defeat). However, I would like to now focus 
on the nature of the justification posited in PC, i.e. I want to consider the question of whether 
the justification we get from a seeming is inferential or non-inferential and just when and how 
there is a difference. As we shall see, under some recent plausible accounts of what it is for a 
belief to be non-inferentially justified, Huemer’s account entails that all beliefs are non-
inferentially justified. 
 
To begin to see why this is true, and to relate the discussion directly to the ethical case, 
consider again PC*: 
 
PC*: If it initially intellectually seems to S that p (and p is an ethical 
proposition), then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some degree of 
justification for believing that p.
 199
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    I do not think that qualification for normal circumstances has a significant impact on the claim that all of our 
justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified: given that leaps of faith and self-deception are epistemically-
dubious I don’t think the claim that all of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified is too strong. 
199
   It is important to note that other intuitionists appear to be committed to something very similar to PC*, e.g. 
Robert Audi (2010) appears to think that an intellectual seeming which is somehow the outgrowth of an adequate 
understanding gets to confer defeasible justification. Note that he also thinks that all perceptual seemings get to 
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Although Huemer is explicit in saying that ethical intuitions are to be identified as initial 
intellectual seemings – or the way things seem to us prior to reasoning – he says very little, if 
anything, about whether the sort of justification referred to in PC* or PC is to be understood as 
inferential or non-inferential.
200
 Such an omission might seem puzzling given that ethical 
intuitionism – of which he is a major proponent – is meant to be the view that we have some 
non-inferential justification for ethical beliefs and some non-inferentially justified ethical 
beliefs. As far as I can tell, the only place where this issue is even referred to is on page 102 of 
his (2005) where he states: 
 
an intuition that p is a state of its seeming to one that p that is not dependent on 
inference from other beliefs and that results from thinking about p, as opposed 
to perceiving, remembering or introspecting.
201
 
 
One might think that the dependency that Huemer refers to here is some sort of inferential 
dependency. If so, from this we might surmise that non-initial intellectual seemings with an 
ethical content are distinguished by the fact that their justification depends upon their standing 
in certain inferential relations to other beliefs. Indeed, something like this appears to be 
suggested when Huemer considers propositions such as We should privatize social security 
and Abortion is wrong: ‘Though these propositions seem true to some, the relevant 
appearances do not count as ‘intuitions’ because they depend on other beliefs’.202 
 
However, if Huemer means by this that our justification for belief and justified belief in non-
intuitive cases depends for its epistemological status on inferential relations to other beliefs 
then it is not at all clear that this is consistent with Huemer’s overall picture about the 
justificatory dependency of our beliefs upon seemings. For recall that Huemer claims that all 
of our beliefs – in normal circumstances - are held on the basis of seemings, and recall that 
Huemer thinks that all seemings can confer some degree of justification. Given that seemings 
are to be understood in distinction to beliefs, then it would seem reasonable to infer from what 
Huemer says that all of our beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states (in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                         
justify. 
200
   That said, in his (2001) he states that it is a principle for foundational justification. However, in more recent 
work it is to apply to all of our justified belief. 
201
    Huemer, M., (2005), p. 102 
202
    Ibid. 
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defeating evidence – which will presumably be other seeming states). This would seem to be 
true whether we are talking about intuitive or non-intuitive cases, e.g. whether we are talking 
about the seeming that 2+2=4 or the seeming that Abortion is wrong. This can be expressed in 
the following argument: 
 
P1: All of our beliefs – in normal circumstances - are held on the basis of seemings 
(premise (1) of the Self-Defeat Argument). 
P2: All seemings can confer some degree of justification (PC).  
P3: All seemings are non-doxastic states.  
C1: All of our justified beliefs are justified by, or have some degree of justification in 
virtue of, non-doxastic states. 
 
Consider now what I took to be a plausible interpretation of some recent interpretations of 
what it is for a belief to be non-inferentially justified: 
 
A non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is based by some non-
inferential mechanism on some kind of reasons or evidence, where non-
doxastic states such as experiences and phenomenal and intellectual 
appearances are the relevant kind of reasons or evidence.
203
  
 
It would appear that, given the conjunction of C1 and these plausible-sounding accounts of 
non-inferential justification, we are left with the further conclusion, C*: 
 
C*: all of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified.  
 
Also, we get the same result if we consider an alternative account of non-inferentially justified 
belief
204
: 
 
A non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is justified independently of 
any actual inference and independently of any ability to draw an inference.
205
  
                                                 
203
    This is taken from remarks Väyrynen makes in his (2008) p. 491 
204
    Note, however, that I rejected this account of non-inferential justification in the Introduction. I include it 
here merely for completeness. 
205
   This conception can be gleaned from the claims Sinnott-Armstrong makes in his (2007). 
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This is because, by the lights of the S-Account, all beliefs are justified independently of 
inference or an ability to draw inferences. All beliefs that are based on seemings have some 
degree of justification no matter what. So the S-Account is indeed committed to C*. Put 
another way; the S-Account is committed to the following concomitant claims: there are no 
inferentially justified beliefs; every justified belief is a regress-stopper; every belief is 
epistemically basic. Let me simply state that it seems to me that C* and its associated claims 
are implausible.
206
  
 
If this doesn’t strike the reader as correct it might help to consider an example of an ostensibly 
inferentially justified belief and to see how the S-Account in some sense transforms this belief 
into a non-inferentially justified one. Consider then, the following belief which I would take it 
that most would agree is inferentially justified for normal human beings: the theory of 
evolution is true. It seems – and I trust that I am not anomalous here - that the justification I 
have for believing this proposition is in some way dependent upon some mixture of testimony, 
inference and reasoning. Hence, it doesn’t appear to be a good candidate for non-inferential 
justification. However, consider now what Huemer’s account entails about my belief: Huemer 
will claim that, although I may have read about evolution and acquired good testimony, and 
although I may have gone through some process of reasoning and inference, this process will 
have involved multiple seeming states, e.g. it seems to me that what my biology teacher said 
was correct, it seems to me that this constitutes good inductive evidence etc. Ultimately, and 
most importantly, my resultant belief that the theory of evolution is true will, according to 
Huemer, be based upon the fact that it seems to me to be true (recall premise (1) of the self-
defeat argument). Given that my belief has this basis, and given that, according to PC, the 
seeming state will necessarily confer justification, and assuming the accounts of non-
inferential justification given above, then it looks like my belief counts as epistemically basic 
or non-inferentially justified. The same story holds for any belief the reader cares to imagine. 
As stated, this result strikes me as implausible. 
                                                 
206
     It doesn’t appear to have been Huemer’s intention either. Note the following comments from his (2005): 
‘Phenomenal Conservatism and my version of intuitionism are versions of foundationalism: they hold that we are 
justified in some beliefs without the need for supporting evidence.’ P. 120 Note also the following from 
Huemer’s (2001): ‘its seeming to S as if P is a distinct state from S's believing that P. This is important, since 
otherwise PC would be granting foundational justification, automatically, to all beliefs, and this is not what we 
want; we want to identify a special class of foundational beliefs, to be distinguished from merely arbitrary 
beliefs.’  
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So it appears that the S-account eliminates the class of non-basic justified beliefs. It seems that 
someone might respond in the following ways. Firstly, it might be argued that although all of 
our beliefs might be non-inferentially justified, there might be a foundationalist structure when 
we consider propositional justification, i.e. justification for belief. That is to say, if we focus 
on propositional justification it might be the case that we can still legitimately draw some 
distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs, i.e. although some beliefs provide 
propositional justification for other beliefs, there is a special class of beliefs for which it is 
false that other beliefs confer justification for believing them. Indeed, perhaps the chain of 
reasoning that we undergo (with multiple seemings in-between) when arriving at ostensibly 
inferentially justified beliefs reflects this structure in some way. In addition to this, someone 
might argue that epistemological foundationalism can and should be understood as a 
conditional claim: if there are justified beliefs then they must ultimately be traceable to non-
inferentially justified or basic beliefs. It just so happens that on Huemer’s account all beliefs 
are non-inferentially justified or basic. Although these responses are correct they do not, 
however, impinge upon the implausibility (not just the oddity) of the claim that all of our 
beliefs are non-inferentially justified.  
 
Given this, I think that it is incumbent upon the proponent of the S-Account to say something 
in response.
207
 As an initial response, someone might point out that, although odd, there is 
nothing implausible about C*. After-all, epistemological coherentism is committed to the 
opposite claim, i.e. that all justified beliefs are inferentially justified, but that in itself doesn’t 
count as a decisive mark against it. As a dual counter-riposte I would say that, (i) once we 
reflect upon the nature of, e.g., perceptual justification, coherentism doesn’t seem very 
plausible anyway, and, (ii) the concept of non-inferential justification seems to have an 
intimate link with the idea of direct or unmediated justification
208
 and it just isn’t plausible to 
claim that we have direct or unmediated justification for all of our justified beliefs, e.g. beliefs 
about the truth of complex scientific hypotheses and beliefs about the existence of scientific 
entities such as protons. 
 
                                                 
207
       Although it may be true that externalist accounts of justification, e.g. reliabilism, appear to expand the 
class of non-inferentially justified beliefs, they are not usually as expansive as PC appears to be. Furthermore, 
process reliabilists, e.g. Goldman (1979) distinguish between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes, 
with the former apparently being their gloss on inferential justification. 
208
     Although see Audi (1999, 2004) for a contrary view. 
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Perhaps, then, the thing for proponents of the S-Account to say in this context would be that, 
on the S-Account of justification, the distinction between non-inferential and inferential 
justification just isn’t theoretically significant. What might be meant by this? Perhaps 
proponents of the seemings account should claim that there aren’t really two kinds of justified 
belief. Rather, there is only one such type: seemings-based justified beliefs.
209
 We can 
eliminate the alleged implausibility I have highlighted by simply denying the distinction that it 
presupposes. Although this might be a position for defenders of the seemings account to adopt, 
there remain some problems with it: firstly, Huemer is an ethical intuitionist and ethical 
intuitionism is traditionally and contemporarily regarded as the view that we have non-
inferentially justified belief. For an ethical intuitionist to claim that the distinction upon which 
the epistemological claim of intuitionism rests is theoretically insignificant is puzzling, e.g., 
imagine a disjunctivist claiming that the distinction between veridical perception and 
hallucination isn’t theoretically significant. Secondly, Huemer himself appears to employ 
something like the distinction when he talks about the difference between initial seemings and 
seemings which depend upon other beliefs (see previous quotations). The main problem, 
however, with this response is that it involves dispensing with a distinction that has a long 
philosophical history, and which serves to differentiate between key epistemological positions, 
i.e., foundationalism (including its more recent moderate forms) and coherentism. In other 
words, it would be highly surprising if it turned out that the distinction between inferential and 
non-inferential justification turned out to be theoretically insignificant.  
 
Given this, I would suggest that the proponent of the S-Account should look for an alternative 
response. There appear to be four main options available to them: 
 
(i) Reject the claim that all of our beliefs held in normal circumstances are 
held on the basis of seemings. 
(ii) Reject the claim that all seemings justify. 
(iii) Claim that some seemings are in fact beliefs. 
(iv) Adopt a new and more plausible conception of non-inferential 
justification/non-inferentially justified belief. 
 
                                                 
209
 In private correspondence Huemer has suggested something along these lines. 
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As shall become clear, none of the options (i)-(iv) are going to be of help to the proponent of 
the S-Account: (i) and (ii) involve giving up central claims of the S-Account, (iii) involves the 
commitment to a further problematic claim, while (iv) won’t actually enable the S-Account to 
avoid the commitment to C*.  
 
Suppose that the proponent of the S-account tries to avoid the commitment to C* by opting for 
(i), i.e. rejecting the claim that all of our beliefs held in normal circumstances are held on the 
basis of seemings. How might they go about arguing for this? The best approach here would 
be to point to plausible cases whereby it looks like an S has a belief where this hasn’t been 
formed on the basis of a seeming. Perhaps the following is one such case: 
 
Maths: After working out the answer to the long multiplication sum 235x235, 
Phillip believes that 235x235=55225. However, it doesn’t seem to him that 
235x235=55225, he simply believes this – inferentially - on the basis of his 
calculations. 
 
I find Maths reasonably plausible as a counterexample to the claim that all of our beliefs are 
held on the basis of seemings (in normal circumstances). Perhaps there are many more 
examples like it. However, even if this is true, I think that problems could remain since it still 
might turn out that most of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified, i.e. because most 
of our beliefs are held on the basis of seemings. This would, I think, still be an implausible 
result. Furthermore, once we allow that there is such a thing as a seeming state, it might be 
difficult to conclusively demonstrate that we can believe propositions without their seeming to 
us to be true.
210
 In any case, proponents of the S-Account are likely be highly reluctant to go 
for option (i) since it renders the SDA unsound, and hence involves undermining crucial 
support for PC.  
 
Another option, (ii), for the proponent of the S-Account would be to adopt a restricted version 
of PC e.g., a version which only allows perceptual seemings to justify, perhaps in conjunction 
with some other theory, e.g., epistemological coherentism, about scientific and a priori beliefs. 
By adopting a version of RPC, proponents of the S-Account could avoid the conclusion that 
all of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified, since on this sort of view, only some 
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   For an attempt to show this see Depoe (forthcoming). 
 107 
of our seemings states get to justify. Although this might be a way of avoiding C*, it is 
unlikely to be attractive to them given that it involves giving up their central epistemological 
claim, PC.  
 
Option (iii), i.e. that at least some seeming states are beliefs, also has associated costs for the 
proponent of the S-Account. Although claiming that some seemings are beliefs could avoid 
the conclusion that all justified beliefs are justified non-inferentially, it might not avoid a 
similar conclusion if it turns out that most of our beliefs are based upon seemings that are not 
beliefs. Furthermore, adopting (iii) further muddies the waters as to what exactly a seeming 
state is supposed to be, and certainly puts further pressure on the idea that seeming states 
constitute a unified kind of mental state upon which all of our beliefs are held (in normal 
circumstances). However, in addition to all of this, the most important cost associated with 
option (iii) is that it seems to imply that some beliefs (those that are seeming states) are self-
justifying, i.e. believing that p confers justification for believing that p. This strikes me as just 
as implausible as C* and hence won’t be of any use to ethical intuitionists seeking to make the 
S-Account look more plausible. 
 
Finally, perhaps proponents of the S-Account could try to avoid the commitment to C* by 
presenting a plausible alternative account of what counts as a non-inferentially justified belief; 
one which would not entail that all of our justified beliefs are non-inferentially justified. This 
is what option (iv) involves. Perhaps then, the problem isn’t with the S-Account as such, but 
with the conceptions of non-inferentially justified belief that generate C*. How might such an 
account look? Before outlining a plausible candidate, I suggest that the following ought to 
constitute some desiderata of an account of this concept: firstly, it should entail that our 
everyday perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified; secondly, it should entail that 
introspective beliefs about our own mental states are non-inferentially justified; finally, it 
should not entail that beliefs about highly complex propositions, or beliefs that are ostensibly 
based upon reasoning and inference get to count as non-inferentially justified. Given this, I 
suggest that the following constitutes an improved (although somewhat rough) account of non-
inferential justified belief which meets these desiderata: 
 
Non-Inferential: A non-inferentially justified belief that p held by a subject, S, 
is a belief that is epistemically grounded by some non-inferential mechanism 
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on some non-doxastic state, where the non-doxastic state doesn’t epistemically 
depend upon already held beliefs or the drawing of inferences. 
 
Some clarification of Non-Inferential is in order. As should be clear, the account presupposes 
that S possesses the concepts that figure in p; otherwise they couldn’t form the belief in 
question. Also, the concept epistemically grounded is supposed to pick out something like a 
causal and normative relation: the non-doxastic state causes and provides reason or evidence 
for believing the proposition. The key concept, however, is that of epistemic dependency. The 
first thing to say is that this term cannot be picking out the presence or absence of a mere 
causal dependence. If it were, then it would fail to count – implausibly in my view - as basic 
and non-inferential my perceptual belief based on my perceptual experience as of a red square, 
where my turning my head in the direction of the red square and thereby having that 
experience causally depends upon my believing that there is a red square over there (and 
perhaps desiring to see one). Instead, by epistemic dependency I have in mind something like 
the concept that Robert Audi (1997) employs: roughly-speaking, Audi thinks that to say that x 
is epistemically dependent on y is just to say that y must be known or justifiedly believed by an 
S in order for S to know or justifiedly believe x.
211
 Perhaps, then, the correct way to think of 
epistemic dependency is this: 
 
Epistemic Dependency: for a non-doxastic state, d, to epistemically depend on 
a non-doxastic state(s) or belief(s) that q, r, s…or the drawing of relevant 
inferences, is for it to be the case that, ceteris paribus, the subject, S, would 
have had to have had those non-doxastic states, beliefs, drawn those inferences 
etc. in order for d to be justification-conferring, and that an appropriate 
proportion of those non-doxastic states, beliefs, inferential processes etc. will 
have had to have been justified, justification-conferring or valid (respectively). 
Furthermore, the non-doxastic states/beliefs q, r, s…ought to be in some way 
relevant or appropriately related to the non-doxastic state d, i.e. they ought to 
support d (but where the support relation isn’t inferential).212 
 
                                                 
211
   Audi, R., (1997), p. 117 
        Note that Audi does not employ this in an account of non-inferential justification. 
212
   This might leave the boundaries between inferential and non-inferential justification vague. I am not unhappy 
with this result given that there are in all likelihood borderline cases. 
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On this account, a non-doxastic state that is epistemically dependent on other non-doxastic 
states or beliefs or the drawing of relevant inferences could only confer inferential or mediate 
justification. Indeed, in the case of the seeming that the theory of evolution is true, it is 
plausible to think that, insofar as this sort of seeming could confer justification at all, it could 
only confer inferential or mediate justification. Does this new conception of non-inferential 
justification help the proponent of the S-Account avoid the commitment to C*? Unfortunately 
it does not. The reason for this is that by the lights of PC, no seeming state will ever be 
epistemically dependent in the way specified, because the causal etiology of the seeming state 
has no impact on the justification-conferring powers of the seeming state, i.e. the only sort of 
dependency will be causal and not epistemic. So, on the S-Account, all seemings get to 
justify, and, by the lights of Non-Inferential, all beliefs will be non-inferentially justified. 
Therefore option (iv) cannot help the proponent of the S-Account to avoid C*. Notice, 
however, that a restricted PC could utilize this account of non-inferentially justified belief in 
order to evade the commitment to C*, since at least some versions of this could allow for the 
sort of epistemic dependency specified, i.e. some seemings will only be justification-
conferring if they are the result of, e.g., justified beliefs, other justification-conferring seeming 
states. I will have more to say about RPCs and this issue in the following section. 
 
I therefore contend that we have good reason to think that the prospects for the S-Account, as 
it stands, are bleak. It is therefore doubtful that contemporary ethical intuitionists can rely on 
PC in order to ground their ethical epistemology.  
 
In the final section, I would like to suggest that it is reasonable to think that the most plausible 
seemings account of justification is going to involve some sort of restricted PC. I have already 
explained in §2 that, given the possibility of RPC, ethical intuitionists will have work to do in 
order to show that ethical seemings are among the class of seeming states that do get to justify. 
In the following section I will also suggest that ethical intuitionists who opt for a restricted PC 
ought to adopt a new conception of non-inferentially justified belief. I will propose such an 
account and end by considering some applications of it, including the case of the Rossian 
principles. 
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4. Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism and Non-Inferential Justification 
In the previous sections I have argued that the S-Account – which involves a commitment to 
PC and to the SDA as support – faces serious problems. Specifically, I have shown the 
following: 
 
(a) There are other epistemological principles apart from PC that avoid self-defeat, 
e.g., RPCs. 
(b) PC faces plausible counterexamples. 
(c) The assumptions of the S-Account lead us to an implausible conclusion. 
(d) In order to avoid (c), proponents of the S-Account need to make substantial 
revisions to their position, e.g. adopt a restricted version of PC. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the problems with the S-Account that I have highlighted lead us 
– cumulatively – to the point whereby some sort of restricted PC is the most plausible position 
for someone (e.g. an ethical intuitionist) who is attracted to something like the S-Account to 
adopt,
213
 i.e., given (b), (c) and (d), it appears that we have reason to doubt the truth of a full-
blown PC. In addition, once we accept the truth of (a), we can see that adopting some sort of 
restricted version of PC need not lead to self-defeat.  
 
However, as was suggested in §2, ethical intuitionists who opt for a restricted PC will have 
work to do in order to show that ethical seemings are part of the class of seeming states that do 
get to confer justification for belief. I will not be attempting this task here. Supposing, 
however, that ethical intuitionists can address this problem, proponents of RPC (intuitionist or 
otherwise) will have to show that their epistemology does not commit them to the implausible 
conclusion C*, and that it can avoid allowing for the illegitimate transformation of ostensibly 
inferentially justified beliefs into non-inferentially justified beliefs, e.g., as was the case with 
PC and the belief that theory of evolution is true. In order to do this, it appears that the 
proponent of RPC has three options (although note that they are not mutually exclusive):  
 
(i) claim that some beliefs are not based upon seemings,  
(ii) restrict seemings-based justification to paradigm foundational beliefs,  
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 Contemporary ethical intuitionists like Audi appear to hold something like a restricted PC.  
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(iii) adopt a new conception of non-inferential justification that allows seemings – in 
certain circumstances - to confer inferential justification.  
 
I will suggest that proponents of RPC ought to select option (iii), (although this could be 
adopted in conjunction with (i)), but let me consider these options in turn. 
 
Firstly, the proponent of RPC might claim that some beliefs are not, as a matter of fact based 
upon seemings. For example, they might claim that, e.g., beliefs about scientific hypotheses 
and the existence of scientific entities are not based solely upon seemings but are, instead, 
based upon seemings and background beliefs, or are simply based upon beliefs.
214
 If this is so, 
then by assuming the most plausible extant accounts of non-inferential justification and 
justified belief these justified beliefs would not be candidates for non-inferential justification 
since they are not based upon non-doxastic states. Perhaps then, this could enable RPC to 
avoid the commitment to C*. There are, however, a number of potential problems with this 
approach. Firstly, once we accept that there is such a thing as a seeming state,
215
 there is the 
possibility that all of our beliefs held in normal circumstances are, as a matter of fact, based 
upon seeming states. If this is true, then proponents of RPC would need to give an account of 
how beliefs in complex propositions like the theory of evolution is true get to be justified in a 
way which doesn’t entail that they are non-inferentially justified. Even if this claim about the 
basis for our beliefs isn’t plausible for all our beliefs, it might be more plausible vis-à-vis our 
ethical beliefs, including beliefs that are formed as a result of reasoning and reflection. If so, 
then proponents of RPC would be faced with having to account for how ostensibly 
inferentially justified ethical beliefs (if they are justified at all), e.g., the belief that abortion is 
prima facie wrong, or, the belief that a world, x, with a huge population of lives barely worth 
living would be better than a smaller world, y, with a population with high quality of life, 
provided that x’s population was sufficiently numerous,216 get to be justified. Furthermore, and 
related to this, even if it is false that all of our beliefs (ethical or non ethical) are based upon 
seeming states, it still might be the case that some believers hold their beliefs about ostensibly 
inferentially justified beliefs on the basis of seeming states, e.g., beliefs about complex 
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      In private correspondence, Elizabeth Tropman has endorsed something like this view. 
215
   Contemporary ethical intuitionists like Audi do think that there are seeming states, e.g. see his (2004), 
(2008), (2010). 
      
216
    Huemer himself endorses the repugnant conclusion. See his (2008). Presumably, he thinks that this belief is 
justified by a seeming-state.  
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scientific hypotheses or beliefs based upon scientific observations.
217
 Given that it is not 
implausible to think that such beliefs would be justified, proponents of RPC would therefore 
need to say something about the justificatory status of these beliefs and the sort of justification 
these seeming states can confer.  
 
The second way in which proponents of RPC might avoid the commitment to C* and the 
problem of illegitimate transformation would be to restrict seemings-based justification to 
basic or foundational beliefs, e.g., perceptual beliefs, introspective beliefs, some a priori 
beliefs etc. By adopting this position they would have no problem with there being a 
commitment to C*. However, adopting this position might leave the scope of seemings-based 
justification unnecessarily restricted, i.e., once we allow that there is such a thing as a 
seeming-state it is possible that subjects could base their beliefs upon seemings for non-
foundational or non-basic beliefs. This seems especially pressing in the case of ethical beliefs 
where, as I suggested, it is reasonable that our beliefs tend to be based upon the way things 
seem to us (even beliefs that are the result of reasoning and reflection). In such cases, if we 
simply restrict seemings-based justification to foundational beliefs then by opting for (ii) we 
either have to say that non-foundational beliefs based upon seemings are unjustified, or that 
they are non-inferentially justified. In some cases, neither of these options will be particularly 
attractive, e.g., a case where it seems to a subject that abortion is prima facie wrong, or it 
seems to someone that the so-called repugnant conclusion is true as the result of reasoning and 
ethical reflection.  
 
Given this I suggest that in order to best address these issues, defenders of RPC should adopt a 
new conception of non-inferentially justified belief which allows for non-doxastic states such 
as seemings to confer inferential justification in certain circumstances. Specifically, I think 
that they would do well to adopt the conception offered in the previous section: 
 
Non-Inferential: A non-inferentially justified belief that p held by a subject, S, 
is a belief that is epistemically grounded by some non-inferential mechanism 
on some non-doxastic state, where the non-doxastic state doesn’t epistemically 
depend upon already held beliefs or the drawing of inferences. 
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    See Harman’s famous example of the proton observation (1979). I will discuss this in the following chapter. 
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Recall also, the associated account of epistemic dependency: 
 
Epistemic Dependency: for a non-doxastic state, d, to epistemically depend on 
a non-doxastic state(s) or belief(s) that q, r, s…or the drawing of relevant 
inferences, is for it to be the case that, ceteris paribus, the subject, S, would 
have had to have had those non-doxastic states, beliefs, drawn those inferences 
etc. in order for d to be justification-conferring, and that an appropriate 
proportion of those non-doxastic states, beliefs, inferential processes etc. will 
have had to have been justified, justification-conferring or valid (respectively). 
Furthermore, the non-doxastic states/beliefs q, r, s…ought to be in some way 
relevant or appropriately related to the non-doxastic state d, i.e. they ought to 
support d (but where the support relation isn’t inferential). 
 
I submit that proponents of RPC have good reason to adopt this characterisation (and note that 
it is only a characterisation, not an analysis) of non-inferential justification, and that it, quite 
generally, constitutes an improvement on extant accounts. Unlike those who are committed to 
PC, proponents of RPC can legitimately allow for some non-doxastic seeming states being 
epistemically dependent in the way outlined. That is, proponents of RPC can and should adopt 
the view that the justification conferred by a non-doxastic state need not always be non-
inferential justification. 
  
Not only does this account plausibly enable RPC to avoid a conclusion like C* (and the 
general problem of non-inferentially justified belief being so ubiquitous), but it also avoids the 
problem of the illegitimate transformation of inferential to non-inferentially justified belief. 
Furthermore, it fulfills the desiderata for a satisfactory account of this concept outlined in §3 
for above. At this point, however, someone might reasonably take issue with my use of the 
term non-inferential. Given that epistemic dependency does not entail an inferential 
dependency (since it is plausible that seeming states aren’t inferentially based on anything) it 
might not seem plausible to label this a condition on non-inferentiality. If this seems like a 
problem, perhaps it would be better to distinguish between basic and non-basic beliefs instead. 
Alternatively, one might use the terminology of immediate and mediate justification. Either of 
these alternative labels will suffice; either way, my account provides a more plausible gloss on 
 114 
what justified beliefs of normal epistemic agents are basic or immediate as compared with 
extant accounts. 
 
I will now briefly consider some applications of this improved conception of non-inferential 
or basic justification to the case of ethical beliefs. Firstly, consider the case of non-substantive 
propositions, e.g. murder is wrongful killing (see previous chapter for more details). It seems 
highly plausible that a seeming state about this proposition will simply flow from an 
understanding of it, i.e., from the possession of the concepts figuring in it. This is because it 
seems plausible that understanding this proposition puts subjects in a position to see that it is 
true. Given this, it appears plausible that a seeming state about this proposition will not be 
epistemically dependent on subjects having justification for believing other propositions. 
Hence, justified beliefs in non-substantive propositions will turn out to be non-inferentially 
justified on my conception. This seems precisely the right thing to say about these cases.  
 
What though of the case of beliefs about substantive ethical propositions? Let me begin by 
considering particular cases, e.g., the seemings-based belief that what John did was wrong. In 
this sort of case is the seeming-state epistemically-dependent? I can imagine someone 
claiming that seemings had in response to the non-ethical features of the particular scenarios 
are not epistemically dependent upon beliefs or perceptions of those non-ethical features. This 
would likely involve an appeal to the autonomy of ethics, i.e., that there is no legitimate 
inference from purely non-ethical premises to an ethical conclusion.
218
 However, even if we 
accept this, notice that it might still be the case that seemings about substantive propositions 
are in fact epistemically dependent on other ethical beliefs. In other words, the justification-
conferring powers of seemings about substantive ethical propositions might be similar to the 
putative justification-conferring powers of seemings about scientific propositions, i.e., they 
might depend on the subject having a stock of relevant justified ethical beliefs. Hence, on my 
conception it is an open question whether and which seemings-based beliefs about particular 
cases are non-inferentially justified (setting aside issues of how they are supposed to justify). 
 
Consider now the case of seemings about non-self-evident substantive propositions with a 
general content, e.g., euthanasia is morally permissible. Although I will not be arguing for this 
                                                 
    
218
   There are tricky questions here about what counts as being relevant or appropriately related as it is specified 
in Epistemic Dependency when we are considering the relation between states with ethical and non-ethical 
contents. 
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point, I think that it is plausible that seemings about this proposition will be epistemically 
dependent upon the possession of other justified ethical beliefs, e.g., about particular cases or 
about the badness of suffering. Finally, consider the case of apparently substantive self-evident 
propositions, e.g., the Rossian principles. Recall the previous chapter where it was suggested 
that it is not plausible to claim that an adequate understanding of the substantive Rossian 
principles could ground non-inferential justification for believing them. The ethical intuitionist 
could of course attempt to deny this by claiming that adequate understanding is a non-doxastic 
state. Given recent conceptions of non-inferential justification this would suffice to support 
their claim for non-inferential justification. Recall, however, that in response I argued that (i) 
it is not obvious that, given the reflection on particular cases apparently required for adequate 
understanding, non-inferential justification is conferred by an adequate understanding, and, 
(ii) we haven’t been given sufficient reason for thinking that adequate understanding is a non-
doxastic state.  
 
Firstly, let me say a few things about objection (ii) in light of the foregoing discussion of 
intellectual seeming states. If an ethical intuitionist wanted to avoid having to give a detailed 
account as to why we should think that adequate understanding is a non-doxastic state, they 
could perhaps simply claim that beliefs based upon an adequate understanding are mediated 
by seeming states. Indeed M.S. Bedke (2010) appears to attribute this view to proponents of 
the self-evidence account such as Robert Audi.
219
 Perhaps, then, seeming states which ‘flow 
from’ or are in some sense the ‘intellectual outgrowth’ of an adequate understanding get to 
confer a particularly strong sort of prima facie justification, i.e. the sort we associate with self-
evidence. If plausible, this would neutralise my worry about adequate understanding simply 
being a more-or-less complex set of beliefs. 
 
Despite this, ethical intuitionists still need to face objection (i). Indeed, I think that given my 
improved conception of non-inferential or basic justification, we have even better reasons for 
thinking that beliefs based upon an adequate understanding or seeming states that are the 
intellectual outgrowths of adequate understandings of mediately self-evident substantive 
propositions are not non-inferentially justified. That is to say; even if adequate understanding 
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   Specifically, he claims that Audi (2008) commits himself to the view that ‘(some) ethical intuitions are 
dispositions to believe self-evident ethical propositions based on non-inferential impressions of their truth, where 
the impression of truth flows from adequate understanding.’ For what it’s worth I do not actually agree with this 
interpretation of what Audi claims in his (2008) but this doesn’t impinge on the possibility of holding this view. 
 116 
is a non-doxastic state or if adequate understanding gives rise to a non-doxastic seeming state, 
given that in order to be justified on this basis a subject will have had to reflect on and form 
justified judgments about hypothetical cases, it seems that adequate 
understanding/understanding-based seemings epistemically depend upon the consideration of, 
seemings about, judgments about, these hypothetical cases (or our having prior experiences of 
particular cases). On my conception of non-inferential or basic justification, beliefs based on 
this sort of robust adequate understanding (or seemings that are the outgrowth of such 
understandings) are therefore inferentially or non-basically justified. Although this enables the 
ethical intuitionist to avoid the implausible claim that all non-contingent ethical truths are self-
evident, it requires them to give up the claim that beliefs based upon an adequate 
understanding of the Rossian principles are non-inferentially justified or basic.
220
  
 
Suppose that I am correct in claiming that adequate understanding-based justification is going 
to be inferential justification in the case of the Rossian principles. Surely, however, it is 
possible for someone to have a seeming that p, where p is a Rossian principle, without a 
robust adequate understanding, e.g. simply with a grasp of the meaning of p? I think that this 
is possible, although I would conjecture that the reason why p would seem true to the subject 
in this sort of case would likely have something to do with the similarity between the Rossian 
principles and the sorts of rough-and-ready principles we are inculcated with as children, e.g. 
‘Don’t lie’, ‘Keep your promises’ etc, and not because the subject is in fact in a position to see 
that the principles are true. In this sort of case, is the seeming state justification-conferring? If, 
as seems plausible, the Rossian principles are substantive, then we might think twice about 
claiming that they are justified, given the worries about how exactly substantive ethical 
intuitions get to be justified. Perhaps, however, if the concepts figuring in Rossian principles 
do in fact stand in some relation of containment then perhaps seeming states based upon a 
grasp of their meaning could be said to be competence-driven. Hence, perhaps seeming states 
about them are justification-conferring. Although this might seem plausible, we should keep 
in mind that if, as seems correct, a deeper understanding (a more robust adequate 
understanding) is required in order to see that the Rossian principles are true, then it might be 
the case that only seeming states which are the intellectual outgrowths of this more robust 
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   Of course, this assumes an epistemological particularism; i.e., that we come to see the truth of general 
principles by reflecting on particular applications of it. Although I do not have a developed argument for this 
position I do think it is highly plausible. W.D. Ross certainly held this view, and Audi appears to endorse 
something like it. 
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understanding are correctly regarded as competence-driven. As a result, it is not at all obvious 
whether and how we have non-inferential justification for believing the Rossian principles. 
 
Conclusion 
This concludes my treatment of the S-Account of non-inferential justification. As should be 
clear, I think that we have reason to think that the prospects for the S-Account – as proffered 
by Huemer - are quite bleak. However, I do think that there are considerably better chances of 
some version of RPC being made plausible, although I think that a good deal more work is 
required in order for it to provide support for ethical intuitionism, e.g., given the lack of clarity 
about just how substantive intellectual ethical seemings are supposed to confer justification, 
the prospects for an intellectual seemings-based ethical epistemology are unclear.  
 
In addition to this, I have also argued that we need an improved conception of non-inferential 
justification. Extant accounts appear to allow for the illegitimate transformation of inferential 
to non-inferentially justified belief and also threaten to make the latter sort of justified belief 
too ubiquitous to be plausible. I have already shown that the application of this account to the 
now much-discussed case of the Rossian principles makes more perspicuous my claim that 
they are not in fact candidates for self-evidence.  
 
In the next chapter I want to consider another ethical intuitionist account which has been the 
subject of growing discussion in recent years: the ethical perception account. This seems 
highly relevant to the present discussion given that perceptual seemings are arguably 
paradigms of the sort of seeming state that get to justify belief, and that perceptual seemings 
are usually taken as paradigm examples of states capable of grounding non-inferential justified 
beliefs. 
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Chapter 3: Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Perception 
In the recent ethical literature there has been a growing interest in a view which I will denote 
the ethical perception view (Greco (2000), Watkins & Jolley (2002), McGrath (2004), Goldie 
(2007), Väyrynen (2008), McBrayer (2010), Cullison (2010), Audi (2010), Dancy (2010)): 
 
EP: we have some non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs on the basis of 
ethical perception.
221
 
 
As it is standardly discussed, EP actually involves a conjunction of two claims. The first of 
these is a thesis about perceptual experience: 
 
EP*: ethical agents can have perceptual experiences as of ethical properties. 
 
The second component of EP is a thesis about the epistemological relation between the 
contents of ethical perceptual experiences or the nature of perception and the justificatory 
status of ethical perceptual beliefs that are, roughly-speaking, based upon these experiences: 
 
EPj: ethical agents have non-inferentially justified ethical, perceptual, beliefs. 
 
I have already spoken extensively about non-inferentially justified beliefs referred to in EPj. 
All that is distinctive about EPj is that the non-inferentially beliefs in question are in some 
sense grounded in or based upon perceptual experience. I will have more to say about this later 
in the chapter. Let me then say a little about the details of EP*. In my discussion of EP* I will 
be assuming a standard representational theory of perception which is ‘by far the dominant 
view of perceptual experience in recent years in philosophy (and psychology and 
neuroscience)’222. This is (roughly) the view that to have a perception of an object O as having 
a property F, is to be in a perceptual mental state with phenomenal character which represents 
O as having the property F, i.e. has representational content O is F. It is almost always 
accompanied by the view that perceptual experiences, like beliefs, have accuracy conditions, 
and that specifying the accuracy conditions of a given perceptual experience is a way of 
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  As is customary, I will be focusing on visual perception. For what it’s worth, I think that the only other 
sensory modality which could plausibly be amenable to ethical perception would be audition, e.g., ‘I heard his 
demeaning tone.’  
222
  Macpherson, F. (2011). 
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specifying the content of that experience, i.e., if we know that the experience will be accurate 
iff there is a red ball on a chair, then we also know that the perceptual experience has the 
representational content that there is a red ball on a chair (it is however a point of intense 
debate what the accuracy conditions are of perceptual experiences). This leads on to a popular 
distinction which I will be employing here between perceptions which are necessarily factive 
(‘perceive’ is what is sometimes termed a ‘success’ verb), and perceptual experiences which 
are non-factive, i.e. one could have a perceptual experience which was illusory or 
hallucinatory but if one perceives that there is, e.g., a red apple in front of them, then there 
really must be a red apple in front of them. Finally, I will also be making the relatively 
innocuous assumption that there can be no change in the representational content of a 
perceptual experience without a change in the phenomenal character of that experience and 
vice versa.
223
  
 
Speaking more specifically about EP*, there are a couple of key points upon which 
philosophers agree must be true if EP* is to be plausible. Firstly, if there is any ethical 
perception, it will require some degree of conceptual and cognitive sophistication on the part 
of the perceiver. The general idea seems to be that in order to have ethical perception one 
would need to acquire certain intellectual abilities which augment a more basic perceptual 
endowment.
224
 How precisely we are to understand the mechanism by which one’s perception 
can come to be altered with training is a point which I will return to later. Secondly, and 
somewhat related to the first point, philosophers seem to be in agreement that, if we can 
perceive ethical properties, this need not require some dedicated faculty or organ of ethical 
perception. In the words of Watkins and Jolley (2002), EP* does not require that we have 
‘otherworldly’ perceptual abilities.225 Consider also the following from Dancy (2010): 
 
if we are to make sense of moral perception, it should be as the ordinary 
perception of moral objects or properties. We should not find ourselves 
inventing further senses, or special adaptations of the existing senses, in order 
to make moral perception possible.
226
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  From Macpherson, (forthcoming). 
224
  This idea is discussed in Greco (2000), Watkins and Jolley (2002), McGrath (2004), Väyrynen (2008), 
Cullison (2010) Dancy (2010). The one possible exception to this is Audi (2010), although he thinks that 
conceptual capability is required for what he calls propositional perception. 
225
  Watkins and Jolley (2002), p. 75 
226
  Dancy (2010), p. 113 
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Hence defenders of EP* apparently set out to evade John Mackie’s (in)famous charge that if 
we had ethical perception ‘it would be utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing 
everything else’227, and would therefore be unacceptably mysterious. Indeed, according to 
philosophers who have been interested in EP*, if we have ethical perception, then it need not 
be any different from other putative examples of sophisticated perception, e.g., perceiving that 
someone is feeling uneasy, that that is my house, that you are angry, that the wine is fine, that 
the cliff is dangerous etc.
228
 
 
Speaking roughly; in this chapter I will argue that, although defenders of EP* can respond to 
the recent objections brought against it, it is not at all obvious that EPj is true, i.e., that ethical 
perceptual experiences could ground non-inferential or immediate justification. Hence, even if 
there is ethical perception (and it is my view that this is a big if), this fact might not support 
ethical intuitionism. The possibility of a weaker view about the nature of ethical perception 
and its relation to non-inferential justification will also be discussed. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows:  
 
In §1 I will outline what I take to be the motivations for the EP* and EPj views. 
 
In §2 I will consider the plausibility of EP*. This will involve responding to three recent 
objections to EP*: the Morally Blind Objection, the No High-Level Representation Objection 
and the Looks Objection. It will be argued that the defender of EP* can plausibly respond to 
all three of these objections. Specifically, it will be argued that the most interesting of these, 
the Looks Objection (roughly, the idea that ethical properties, e.g. rightness, cruelty, don’t look 
a certain way) can be undermined if we distinguish between what is phenomenally present in 
experience and what is phenomenally present as absent in perceptual experience.  
 
In §3 I will consider how the defender of EP* might provide a plausible psychological account 
of how ethical properties could come to be represented in experience. It is my view that the 
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  Mackie (1977), p. 38 
228
  For a further sceptical view about literal moral perception see Simon Blackburn (2007), e.g., ‘Literal 
talk of perception runs into many problems… do I have an antenna for detecting timeless property-to-value 
connections? Is such a thing much like colour vision?’ p. 50  
 121 
most plausible sort of account will involve positing (moral) cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience; roughly, the alteration of perceptual contents by states in the cognitive 
system, e.g. beliefs, emotions etc, which have ethical contents. I will outline what I take to be 
some prima facie plausible accounts of how cognitive penetration might work in the ethical 
case; this will involves considering direct and indirect accounts and models which involve the 
penetrating states being beliefs, seemings, emotions and concept possession. Following from 
this I will respond to two further objections to the EP* that posits cognitive penetration: the Is 
There Anything We Don’t Perceive Objection, and the Directness Objection. Again, it will be 
concluded that the defender of EP* can plausibly respond to these.  
 
In §4 I will proceed to evaluate the prospects for EPj. I will begin by explaining why 
philosophers have believed that the truth of EP* is necessary for the truth of EPj, i.e., the view 
that if EP* were false, any justified ethical perceptual beliefs could not be non-inferentially 
justified. I will, however go on to question whether the truth of EP* is sufficient for the truth 
of EPj. That is, I will suggest that even if ethical perception is possible along the lines of MP* 
(involving cognitive penetration), it is not obvious that some or most ethical perceptual 
experiences would get to confer non-inferential justification for ethical belief, and hence it is 
not obvious that the putative truth of EP* supports EPj and ethical intuitionism. This is 
because it seems plausible that ethical perceptions which are the result of cognitive penetration 
will be epistemically dependent upon the penetrating states, if those states are ethical beliefs, 
ethical emotions or ethical seemings.  
  
In the final section, §5 I will briefly discuss a view about ethical perception that claims that 
EP* may not be necessary for the truth of EPj. Roughly, this is the view that we could have 
non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs that are in some sense perceptual beliefs, without 
actually having perceptual experiences as of the instantiation of moral properties. It will be 
suggested that non-doxastic states such as seemings and emotions could possibly facilitate this 
sort of non-inferentially justified ethical belief. 
 
1. The Motivations for EP* and EPj 
In this section I will briefly explain the motivations for holding EP* and EPj. 
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EP* will likely strike many philosophers as odd and some might wonder what the motivation 
for discussing it is. Despite initial appearances, I think that there are at least two primary 
motivating reasons for being interested in EP*. The first of these is what I call the 
phenomenological motivation. Consider the following oft-quoted example from Gilbert 
Harman (1977): 
 
Cat: If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline 
on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is 
wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong.
229
 
 
From this phenomenological datum defenders of EP* think that we have something like a 
prima facie case for the view that the moral seeing described here is non-metaphorical. 
Sceptics might object that all such scenarios establish is a case against the view that when 
making particular moral judgments subjects always consciously (or unconsciously) infer from 
general principles. I will discuss this point later in the essay, but for now it is worth noting that 
EP* seems to at least provide a coherent alternative hypothesis about what goes on in Cat to 
the view that we infer – consciously or otherwise – that what the youths are doing is wrong.  
 
In a sense, the phenomenological motivation – as I have characterized it – offers a response 
(albeit a limited one) to a possible worry about EP*. I have in mind here the thought that our 
ethical life is taken up by reflecting upon real-life or imagined cases, often with a view to 
making an ethical judgment. For example, we may be wrestling with an ethical dilemma 
which we ourselves are faced with, or we may be considering a hypothetical case from an 
ethics textbook. Thus, it might be said that our ethical lives are largely constituted by ethical 
thinking rather than ethical perceiving, which may then lead to questions about the utility of 
sketching something like EP*, i.e. if we can gain ethical knowledge just by reflecting, who 
needs ethical perception? Where is the philosophical problem?
230
 I take it that the 
phenomenological motivation pushes us at least some way towards meeting this challenge; 
insofar as there seem to be cases where subjects have ethical knowledge but where talk of pure 
ethical ‘thought’ or ‘reflection’ seems strained, the ethical perception view has some initial 
relevance and (hopefully) some initial credence. Furthermore, defenders of EP* might claim 
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  (1977), p. 4  
230
  Something like this objection is pushed by Simon Blackburn (2007), p. 50. Similar points are made by 
Michael Smith (1994), see Ch. 2. 
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that in the sorts of scenarios they are interested in, subjects may be unable to appeal to general 
principles or similarity to prior cases.
231
 
 
The second, more significant, motivation for discussing and taking seriously the EP* view is, I 
think, due to recent developments in the philosophy of perception. Call this the high-level-
perception motivation. Almost everyone who thinks that perceptual experiences have 
representational contents agrees that the contents of visual experience will include properties 
pertaining to shape, size, position, colour and object-hood.
232
 It seems to me that some recent 
commentators and defenders of EP*
233
 have derived impetus from the development of a high-
level view about the admissible contents of perceptual experience. For example, Susanna 
Siegel (2006), (2009), has argued that human beings might come to have perceptual 
experiences which represent ‘high-level’ properties (H-properties) such as natural kind 
properties, semantic properties, and causal relations. In this context, it seems that if suitably 
trained perceptual agents can come to perceive that, e.g., the tree over there is a pine, then, 
plausibly, it becomes somewhat less incredible to think that in scenarios like Cat, conceptually 
and cognitively sophisticated agents could come to perceive that what the hoodlums are doing 
is wrong. I will have a lot more to say about the high-level view of perceptual experience in 
§2, but for now it should be noted that, in conjunction with the phenomenological datum 
above, the high-level-perception motivation provides further reason to consider and take 
seriously the EP* view. 
 
Let me briefly say a little about the motivations for EPj. One principal motivation for being 
interested in EPj is that it might be able to contribute to making plausible a naturalistic 
epistemology of ethics. For example, the prominent moral naturalist David Copp (2000) takes 
naturalism to be roughly the view that ethical epistemology is empirical in the sense that it is 
grounded in observation. In addition, Copp thinks that a thoroughgoing naturalism ought to be 
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  Note however, as Jonathan Dancy (2010) nicely points out, that in some cases it seems that reflection or 
judgment must be our way in to moral knowledge as opposed to perception: ‘I might easily run an intellectual 
check on my moral perceptions, and would hardly do it the other way round. I don’t say “Well I reckon it would 
be wrong, but I will be able to check on that when I have done it because then I’ll be able to see whether it is 
right or wrong.”’ (p. 115) Dancy goes on to note, that things seem to be different in the aesthetic case; e.g., the 
best way of checking what the addition of a brush-stroke to a canvas looks like – which we had previously only 
conceived intellectually – is often by simply adding the brush-stroke and seeing what it looks like. 
232
  See Macpherson (forthcoming) 
233
  E.g. Väyrynen (2008) discusses the view explicitly, while McBrayer (2010) seems to have the view in 
mind when defending the possibility of ethical perception. Also, Cullison seems to gesture towards this view in 
his (2010). 
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committed to a sort of methodological naturalism. This is roughly the view that any 
acceptable ethical epistemology must fit with our best empirical psychology. Now, given that 
EPj purports to offer an epistemology which is at least partly grounded in perception, and 
given that theorists of EPj have been keen to stress that there needn’t be anything 
psychologically bogus about the view (from the perspective of empirical psychology), it 
would seem that the EPj view will be a natural focus of philosophical interest for ethical 
naturalists (I think this point holds whether one is a naturalist of the non-reductive or reductive 
kind),
234
 and for those who are interested in the prospects for an empirical ethical 
epistemology. 
 
The second motivation for considering EPj comes from a well-known view about ethical 
knowledge, attributed to Aristotle, that the virtuous agent may be correctly said to attain 
ethical or evaluative knowledge via something akin to ethical perception. The thought is that 
we ought to think of the practical wisdom (phronēsis) possessed by the virtuous agent, as 
being a perceptual capacity.
235
 Now, although ethical intuitionism is not commonly associated 
with virtue ethics (W.D. Ross was, however, a significant Aristotelian scholar), it seems that 
the persistence of interest in this view provides us with at least some reason to think that a 
view about ethical perception is worth considering.  
 
Finally, philosophers ought to be interested in the prospects for something like the EPj view 
insofar as it promises to ground a non-inferential epistemology for ethical beliefs. It is 
commonly assumed that perceptual experiences get to justify empirical beliefs (perhaps all of 
them get to justify – more on this view later), and furthermore, that the justificatory story is a 
non-inferential one. After-all, perceptual states are apparently paradigm examples of non-
doxastic states, and given a plausible understanding of non-inferential justification this 
basically involves non-doxastic states grounding justification for belief (see previous 
chapters). Given this, it would appear to be worthwhile for those interested in the prospects for 
ethical intuitionism (and moral epistemology generally) to investigate the prospects for 
something like EPj. 
 
                                                 
234
  In addition to the attraction EP potentially holds for naturalists, I think that those philosophers who are 
inclined towards moral particularism may also wish to explore the view. Indeed, Sarah McGrath thinks that EP is 
the only sort of view that can account for our knowledge of particular cases. It is also, of course, of interest to 
ethical intuitionists who are interested in defending the possibility of non-inferential moral knowledge. 
235
  For more details see McDowell (1979). 
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Now that I have outlined what I take to be the primary motivations for being interested in EP* 
and EPj I will proceed in the next section to evaluate the prospects for EP*. 
 
2. Evaluating EP* 
In this section I would like to consider three challenges to the EP* view: the Morally Blind 
Objection No High-Level Representation Objection and the Looks Objection. Dealing with 
these objections is important in its own right, but it will also allow us to cash out what the 
most plausible version of EP* might look like. The conclusion of this section will be that the 
defender of EP* can credibly resist these objections. 
 
The first objection to EP* that I am briefly considering is the Morally Blind Objection. The 
worry has been discussed by Andrew Cullison and David Copp in recent articles and can be 
understood via examples like the following: 
 
Morally Blind: Pat and Chris are walking home from school. As they round a 
corner they see some of their undergraduate students pour gasoline on a cat and 
light it on fire. Chris screams 'I can't believe they're doing that! That's so 
wrong!' Pat asks, 'What do you mean?' Chris replies 'Don't you see it? Can't you 
see that it's wrong?' Pat shrugs his shoulders.
236
 
 
The worry which stems from this example, and others like it, is that although Pat is putatively 
failing to pick up on the instantiation of an ethical property, intuitively we are disinclined to 
say that there is anything going wrong with his perceptual faculties. Here is a formalisation of 
the argument:  
 
P1: If there is such a thing as ethical perception then Pat fails to perceive that 
what the hoodlums are doing is wrong and Chris does not fail to perceive that 
what the hoodlums are doing is wrong. 
P2: If Pat fails to perceive that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong and Chris 
does not fail to perceive that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong then Pat's 
perceptual faculties are defective. 
P3: Pat's perceptual faculties are not defective. 
                                                 
236
  This example is taken directly from Cullison (2010). 
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C: No-one can perceive that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong.
237
 
 
The thought amounts to something like this: Pat’s and Chris’ perceptual apparati are both 
working just fine. If Pat evinces any error it is an error of judgment rather than one of 
perception, i.e. perhaps he lacks a relevant set of ethical beliefs connecting animal torture with 
wrongness. Put another way: if Pat’s perceptual apparatus is not defective, then the best 
explanation of their divergent judgments is that neither he nor Chris are perceiving ethical 
properties. 
 
Now, although this argument seems initially attractive it fails to take into account a point 
noted earlier that commentators and defenders of EP* are keen to stress; namely, that moral 
perception will plausibly involve a degree of conceptual or cognitive sophistication and/or the 
possession of some sort of recognitional capacity. Given this, a response to the Morally Blind 
Objection seems to be forthcoming; if we allow that the possession of conceptual or cognitive 
sophistication can enable a perceptual agent to perceptually ‘pick up’ on certain features of the 
world that other agents who lack such sophistication cannot (a central claim of defenders of 
EP*), then P2 of the Morally Blind Objection no longer appears true. Put another way, if we 
can reasonably conjecture that Chris’ perception that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong 
requires some sophistication that Pat does not possess, then we can allow that Pat fails to 
perceive that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong without saying his perceptual faculties are 
defective. This seems plausible if we assume that ethical perception involves some sort of 
skill; we do not normally regard the lack of a skill as a defect.
238
 Alternatively, the defender of 
EP* might claim that, given that Pat is failing to pick up on moral wrongness (due to his 
lacking in sophistication), this can be reasonably regarded as a defect, and hence P3 is false.
239
 
In any case, if this doesn’t seem plausible, it is still open to the defender of EP* to deny P2.240 
Indeed, the Morally Blind Objection begs the question against someone wanting to defend the 
view that, given some conceptual or cognitive sophistication, subjects can perceive things 
                                                 
237
  This argument formalisation is adapted from that found in Cullison (2010). 
238
  Thanks to Michael Brady for this suggestion. 
239
  However, given that some might think that Pat isn’t misrepresenting anything, this strategy may seem a 
good deal less plausible than the former. 
240
 It has been suggested to me by Martin Smith that a more difficult case would be the following: suppose 
that Pat, rather than shrugging his shoulders, insists that what the hoodlums are doing is fine. If there is ethical 
perception then it seems that Pat must be hallucinating. But of course Pat isn't hallucinating so the EP* view 
must be false. I think in response the defender of EP* should admit that such cases of hallucination are possible 
but that these sorts of cases are no more odd than other cases of mis-perception of high-level properties.  
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over-and-above what are normally taken to be basic objects of perception, e.g. objects, colours 
and shapes.  
 
This brings us on to the second objection, the No High-Level Representation Objection, which 
basically amounts to a rejection of the high-level view about the admissible contents of 
experience sketched above, i.e., a denial of the view that in addition to properties pertaining to 
shape, size, position, colour and object-hood, perceptual experiences can represent H-
properties such as natural kinds, causation, individuals etc. The objector will claim that moral 
properties are plausibly regarded as H-properties (based upon an intuitive grasp of the 
distinction between high-level and low-level)
241
, and that since H-properties generally can’t 
get into the contents of experience, there can be no ethical perception.  
 
The fundamental problem with this objection is that it fails to respect what is in fact an on-
going and unresolved debate in the philosophy of perception regarding the admissible contents 
of experience; roughly, between high-level and low-level theorists about perceptual content.
242
 
Of course the objector is correct in claiming that if the high-level view about content is false, 
then EP* is plausibly also false (assuming that ethical properties are H-properties). However, 
the point of import here is that the antecedent of that conditional is far from established, and 
hence the No High-Level Representation Objection fails to establish the falsity of EP*. In 
addition, it fails to take into account the plausible thought that whether a property gets to be 
                                                 
241
  It has been suggested to me by Stuart Crutchfield that, given that the high/low level distinction is to 
some extent stipulative, it is not clear if intuitions about this distinction really cut much ice. 
242
  Recently, high-level theorists have deployed what has come to be known as contrast arguments (see 
Siegel (2006), (2007)). This involves taking the putative difference in the phenomenal character – the what-it-is-
likeness - of a given pair of experiences e and e* with the same (or as similar as is possible) low-level content, 
and inferring that the best explanation of the phenomenal disparity between e and e* is that they differ in high 
level content (note again that the success of such arguments relies on the assumption – which I am making - that 
there can be no change in the representational content of a perceptual experience without a change in the 
phenomenal character of that experience and vice versa). So for example, the phenomenal character of an 
individual who can come to identify pine-trees by sight is plausibly different from the character of their 
experience prior to acquiring this ability. High-level theorists about content will argue that the best explanation 
for the phenomenal disparity is that the pine-tree expert has come to have perceptual experiences which can 
represent the property of being a pine tree. There are of course counter-hypotheses that an opponent will push, 
e.g. either denying that the change in phenomenology is due to a change in the character of perceptual experience 
as opposed to a change in the character of experience elsewhere in one’s cognitive economy, e.g. the making of a 
judgment (which may or may not have phenomenology), or else by resisting the claim that the change in 
character of perceptual experience is due to the representation of an H-property, as opposed to the experience 
involving a different focus in attention. High-level theorists do, however, have things to say in response. No-one 
to my knowledge has proposed similar sorts of contrast cases for moral properties. I suspect that this may be 
because it might be easier for opponents to point to other, non-perceptual sources of phenomenological change in 
overall experience, e.g. emotional phenomenology, to account for any apparent change in phenomenal character. 
Indeed, I doubt that someone could come up with a convincing contrast example for the moral case. 
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represented in experience is something which might need to be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis. Hence, even if the perceptual representation of ethical properties is implausible, this 
neither entails nor is entailed by the truth or falsity of the claim that other H-properties, e.g. 
natural kinds, get to be represented in perceptual experience. Given all this, what will be of 
more interest is an objection to the EP* view which grants or remains agnostic about the claim 
that some H-properties can figure in the represented contents of perceptual experience, but 
which denies that ethical properties are amongst this class.
243
 
 
Let us now consider an objection to EP* which apparently does not rely on ruling out the 
high-level view about content altogether
244
 but instead focuses on the phenomenal 
representation of moral properties as being problematic. Specifically, the objection is 
supposed to boil down to the deceptively straightforward idea that ethical properties, e.g., 
wrongness, cruelty etc don’t look (or sound, smell, feel, taste) like anything. I will follow 
Justin McBrayer (2010)
245
 in denoting this the Looks Objection. 
 
Here is the general point as expressed by the ethical intuitionist Michael Huemer (2005): 
 
For someone to observe that an object is F, where F is some property, there 
must be a way that F things look (or sound, smell, etc.), and the object must 
look (sound, smell, etc.) that way… The point of interest here is that there is no 
such thing as the way wrongful actions look or the way that permissible actions 
look.
246
 
 
More formally, the argument runs: 
 
P1: It is possible to have a perceptual mental state that represents an ethical 
property only if there is a way that ethical properties look. 
                                                 
243
  Of course, someone who is a card-carrying low-level theorist will deny that perception can represent 
moral properties. The point here would be that this doesn’t seem to be an objection to the representation of moral 
properties per se. 
244
 In discussions of the Looks Objection, e.g. McBrayer, it is assumed that the Looks objection is in fact 
independent from a denial of high-level visual representation. I am not convinced that this is the case, given that 
the Looks objection can be plausibly run against just about any putatively represented high-level property. 
Indeed, my conclusion is that defenders of EP* are in no worse a position vis-à-vis the Looks objections as they 
are against the No High-Level Representation objection. 
245
  See his (2010a) 
246
  Huemer, M., (2005), p. 86 
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P2: Ethical properties, e.g. wrongness, cruelty, don’t look a certain way. 
P3: Therefore, it is not possible to have a perceptual mental state that represents an 
ethical property. 
C:  Given a representational theory of perception, EP* is false. 
 
McBrayer (2010) has recently attempted to defend EP* from the Looks Objection (hereafter: 
LO). His method is to consider the extant accounts of looks (which is clearly an ambiguous 
term) and to contend that whichever we assume, the argument which expresses the LO comes 
out as unsound. At this point I wish to express some scepticism about McBrayer’s 
argumentative strategy. It seems to me that McBrayer does not really tackle head-on the 
notion of looks which is of crucial import here, what I am terming phenomenal-looks, i.e., the 
looks which we associate with phenomenal experience in perception. Instead, he considers 
accounts of looks which do not entail phenomenal-looks, and hence I am doubtful that his 
response really addresses the objection. To illustrate these problems, consider the following 
account of ‘looks’ which McBrayer spends some time discussing: 
 
X experiential-doxastic looks F to S iff the way X looks to S disposes S to 
believe that X is F. 
 
Given this way of cashing out the notion that ‘X looks F to subject S,’ McBrayer thinks that 
the LO fails, since he thinks that it is easy to imagine cases where the way things ‘look’ 
disposes an agent to form an ethical belief. I agree that it is indeed straightforward to imagine 
cases, such as CAT, whereby a normally functioning moral agent, S, will likely be disposed to 
form an ethical belief based on the way things phenomenally look. However, although this 
may provide some sort of limited response to a version of the LO I seriously doubt that it 
serves to establish a sufficient reason to think that in such cases S is actually phenomenally 
representing ethical properties and is thus appropriately disposed to form beliefs about their 
instantiation, as opposed to other plausible counterhypotheses, e.g. S’s represents some non-
ethical properties which are filtered through his background beliefs, such that he is 
appropriately disposed.  
 
Thus we might think that although this sense of looks makes P2 of the LO obviously false, it 
seems inappropriate for the sort of looks – phenomenal-looks - that we are talking about and in 
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any case doesn’t appear to be the sense that the objector has in mind.247 That isn’t to say, 
however, that, e.g., the experiential-doxastic sense of looks has nothing to do with 
phenomenology since it is clear enough that the phrase ‘the way X looks’ refers explicitly to 
an agent’s experiential state. The problem is that ‘the way X looks’ is ambiguous between two 
broad interpretations, only one of which involves the phenomenal representation of ‘X as 
F,’248 and that is what is at issue here. To remove the ambiguity experiential-doxastic looks 
would have to be re-written as follows:  
 
X experiential-doxastic looks* F to S iff X’s looking F to S disposes S to 
believe that X is F. 
 
Given this emendation to the experiential-doxastic account of looks, the view that there is non-
controversially a moral ‘look’ may become less obviously correct. 
 
Here I aim to provide an improved response to the LO which I believe does tackle the main 
thrust of the objection. My response involves distinguishing between what can be usefully 
referred to as: 
 
(a)       sensory phenomenal representation or phenomenal presence, and, 
(b) non-sensory phenomenal representation or phenomenal presence as absence. 
 
Before going into the details of my argument, let me firstly give a very rough description of 
the distinction in mind. The thought here is that to be sensorially represented (or to be 
phenomenally present) is to be represented in the same sort of robust way in which colours 
and shape properties get represented. To be non-sensorially represented (or to be 
phenomenally present as absent) is to be represented in experience in some other –somewhat 
less robust - sort of way, i.e. in a way different from the way colours and shapes get 
represented.  
 
                                                 
247
  I would suggest the same for the other sorts of ‘looks’ that McBrayer considers, e.g. comparative-looks. 
248
  I use this locution rather than ‘that X is F’ since I want to remain non-committal as to whether the 
contents of visual experiences are propositional.  
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As will hopefully become clear, my response to the LO amounts to the claim that it involves 
equivocating on the notion of ‘looks’.249 That is to say, if we interpret looks as referring to 
sensory phenomenal representation or phenomenal presence, then although I admit that P2 of 
the LO, which would claim that there is no sensorial representation of ethical properties, is 
probably true, P1, which would limit the representation of moral properties in experience to 
sensorial representation, becomes dubious. Alternatively, if we interpret looks as including 
non-sensorial representation or phenomenal presence as absence, then we have the converse 
result; P1 looks more plausible, but P2 no longer appears to be obviously true. Either way I 
think we have insufficient reason to think that the argument is sound, or so I shall argue.
250
 
 
Let me make some further clarificatory remarks concerning the distinction between categories 
(a) and (b) that I have in mind. The first thing to say is that although the distinction between 
(a) and (b) is potentially very closely related to the debate about whether H-properties are 
represented in perceptual experience, I do not think that the distinctions necessarily map on to 
one another neatly. For example, it seems that a high-level theorist who thinks that, e.g., pine 
trees can come to be represented in experience could claim either that the way H-properties 
get to be represented is in terms of sensory phenomenal representation, or that H-properties 
are only represented in the non-sensorial or present as absent sort of way. That said, to my 
mind, if it is the case that H-properties do come to be represented in experience, then it seems 
most plausible that they would be represented in a way which differs from the way in which 
colours and shapes are represented.
251
 In any case, I think that defenders of EP* should 
welcome the elucidation of this distinction since I believe that it can provide a convincing 
response to the Looks Objection, and at the very least constitutes an improvement on extant 
responses. 
 
In order to see what sort of distinction I am getting at, consider Alva Noë’s (2009) view that, 
in having an experience, e.g., as of a tomato, in addition to experiencing what might be loosely 
called the qualities of the tomato which are visible, i.e. the colour, shape of the side of the 
                                                 
249
  McBrayer makes the same claim, although as stated, I do not think he really addresses the objection by 
considering the accounts of ‘looks’ that he does. 
250
  One might object here that I am committing the same mistake that I attributed to McBrayer, i.e. of 
focusing on a sense of looks which the objector doesn’t have in mind. I think my response to the LO constitutes a 
significant improvement on McBrayer’s because it (i) focuses on phenomenal looks, and (ii) accounts for the 
prima facie attractiveness of the LO. If the objector didn’t have non-sensorial looks in mind when formulating the 
objection then I contend that they ought to have this in mind when discussing the contents of experience. 
251
  Robert Audi appears to refer to this ‘robust’ sort of representation as cartographic representation. 
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tomato one is looking at, one also may have an experience as of the backside of the tomato, 
which is of course in some obvious sense not seen. As Noë (2009) puts it: 
 
vision is not confined to the visible. We visually experience what is out of 
view, what is hidden or occluded… For example, you look at a tomato. You 
have a sense of its presence as a whole, even though the back of the tomato (for 
example) is hidden from view. You do not merely think that the tomato has a 
back, or judge or infer that it is there. You have a sense, a visual sense, of its 
presence.
252
 
 
This is putatively a case where there is phenomenal representation of a property but where this 
is of a different sort from the ‘normal’ representation of colour and shape properties. Noë 
characterizes such representation as presence as absence. As I am understanding the 
distinction, presence as absence is roughly synonymous with what some philosophers refer to 
as non-sensorial representation, although it is worth noting the possibility that these might 
denote different categories of phenomenal representation.
253
 Other ostensible examples of this 
sort of non-sensory/presence as absence representation include the representation of absences 
or empty spaces, and the representation of the differences between objects, e.g. that one object 
is bigger than another.  
 
Consider now Susanna Siegel’s case of perceiving the property of being a pine tree after 
developing a recognitional capacity. I would suggest that it makes sense to say that although 
this property cannot be properly said to be visible in the same way that the features associated 
with, e.g. the colour and shape of the leaves clearly are, this natural kind property may 
nonetheless be in some sense phenomenally present in your visual experience, in a way similar 
to the way the backside of the tomato is present, or perhaps more similar to the way that the 
empty space between objects is present in your experience, without it being seen as such. The 
crucial point is that the things which are phenomenally present as absent make a difference to 
the phenomenology of the experience, i.e. they can get into the representational contents of 
                                                 
252
           Noë, A., (2009),  pp. 470/1 
253
  Thanks to Stuart Crutchfield for pushing me on this point. I think that there is probably a degree of 
confusion within the philosophy of perception literature as to how the notions of non-sensorial representation and 
phenomenal presence as absence relate to one another. Although I concede that they may not, in the end, amount 
to precisely the same thing, they appear to be sufficiently similar for my relatively modest use of them here.  
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visual experience, but the difference they make to phenomenology is not the same as the way, 
e.g., colours and shapes affect phenomenology.
254
 
 
What relevance does all this have for the Looks Objection? My claim is that it is only by 
thinking of phenomenal presence or sensorial representation that P2 of the LO seems 
plausible; it does seem false that wrongness or injustice or goodness look a certain way if we 
are thinking of this in terms of the way colours and shapes can look a certain way. However, 
as we have now seen, it is not at all obvious that this type of phenomenal representation is the 
only type of phenomenal representation, and hence it is not at all clear that P1 of the Looks 
Objection comes out as true.  
 
Indeed, what I claim the defender of EP* ought to say here is that, if there is the phenomenal 
representation of ethical properties in perceptual experience (and recall that they are plausibly 
construed as H-properties), then it will most plausibly be non-sensorial phenomenal 
representation. Once we acknowledge the possibility that there can be non-sensory 
phenomenal representation in visual experience (or that things can be represented in visual 
experience as being phenomenally present as absent), P2 becomes a lot less attractive, and 
hence I contend that we have insufficient reason to think that the Looks Objection is sound. To 
clarify my argument here: it seems that defenders of EP* are in much the same dialectical 
position vis-à-vis the Looks Objection as they are with respect to the No High-Level 
Representation and Morally Blind objections. That is to say, it is not obvious that one can 
simply rule out moral properties as being phenomenally represented in experience without pre-
judging the outcome of an ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception as to what sorts of 
things can come to be represented in experience, and in what sort of way they are 
phenomenally represented. 
 
This concludes this section on the EP* view. I hope to have shown that the defender of this 
view can deflect substantial objections to the view. I also hope to have provided a plausible 
account of what moral perceptual representation may actually be like. In the following section, 
§3, I will briefly outline how the defender of EP* might provide a plausible psychological 
                                                 
254
  Robert Audi (2010) appears to hold something like this view: ‘moral properties are not easily conceived 
as observable, in what seems the most elementary way: no sensory phenomenal representation is possible for 
them,’ p. 87. 
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account of how moral properties might come to be represented in experience. This will 
involve a brief consideration of the putative phenomenon of cognitive penetration. 
 
3. EP* and Cognitive Penetration 
At this point the reader will want to know a bit more about how visual experience might come 
to involve the representation of H-properties. As I understand this issue, it essentially involves 
considering how perception might get to non-sensorially represent properties or represent 
properties in a present as absent sort of a way. To repeat my claim from the previous section; 
it seems to me that the most plausible way of understanding how high-level properties like 
being a pine tree could be represented in experience, is in terms of those properties being 
represented non-sensorially or present as absent. Indeed, I find it difficult to get a grip on the 
idea that H-properties could be represented in the same way that colours and shapes get to be 
represented.  
  
The task then, for this section, is to sketch a plausible psychological account of how 
experience might come to represent H-properties, of which ethical properties are plausibly a 
species. This will involve a discussion of the phenomena of cognitive penetration. It will be 
suggested that this is the most plausible way in which most H-properties get to be represented 
in perception (if any are). I will also suggest that there are no principled reasons for denying 
that cognitive penetration could occur in the ethical case. Although my account will be 
admittedly speculative in nature, my aims are, in any case, modest: I am simply sketching 
what I take to be the most psychologically plausible accounts of how moral perception might 
be possible. After doing this I will end the section by responding to two residual objections to 
an account of ethical perception that depends on cognitive penetration: the Is There Anything 
We Don’t Perceive Objection,255 and the Directness Objection. 
 
Let us first consider the issue of how H-properties might come to be (non-sensorially) 
represented in perceptual experience. It seems to me that there are two general ways in which 
this could occur: high-level representation might be hard-wired, or it may be acquired and 
enter into experience via some psychological mechanism. That is to say, it could be argued 
that either the visual system comes ready-made for non-sensorial phenomenal representation, 
or, that only after the acquisition of certain cognitive and conceptual capabilities could non-
                                                 
255
  Andrew Cullison (2010) discusses this problem under the same heading. 
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sensorial phenomenal representation come to be possible.
256
 I think which option is most 
plausible may vary depending on the putative case of non-sensorial representation we are 
talking about. More specifically, I that think how cases are resolved may well have something 
to do with the extent to which having the representation of the properties in question would 
normally
257
 be useful to a human agent, regardless of the environment they are placed in.
258
 
Susanna Siegel (2009) has suggested that it is not incoherent to think that the visual system 
might come hard-wired to represent causation, where causal relations apparently fall on the 
high-level
259
 side of the high-level/low-level divide (and, in my view, are good candidates for 
non-sensorial representation). It seems reasonable to think that being able to perceive causal 
relations is something which would normally be useful to human agents regardless of the 
environment in which they are placed.  
 
What, though, of the ethical case? Interestingly, one might think that, unlike the representation 
of, e.g., being a pine tree, the representation of, e.g. wrongness, is the sort of thing which 
would be useful (roughly, fitness-enhancing) to human beings in almost any environment in 
which they would be placed. The same might also be reasonably said for evaluative properties 
like danger. This might lead someone to think that the most plausible account of how the 
visual representation of ethical properties comes about is that moral phenomenal 
representation is in some sense innate.  
 
Although I have no knock-down arguments against the innate perception view, it doesn’t 
strike me as being particularly plausible and in any case would appear to involve taking on 
quite serious theoretical commitments that I think ethical intuitionists should want to avoid. I 
have the following things to say against the proposal. The first thing to note is that it is 
plausibly only a necessary condition for innate representation that a property’s being visually 
represented would normally be useful to an agent regardless of their environment. It is not a 
                                                 
256
  A third view might be that representation is hard-wired in the sense that the brain is configured in such 
a way as to have representation triggered by exposure to certain environmental stimuli. There are no doubt other 
views one could take. 
257
  I insert this clause to deal with apparent counterexamples. For example, Michael Brady has pointed out 
to me that human beings are plausibly hard-wired to find other human beings sexually attractive, but there are 
some abnormal circumstances where this would be useful to individuals, e.g. where there are strict prohibitions 
on sexual intercourse etc. 
258
  I take this suggestion from Macpherson (forthcoming). To illustrate, she thinks that it is doubtful that 
human beings come ready-made for the representation of natural kind properties like ‘being a pine tree’ since this 
is a property the representation of which would only be useful in relatively specific circumstances. 
259
  Let me say in passing that it isn’t obvious to me whether causal relations do fall on the high-side of the 
high/low-level divide. 
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sufficient condition. Hence, a lot more evidence would have to be garnered for such a view. To 
my knowledge there is little or no empirical evidence to back up this claim. Although there 
may be some evidence from empirical psychology supporting the claim that young children 
(as young as three-years old) are ‘ready-made’ for making ethical judgments,260 it is not 
obvious to me what relevance this might have for the claim that the visual representation of 
ethical properties is hard-wired; e.g., the fact that children can apparently distinguish between 
categorical and conventional imperatives doesn’t necessarily tell us anything about what sort 
of visual experiences they are having. Also, the idea that ethical perceptual representation is 
hard-wired seriously conflicts with some plausible models of ethical development, e.g. the 
Aristotelian view that virtue has to be educated. Moreover, as was stated at the outset, most
261
 
commentators and defenders of EP* seem to be in agreement that ethical perception involves 
the acquisition of capacities, and hence appear to be rejecting the innate-model (at least in a 
simple form). Given all of this I will assume from now on that non-sensorial ethical 
representation only comes with some degree of acquired cognitive sophistication, whilst 
acknowledging the possibility that ordinary human agents could come ready made for ethical 
representation.  
 
If the capacity for ethical visual representation is something which is acquired, how might this 
occur? I think that the most plausible answer is that it occurs via a process of cognitive 
penetration.
262
 What is meant by cognitive penetration? Here is a plausible (although 
admittedly rough) sufficient condition for cognitive-penetration: 
 
CogPen: A visual experience, e, is cognitively penetrated if the 
representational content and phenomenal character of e are altered by states in 
the cognitive system, and where this does not merely involve those cognitive 
states having effects on the subject’s visual attention.263   
                                                 
260
  See Richard Joyce’s (2006) for an extensive treatment and endorsement of this claim. 
261
  I think the only notable exception to this is Robert Audi, who appears to think that something like a 
proto-moral visual representation (or something like it) of fittingness relations is innate. See his (2008) and 
(2010) for details. As I suggest, it seems that this involves quite a considerable theoretical commitment and one 
which might make many think twice about endorsing an intuitionist account. 
262
        It could also be via a process of non-cognitive penetration. Non-cognitive penetration of visual experience 
– as I understand it – is identical to cognitive penetration except for the fact that the penetrating state is non-
cognitive, e.g. a sensation. I will not be discussing non-cognitive penetration here since it is not at all obvious 
how this might facilitate the representation of the sorts of properties that I am interested in, i.e. moral properties. 
263
  In her (forthcoming a), Siegel offers the following necessary condition for cognitive penetration: ‘If 
visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then it is nomologically possible for two subjects (or for one subject 
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The basic idea expressed in CogPen is that the cognitive states of a subject, e.g. beliefs, 
concepts, emotions, non-doxastic states and desires
264
 of the subject, could come to alter the 
content and character of the subject’s perceptual experience, where this is not limited to 
apparently trivial cases such as where I desire to look at the television and end up having a 
visual experience as of the television due to my turning my eyes in its direction. Rather, the 
idea is that states in the cognitive system are having a more intimate causal effect on the 
phenomenal character (and content) of the experience. Applying this to the sorts of cases we 
have been discussing, e.g., pine tree expertise, the idea would be that a subject who possesses 
some degree of cognitive sophistication with regard to pine trees could come to have the 
phenomenal character of their visual experiences altered by these cognitive states, such that 
they could visually (but non-sensorially) represent the natural kind pine trees.  
 
There are two ways in which cognitive penetration of visual experience might occur; it might 
be via a direct or an indirect mechanism. Roughly, direct cognitive penetration would involve 
a cognitive state directly affecting or modifying the phenomenal character and representational 
content of a perceptual experience. Indirect cognitive penetration – as it is conceived in the 
philosophy of perception literature - involves a slightly more complex mechanism:  
 
the first step of the mechanism involves our cognitive states causing some non-
perceptual state with phenomenal character to come into existence or to alter 
the phenomenal character of some existing non-perceptual state that has 
phenomenal character… the second step involves the phenomenal character of 
these non-perceptual states interacting with and affecting the phenomenal 
character and content of perceptual experiences.
265
  
 
Although indirect, this mechanism still facilitates cognitive penetration since it involves a 
cognitive state causally affecting the phenomenal character and content of the subject’s 
experience. 
                                                                                                                                                         
in different counterfactual circumstances, or at different times) to have visual experiences with different contents 
while seeing and attending to the same distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a result of differences 
in other cognitive (including affective) states.’   
264
  At least some desires might be plausibly understood as cognitive states if we think that cognitive states 
are just those states that have intentional or propositional contents. See Dustin Stokes (forthcoming) for the claim 
that visual experience might be cognitively penetrated by desires (understood as cognitive states). 
265
  Macpherson, F., (forthcoming), pp. 30-32  
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Although the question of whether cognitive penetration does actually occur is by no means 
settled, there are many suggestive studies
266
 apparently supporting the claim that cognitive 
penetration of visual experience is indeed possible. To my mind the best evidence comes from 
psychological experiments
267
 where the colour experiences of subjects appear to have been 
altered by their antecedently held beliefs (see Macpherson (forthcoming) for details). For the 
rest of the discussion I will be assuming that cognitive penetration is indeed a psychologically 
real occurrence and will suggest some plausible models of how it might occur in the ethical 
case (the reader is of course invited to bear in mind that what follows is conditional on 
cognitive penetration being possible for ordinary perceptual agents).
268
  
 
Let us first briefly consider a few models of direct cognitive penetration. Recall again 
Harman’s Cat. Suppose that you have just rounded the corner and are visually presented with 
the hoodlums setting the cat alight. There are, I think, a few (prima facie) plausible ways in 
which direct cognitive penetration of your visual experience might result in your perceptual 
experience having an ethical content, i.e. this is wrong, or what the hoodlums are doing is 
wrong. The first is that you might have some standing belief to the effect that torturing or 
causing unnecessary pain to sentient creatures is prima facie (or conclusively) wrong. When 
presented with the visual scene of the hoodlums torturing the cat, this background belief about 
wrongness might cognitively penetrate your visual experience such that you come to visually 
represent the wrongness of what the hoodlums are doing. An alternative candidate for the 
penetrating cognitive state might be something like the possession of a concept (admittedly, 
referring to a concept as a state seems strained – I will have more to say about this shortly). In 
this case, one’s visual experience is penetrated by one’s possession of the concept of MORAL 
WRONGNESS such that one comes to visually represent the scene as instantiating wrongness. In 
a bit more detail: if a classical view of concepts is correct, (roughly, the view that a concept, 
C, has a definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts which constitute 
                                                 
266
  e.g., see Bruner and Goodman (1947), Gegenfurtner et al, (2006)  
267
  From Delk and Fillenbaum (1965)  
268
  One might object that the case which, e.g., Macpherson, describes involves low-level properties, i.e. 
colour properties, and this sort of phenomenal representation is apparently different from the sort of non-sensorial 
or present as absent phenomenal representation which I am interested in. In response, I would say the following: 
if we are convinced that perceptual experience can be altered in the way the experiments cited appear to 
demonstrate, then there doesn’t seem to be any principled reason for denying that the same sort of mechanism – 
direct or indirect - might work for non-sensorial representation.  
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necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under C
269
) then the scene before you in the 
case of Cat might be said to fulfill a sufficient condition for the application of the concept 
MORAL WRONGNESS. Alternatively, if one is attracted to a non-classical view, e.g. the 
prototype view of concepts - roughly, the view that concepts are represented by one or more of 
their exemplars or instances - then one of the prototypes for MORAL WRONGNESS might 
reasonably be of cases of the causing of unnecessary suffering. In this case, one’s possession 
of the concept might come to affect or modify the perceptual content of your visual 
experience. 
 
One other possible account of direct cognitive penetration in Cat is that your initial visual 
experience triggers an emotional response,
270
 e.g. horror or outrage or disgust, which 
cognitively penetrates your visual experience. I will say a good deal more about the emotions 
in the following chapter, but for now let me note that it is a widely held view amongst 
philosophers of the emotions that emotions have intentional contents, i.e., they represent the 
world as being a certain way. Now, if emotional experiences can sometimes have ethical 
contents, i.e. representing the world as bearing certain ethical properties, then it seems 
possible that in the case of Cat, your visual experience could be cognitively penetrated by your 
emotional experience such that you come to visually represent the wrongness of what the 
hoodlums are doing.
271
 A somewhat broader way of cashing out this emotional model of 
cognitive penetration would be to say that someone with the right sort of (virtuous) character 
would be disposed to be in particular emotional states in response to stimuli like that presented 
in Cat, and would be disposed, in virtue of their having such a character, to have their visual 
experiences cognitively penetrated by emotional experience. In a sense, it could reasonably be 
said that the ethically sensitive person’s virtuous character is cognitively penetrating their 
visual experience.
272
  
 
Perhaps though, the idea of a person’s character cognitively penetrating experience is more 
aptly described as an instance indirect cognitive penetration. Recall that indirect cognitive 
penetration involves a cognitive state, e.g. a belief, bringing into existence a phenomenal non-
                                                 
269
  From entry on ‘Concepts’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/#ClaThe Last accessed 06/04/11. 
270
  The same points would hold about seeming states with the same or similar contents. 
271
  In her forthcoming, Susanna Siegel suggests that brain architecture (i.e. connections between the brain 
area V1 and the amygdala) is consistent with there being emotional influences on visual experiences. 
272
  Susanna Siegel also mentions this possibility in her (forthcoming a). 
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perceptual state which then interacts and modifies the phenomenal character and content of 
perceptual experience. So perhaps, the example of character penetrating one’s visual 
experience, i.e. where one’s character brings into existence and emotional state which then 
penetrates one’s perceptual experience, is best described as indirect cognitive penetration. 
Before briefly saying a bit more about how indirect cognitive penetration might work in the 
ethical case, it is perhaps worth noting that there is decent (although not uncontroversial) 
independent empirical evidence to think that the sort of phenomenal modification by 
phenomenal states on perception, which proponents of indirect cognitive penetration point to 
(e.g., Macpherson), does in fact occur, e.g. the Perky effect, and the incorporation of external 
stimuli into dream experiences. Thus there is perhaps more reason to think that such a process 
of interaction is a psychologically real occurrence, and hence that it is the more plausible of 
the two proposed accounts.
  
 
In addition to the example of character penetrating one’s visual experience, in what other ways 
might indirect ethical cognitive penetration occur? Macpherson suggests that imagination 
could be a possible candidate for the non-perceptual state with phenomenal character (note 
that she believes that imaginative states can be unbidden and non-deliberate such that there 
isn’t any experience of their deliberate conscious formation), which somehow interacts with, 
and alters the character and content of the perceptual state. How might this work in the ethical 
case? Returning again to Harman’s Cat, perhaps your standing moral belief which links the 
causing of unnecessary pain to sentient creatures and moral wrongness could trigger an 
imaginative state to come into existence which then interacts with your visual experience, thus 
altering and modifying the representational content of the experience. Perhaps the imaginative 
state would amount to something like the imagining of ‘moral wrongness being in your midst’. 
Alternatively, it might be the case that the possession of the concept of MORAL WRONGNESS 
triggers the same sort of imaginative state to come in to existence, e.g. imagining myself 
suffering similar treatment.  
 
Another view would be an account of moral cognitive penetration and perception, orientated 
along virtue-ethics lines, where a suitably sensitive moral agent has some conception of an 
idealised ethical agent such that, when they are presented with a moral situation, they imagine 
(perhaps in a spontaneous and unbidden manner) what the idealised agent would do in such a 
case, and as a result come to represent an ethical property in their visual experience. So, e.g., 
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upon seeing a beggar lying on the street who is clearly ill and in need of medical help, a 
sensitive observer might spontaneously imagine the idealised agent helping the beggar, and as 
a result, come to see that such an action is required of them. The thought here would be that 
one’s non-perceptual imaginative state could interact and alter the character and content of the 
visual experience. Presumably, what distinguishes the ethical expert from the non-expert is 
that they have a better conception of an idealised agent, involving more vivid or fine-grained 
imaginative capabilities.
273
   
 
I do not commit myself here to any of the foregoing models. Instead, my aim has been merely 
to present some (hopefully) plausible-sounding psychological accounts of how cognitive 
penetration might occur in the ethical case. Hopefully, then, the reader will think that there is 
considerably more than a modicum of plausibility to the suggestions.  
 
Before proceeding to §4, and for the rest of this section, I will consider two residual problems 
which have so far been left unaddressed in my discussion of EP*. As I see it, there are two
274
 
major problems that remain to be dealt with, which I will label as follows; the Is There 
Anything We Don’t Perceive Objection and the Directness Objection. I will consider these in 
turn. 
 
The Is There Anything We Don’t Perceive Objection, stems from the fact that the account 
sketched above seems to imply that we could perceive things which seem to be, intuitively at 
least, unobservable, e.g. recall the much-discussed case of the physicist’s ‘observation’ of a 
proton being fired in a cloud chamber. The physicist observes a vapour trail in a cloud 
chamber and remarks non-inferentially, ‘there goes a proton.’ In this case, although the 
physicist’s judgment may be psychologically non-inferential, it plausibly depends for its 
justification on an antecedently held belief about the relationship between what is observed 
and the presence of a proton. Furthermore, we are highly reluctant to say that the physicist 
actually perceives the proton in the cloud chamber, since protons aren’t the sorts of things that 
                                                 
273
  I take this virtue-ethics suggestion from Dworkin (1995). 
274
       There is a third major objection which I will not be discussing here, and that is the causal objection to 
moral perception. Note that In a recent paper, McBrayer (2010a) has defended the ethical perception view 
(roughly EP*) against this objection, claiming that whichever ontological position one adopts with regard to 
moral properties, that the causal problem isn’t really a problem at all.  
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ordinary human beings are supposed to be capable of visually perceiving. In the words of a 
recent philosopher of perception; ‘perception isn’t that powerful’275.  
 
The problem for the defender of EP* seems to be that, prima facie, there doesn’t seem to be 
any principled reason to support the claim that something like the psychological story told 
about cognitive penetration in the previous section, couldn’t be told in the case of protons. 
More worryingly, there doesn’t appear to be any good reason for thinking that putative cases 
of so-called ethical perception aren’t just like the proton case, i.e. that ethical properties are 
just as unobservable as protons intuitively are. If this is so, then it seems that the mere 
coherence of the idea of ethical cognitive penetration is not a sufficient condition for 
establishing that ethical perception is in fact possible, since for all we know, it could be more 
like the proton case, and less like, e.g., the pine trees case. The task therefore remains for the 
defender of EP* to somehow give a good reason for thinking that the ethical case is 
sufficiently different to the proton case.  
 
There are a few avenues of response which I think are open to the defender of EP* to explore. 
The first of these is the innocence by association response. The response here would be to say 
that all philosophers who want to defend the possibility of high-level representation need to 
find some way of showing that the H-properties, which they claim can be represented in 
perceptual experience, are not like protons, i.e. they are not unobservable properties. So, the 
response would go, defenders of EP* are no worse off than defenders of the view that we can, 
e.g., perceive natural kind properties. Perhaps, then, defenders of EP* should just hold fast to 
their view in the hope that the ethical case is in fact different from the case of protons. In her 
(forthcoming), Macpherson denies that her account in any way entails that we can alter our 
perceptual experiences at will, and surmises that very specific conditions for cognitive 
penetration may in fact exist.
276
 However, she claims that it is the job of psychologists to work 
out just what these might be. So, perhaps the defender of EP* might be best advised to leave 
the issue of what we can and cannot perceive open, and simply cross their fingers that, once 
the ‘specific conditions’ for cognitive penetration are spelt out fully, the ethical case (or at 
least the case of some ethical properties) falls on the right side of the divide.  
                                                 
275
  Siegel, S., (2009): note, however, that Siegel does not say this in the context of a discussion of the 
perception of protons. 
276
  Specifically, Macpherson (forthcoming) suggests that ‘the difference between voluntary and 
involuntary imagination may have some, as yet unknown, role to play, as may one’s familiarity with what one is 
imagining, as may some relations between imagined and perceived properties.’ P. 41 
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This, however, might seem quite an unsatisfying response to many (including those attracted 
to the EP* view). A more appealing option might be to attempt to identify some feature that 
does indeed distinguish ethical properties (and other H-properties) from protons. I must 
confess, however, that I cannot at present think of what such a feature might be. Despite this, I 
would like to briefly mention an alternative and under-discussed option for the defender of 
EP* that I actually find quite attractive; once we have the sensory/non-sensorial phenomenal 
representation distinction in mind, perhaps the possibility of the phenomenal visual 
representation of protons doesn’t seem so outlandish – bearing in mind that we are only 
talking about cases like that of the physicist observing a vapour trail in the cloud chamber. At 
a push, we might even concede that the perception of protons – in suitable circumstances - is 
possible. After all, if it is possible to have perceptual experiences of the backside of objects 
(see Noë (2009), and above), and if we admit that ‘vision is not confined to the visible’, then 
perhaps the perception of protons isn’t such an unpalatable prospect. If this is correct, then the 
mere possibility of proton perception shouldn’t make us worry about ethical perception since 
proton perception might not be that unpalatable a prospect.  
 
Admittedly, under plausible contemporary accounts of non-inferential justification (and 
knowledge) – where non-inferential justification is justification that is grounded in a non-
doxastic state - this suggestion would seem to imply that we could possibly have non-
inferential knowledge of protons, and we might then agree with Nicholas Sturgeon (2002) 
when he claims that this is ‘not very plausible’277. I concede that this doesn’t seem like the 
correct thing to say. However, as will be suggested in §4, we have good reason to think that, 
given my improved account of non-inferential justification (see previous chapter), if the 
perception of protons were possible it would not be the sort of experience which could ground 
non-inferential justification. Instead, such experiences could only ground inferential or 
mediate justification. This, it seems to me, is precisely the right thing to say about these cases. 
 
However, even if we think that the perception of protons could be possible (bearing in mind 
that there are alternative responses at hand), this suggestion leads us on to the second problem 
which I identified: the Directness Objection. The problem seems to be that if we have 
conceded that non-sensorial representation might be possible in the case of protons (i.e. that 
                                                 
277
  Sturgeon, N. (2002), p. 202 
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protons could be phenomenally present as absent in visual experience), then maybe this 
simply shows that non-sensorial representation is not direct enough to facilitate perception. 
This sort of point might involve making a distinction between perception and what might be 
called accurate phenomenal representation, where the latter captures the redundant features of 
veridical phenomenal representation which in some way falls short of perception. Such a 
distinction seems to be employed by philosophers of perception who are interested in the 
question of high-level representation. For example, note the following from Susanna Siegel 
(2009) (here she is discussing the perception of causal relations): 
 
[visual] experience could represent (even correctly represent) that causal 
relations obtain, but these experiences might fail to count as perception, if their 
relation to what they represent is never sufficiently direct.
278
   
 
The thought here would be that non-sensorial representation, and the sort of cognitive 
penetration described in the previous section (especially the indirect form of cognitive 
penetration), are just too indirect to be counted as giving rise to perception of the properties in 
question. Indeed, one might hold this for all cases of non-sensorial representation: if non-
sensorial representation of H-properties works in the way envisaged above, i.e. by way of the 
mechanism for cognitive penetration outlined, then it is insufficiently direct to ground 
perception.
279
  
 
In response, it seems that the defender of EP* could simply claim that in the case of H-
properties which come to be represented via cognitive penetration, the relation to what is 
represented is as direct as we could reasonably hope for, given the apparent need for cognitive 
sophistication. Such a response might be made in tandem with the following concomitant 
point: even if it is true that in veridical cases of the visual representation of moral properties 
we are not dealing with instances of perception as such (because the relation to what is 
represented is insufficiently direct), the defender of EP* - and those interested in defending 
EPj - might simply claim that accurate visual phenomenal representation is a type of mental 
state that is in the business of conferring justification. 
                                                 
278
          Siegel, S., (2009), p. 519  
279
  Note of course that if non-sensorial representation comes hard-wired for certain properties, then 
perhaps the representation could be sufficiently direct to count as perception. As noted above, such a route could 
be open to an ethical intuitionist, although I will not pursue this possibility here. 
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Another response available to a defender of EP* at this stage might be to say that if cognitive 
penetration (in either its direct or indirect forms) is a reasonably pervasive feature of our 
perceptual lives, then this might lead us to rethink how we understand perception. To put this 
somewhat elliptical point another way: if it turns out that perceiving, e.g., that the person in 
front of me is my mother, via cognitive penetration is a regular occurrence, then perhaps our 
view that perception is in some – admittedly loose – sense, (causally) direct or unmediated 
ought to be jettisoned.
280
  
 
Suppose that all I have said so far is correct (or suppose that any difficulties with my 
arguments can be addressed). In the next section, §4, I will go on to discuss EPj. I will begin 
by explaining why some philosophers have assumed that the truth of EP* is necessary for the 
truth of EPj before considering whether it is also sufficient. Following from this I will argue 
that, if we assume that cognitive penetration is required for ethical perception then it is not at 
all obvious that some or most ethical perceptual experiences could get to confer non-
inferential justification for belief. Hence, it is not at all obvious that the putative truth of EP* 
supports EPj and ethical intuitionism.  
 
4. EPj and Cognitive Penetration 
EPj is a claim about the type of justification - non-inferential - that ethical perceptual beliefs 
are supposed to possess. On the face of it, the view is logically independent from EP*. 
However, in the recent literature it has been suggested that there is in fact an important 
relation between EP* and EPj, e.g., Väyrynen (2008), McNeill (forthcoming), namely, that 
EP* is necessary for the truth of EPj, i.e., non-inferentially justified ethical perceptual belief 
would only be possible if EP* is true. 
 
In order to see why this is plausible I will briefly outline a suggestion from Will McNeill 
(forthcoming)
281
 who builds upon a distinction, originally made by Dretske (1969), between 
what he terms primary and secondary seeing. Although Dretske originally held the distinction 
with regard to the objects we perceive, McNeill thinks we can make similar distinctions with 
                                                 
280
  Thanks to Stuart Crutchfield for suggesting this line of response to me. I think the point connects with 
the general thought that if cognitive penetration is pervasive then the epistemologically attractive idea that 
perception is theory-independent will need to be given up. 
281
  McNeill, W., (forthcoming) 
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regard to the features or properties that we see. The general idea is that in the case of primary 
seeing
282
, one can see that 'O is F' by seeing – in some literal sense - the object/event O and 
the feature F, while in secondary seeing, one can see that 'O is F' by seeing – in some literal 
sense - some distinct object/event Q and some distinct feature G. Here is an example of 
primary seeing: I can primarily see that there is a red apple by literally seeing the apple and 
the property of redness that it instantiates. Here then, is an example of secondary seeing of the 
sort described: I might be said to see that John is ill without seeing John himself and the 
property of being ill which he bears. Instead, I might reasonably be said to see that John is ill 
by seeing that his mother is crying outside his hospital room. Notice that the relation between 
secondary and primary seeing is one of dependency; in the case of seeing that John is ill, I can 
only secondarily see this by primarily seeing that his mother is crying outside his hospital 
room.  
 
What is the significance of this distinction? McNeill argues that whether an instance of 
perception is one of primary or secondary seeing is directly relevant to the question of whether 
the perceptual knowledge which one gains is inferential or non-inferential. In a nutshell, 
McNeill thinks that if an instance of perception is one of secondary seeing, then the 
knowledge gained on that basis is necessarily epistemically inferential. This is true, even 
though such perception might be psychologically non-inferential, i.e., ‘spontaneous’ or 
‘unbidden’. Only with primary seeing (as I have defined it) is the knowledge gained non-
inferential. In the case of secondary seeing that ‘John is ill’, McNeill claims that one will have 
to possess “some state that can connect the fact primarily seen with the fact secondarily seen, 
and do so in a way that secures knowledge of that second fact.”283 McNeill seems to think that 
in order to be warranted in one's beliefs such a state would need to be some sort of belief – 
although it needn't be involved in any conscious inference – connecting the fact that John's 
mother is crying with John and his illness. The general lesson is a familiar one: ‘some 
knowledge that we spontaneously come by on the basis of seeing is nonetheless epistemically 
inferential’284.  
 
                                                 
282
 Technically, McNeill uses the term primary seeing when discussing the perception of objects. He 
doesn’t use the term in his discussion of features (so for McNeill, primary seeing only sometimes generates non-
inferential knowledge, i.e. when the properties/features in question are also seen). I think, however, that nothing 
is awry in using the term in the way I do here. 
283
  McNeill, Ibid, p. 7 
284
  Ibid, p. 11 
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To illustrate, suppose for now that the primary seeing of protons is not possible. Now consider 
the case of the physicist’s observation of a proton being fired in a cloud chamber.285 In this 
case most commentators will claim that although the physicist’s judgment that ‘there goes a 
proton’ may be psychologically non-inferential, it plausibly depends for its justification on an 
antecedently held belief about the relationship between what is observed and the presence of a 
proton.
286
 Hence there is a crucial distinction between psychological and epistemological 
inferentiality. The point argued by McNeill is that only cases of primary seeing can ground 
epistemic non-inferentiality. 
 
Suppose that McNeill is right about all this. The import of all this for our discussion is that 
EP*, i.e., the view that we represent ethical properties in perceptual experience (we have 
primary ethical seeing) is apparently necessary for the truth of EPj. We can, however, also ask 
whether the truth of EP* is sufficient for the truth of EPj. Dogmatists about perceptual 
experience claim that all perceptual experiences (including cognitively penetrated 
experiences) justify non-inferentially. Perceptual Dogmatism (PD)
287
 amounts to the 
conjunction of the following claims: 
 
(1) If a subject, S, has a perceptual experience of X as F, then, in the absence of 
defeaters, S thereby has justification for believing that X is F. 
(2) The justification in (1) is immediate or non-inferential justification. 
 
A few things are worth noting about PD. The first thing to say is that (1) amounts to the claim 
that a perceptual experience – whatever its content - is sufficient for prima facie justification 
and will therefore include perceptual experiences with impossible contents, e.g., the Penrose 
triangle, and, contradictory contents, e.g., the waterfall illusion. Secondly, (2) amounts to the 
claim that the subject of a perceptual experience gets justification for belief that does not 
depend upon the subject having justification for believing other propositions.
288
 In more detail; 
                                                 
285
  It was Harman who introduced this example; see his (1977) p. 6. Harman understands an observation as 
‘an immediate judgment made in response to the situation without any conscious reasoning having taken place.’ 
Hence, given this there can be observations of protons.  
286
  As Tropman (2009) suggests: ‘despite the lack of explicit reasoning in this case, the physicist’s 
theoretical belief concerns unobservables, and for this reason it would be strange to call her scientific observation 
‘non-inferential.’ P. 443  
287
  Audi, Huemer and Pryor can all be reasonably regarded as perceptual dogmatists. 
288
  Some philosophers, e.g. Crispin Wright, think that the justification we get from perceptual experiences 
depends upon our having something like a propositional justification for believing (or accepting) other 
propositions, e.g., about the existence of the external world. Such a position is sometimes referred to as 
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PD claims that, although cognitively penetrated experiences might be causally dependent upon 
having certain beliefs or non-doxastic states, the justified beliefs that are formed on the basis 
of those experiences are epistemologically independent of such background beliefs. Put 
another way, the causal etiology of a perceptual experience is, according to Dogmatists, 
irrelevant to the justificatory status of beliefs based upon perceptual experiences experience, 
i.e., as to whether they are justified at all and whether the justification is non-inferential. On 
the topic of inferentiality, note the following from James Pryor (2000): 
 
why should the fact that your background beliefs causally affect what 
experiences you have show that the justification you get from these experiences 
relies on or derives from those background beliefs? Your sunglasses causally 
affect your experiences, but none of you perceptual beliefs are justified to any 
extent by your sunglasses.
289
 
 
Applied to the case at hand, Pryor’s thought is that although a subject’s background belief(s) 
may play a causal role in cognitive penetration, this does not entail that the resultant justified 
belief or knowledge that one has on the basis of the cognitively penetrated experience depends 
epistemically for its justification upon that background belief(s). In some sense the etiology of 
the perceptual experience is epistemically screened-off by the subject’s perceptual experience. 
Given its compatibility with non-inferential justification it is unsurprising that some recent 
ethical intuitionists, e.g. Robert Audi, subscribe to something like Perceptual Dogmatism. 
 
Despite its affording a nice straightforward epistemology of perceptual belief, PD is 
controversial and has recently come in for some heavy criticism (see Markie (2006), Siegel 
(forthcoming), Lyons (forthcoming)). Indeed, if there is such a thing as cognitive penetration 
of visual experience, then the claim that the causal etiology of perceptual experiences has no 
impact on the justificatory status of beliefs based on perceptual experience is probably false. 
Susanna Siegel (forthcoming) has suggested the following as a counter-example to claim (1) 
of Perceptual Dogmatism: 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Conservatism (not to be confused with Phenomenal Conservatism). I am assuming here (and in the thesis as a 
whole) that Conservatism is false. See Nicholas Silins (2008) for discussion and an argument against 
Conservatism.  
289
  Pryor, J. (2000)  p. 546 
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Angry-Looking Jack: Jill believes, without justification, that Jack is angry at 
her. The epistemically appropriate attitude for Jill to take toward the 
proposition that Jack is angry at her is suspension of belief. But her attitude is 
epistemically inappropriate. When she sees Jack, her belief makes him look 
angry to her. If she didn’t believe this, her experience wouldn’t represent him 
as angry. 
 
Siegel thinks that it is implausible for Dogmatists to claim that Jill gets any justification from 
her perceptual experience and hence the sufficiency claim of Dogmatism is false. She claims 
that the explanation for this is that there is a circular structure to Jill's belief-formation; the 
idea here is that the Jill’s perceptual belief that Jack is angry is ultimately based on her 
antecedently held belief about Jack’s anger. However, the following points ought to be 
highlighted about Siegel’s claims; firstly, we might doubt that there really is a basing relation 
here given that it is unlikely that non-doxastic states such as perceptual experiences get to be 
non-causally based upon anything. Hence the claim for circularity might seem odd. Indeed, it 
seems plausible that the belief is based upon the perceptual experience alone. We might, 
however, still think that Jill’s belief is unjustified because of her original unjustified belief as 
opposed to circularity.  Secondly, defenders of PD might just want to bite the bullet in the case 
of Angry-Looking Jack. Despite this, even if defenders of PD do say that Jill's experience is 
justification-conferring (which I don’t think is very plausible), Jack Lyons (forthoming) has 
suggested that Dogmatism cannot cope with the following example: 
 
Wishful-Thinking: Suppose Jack really wants it to be the case that Jill is 
happy to see him, so much so that when he does see her, his wishful-thinking 
penetrates his experience such that he comes to perceptually represent Jill as 
happy to see him. 
 
Although the defender of Dogmatism might again slam down their fist and say that Jack is 
defeasibly justified in believing that Jill is happy to see him, I would be inclined to agree with 
Lyons when he claims that ‘an epistemology that licenses wishful-thinking in this way simply 
can’t be taken seriously’290. It just isn’t plausible that the causal etiology of a perceptual 
experience has no effect on the justfication-conferring powers of that experience, lest we be 
                                                 
290
  Lyons, J. (forthcoming) p. 18 
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forced to conclude that Wishful-Thinking and my perfectly kosher experience as of the 
computer screen in front of me start off with the same epistemic credentials. Given this, I 
conclude that we have good reasons for thinking that claim (1) of Perceptual Dogmatism is 
false.  
 
Despite this, notice that the problems raised by Siegel and Lyons need not themselves be taken 
to undermine the claim that cognitive penetrability makes perceptual belief inferentially 
justified, i.e., of undermining claim (2). Rather, they could be understood as pointing out that 
the causal etiology of a perceptual experience can affect whether that experience gets to be the 
sort of thing that can confer justification. In cases of epistemically-bad cognitive penetration, 
perceptual experiences just don’t seem to be in the business of justifying at all. That is why, as 
it stands, PD is falsified. However, Siegel claims the existence of epistemically-bad cases of 
cognitive penetration is consistent with (a) there being good cases, and, (b) those good cases 
being capable of justifying non-inferentially. Put another way; admitting that causal etiology 
can affect the justification-conferring power of perceptual experience does not entail that it 
does so in all cases and need do so in a way that impinges on the claim about non-
inferentiality.
291
 So, even if Perceptual Dogmatism is false, it is not obvious that this 
undermines perceptual ethical intuitionism. That claim requires more argument. 
 
I would now like to suggest that we do in fact have good reason for thinking that at least some 
(and perhaps many or most) cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences - including putative 
cases of ethical perception - will only be capable of conferring inferential or mediate 
justification for belief. In other words, I will be suggesting that insofar as some cognitively 
penetrated experiences get to justify, claim (2) of Perceptual Dogmatism is plausibly false, i.e. 
although many or most perceptual experiences are sufficient for justification, in the case of 
cognitively penetrated experiences, some or many of these will only be compatible with 
inferential or mediate justification. In order to begin to see this, recall my account of non-
inferential or immediate justification offered in the previous chapter: 
 
                                                 
291
  Note the following remarks from Siegel (forthcoming a): ‘Pryor says cognitive penetration itself doesn’t 
impede immediate justification, because it need not introduce justificatory intermediaries. This seems correct.  He 
also suggests that it doesn’t impede immediate justification at all, on the grounds that etiology and justification 
are independent issues. But the cases just described suggest that the etiology introduced by cognitive penetration 
does sometimes impede justification, not because it forces the structure of justification to be mediate rather than 
immediate, but because some kinds of etiology seem to place constraints on when experience can justify beliefs 
at all – a fortiori, on when experiences can immediately justify them.’ 
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Non-Inferential: A non-inferentially justified belief that p held by a subject, S, 
is a belief that is epistemically grounded in some non-doxastic state, d, where 
the non-doxastic state, d, doesn’t epistemically depend upon relevant non-
doxastic states, beliefs or the drawing of relevant inferences.
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Given my account, whether a perceptual experience confers inferential justification will be 
contingent upon whether it epistemically depends upon other non-doxastic states, beliefs or the 
drawing of relevant inferences. Recall that epistemic dependency amounts to something like 
the following: 
 
Epistemic Dependency: for a non-doxastic state, d, to epistemically depend on 
a non-doxastic state(s) or belief(s)  that q, r, s… or the drawing of relevant 
inferences, is for it to be the case that, ceteris paribus, the subject, S, would 
have had to have had those non-doxastic states, beliefs, drawn those inferences 
etc. in order for d to be justification-conferring, and that an appropriate 
proportion of those non-doxastic states, beliefs, inferential processes etc. will 
have had to have been justified, justification-conferring or valid (respectively). 
Furthermore, the non-doxastic states/beliefs q, r, s… ought to be in some way 
relevant or appropriately related to the non-doxastic state d, i.e. they ought to 
support d (but where the support relation isn’t inferential). 
  
Before proceeding to argue that at least some moral perceptual experiences are epistemically 
dependent in the way described (and hence not capable of conferring non-inferential or 
immediate justification), I would like to remind the reader of the principal motivation for 
wanting to adopt a conception of non-inferential justification along the lines of Non-
Inferential; that is, under alternative conceptions of non-inferential justification, which claim – 
roughly – that a non-inferentially justified belief is a belief that is epistemically grounded in a 
non-doxastic state, there is the possibility of the illegitimate transformation of ostensibly 
inferentially justified beliefs into non-inferentially justified beliefs.  
 
                                                 
292
  It is worth pointing out that there are similarities between my account of non-inferential justification 
(and the associated account of epistemic dependency), and the notion of a belief-dependent reliable process as 
suggested by Goldman (1979). The idea here is that a reliable process which is belief-dependent cannot confer 
justification independently of the ‘input’ beliefs to the process being themselves justified. 
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I now want to suggest that we have a similar sort of problem in the perceptual case. 
Specifically, the problem seems to be that under alternative conceptions of non-inferential 
justification, we could have non-inferential justification for believing propositions which seem 
to be incapable of being justifiably believed non-inferentially due to the sort of illegitimate 
transformation referred to; namely, non-inferential justification for believing propositions 
about ‘scientific’ entities.293 Recall from §3 my claim that, in certain circumstances and with a 
sufficient stock of background beliefs, a scientist might be able to have visual representation 
or perception of protons, e.g., where a scientist observes a vapour trail in a cloud chamber. 
Given this possibility, however, alternative conceptions of non-inferential justification are 
forced to say that insofar as beliefs based upon this experience would be justified, then they 
would be non-inferentially justified or epistemically basic or regress-stoppers.
294
 That result 
seems wholly implausible to me; insofar as these sorts of perceptual experiences get to justify 
it will be inferential or mediate justification. In the proton case, and others like it
295
 it seems 
more sensible to say that my perceptual experience as of a proton is epistemically dependent 
upon my having, e.g., a sufficient stock of background beliefs about protons etc, and that an 
appropriate number of those beliefs are justified beliefs. That is to say, ceteris paribus, the 
perceptual experience wouldn’t get to justify unless an appropriate number of those 
background beliefs were themselves justified, e.g., suppose that I formed the relevant 
background beliefs about protons while under the influence of mind-altering drugs or on a 
series of whims. I am highly reluctant to say that a perceptual experience that is cognitively 
penetrated by these unjustified beliefs would get to justify. Given this, I claim that we have 
good reason to think that my account of non-inferential justification gives the correct answer 
in the case of the putative perception of ‘scientific’ entities, i.e. that these sorts of experiences 
could only justify and ground justified belief because of the stock of relevant justified 
background beliefs that the subjects in question have.  
 
                                                 
293
  Someone might claim that the same could be said about perceiving or having perceptual experiences as 
of protons. In response I would point back to the distinction between sensorial and non-sensorial representation. 
294
  Someone might claim that no-one would actually base their belief on a perceptual experience of a 
proton. Rather, they would base their belief on background beliefs about the existence of protons. In response I 
would say that (i) cases where someone actually takes their perceptual experience of the proton as the reason for 
believing a proton to be present don’t strike me as unimaginable, and, (ii) such perceptual experiences would, 
according to other accounts of non-inferential justification, still be conferring non-inferential justification for 
belief even if they don’t get to ground justified belief, which still seems implausible.  
295
  e.g. Siegel (forthcoming a) presents a case about a scientist who believes in preformationism coming to 
have a perceptual experience as of an embryo in a sperm cell. Insofar as anyone would want to call the resultant 
belief about the presence of an embryo justified I would suggest that we ought to call it inferentially or mediately 
justified.  
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What, though, of the ethical cases that we are interested in? Is there an epistemic dependency 
in these cases too? I want to briefly suggest that in at least some cases (and perhaps a great 
many or all cases), the justification conferred by an ethical perceptual experience which is the 
result of cognitive penetration seems to be a good candidate for being epistemically 
dependent, and hence not in the business of conferring non-inferential justification (given my 
improved characterisation). Therefore, such experiences wouldn’t be capable of grounding 
non-inferentially justified belief
296
 and hence it is not obvious that the truth of EP* supports 
EPj and ethical intuitionism. 
 
Consider, then, the following ethical examples of cognitive penetration (I use examples of 
direct cognitive penetration for simplicity, although similar points could be made for indirect 
penetration): 
 
Martha: Suppose that Martha has some standing moral beliefs about the 
wrongness of torturing sentient beings (and some related beliefs about the 
badness of pain etc). Now suppose that she rounds a corner and is presented 
with some hoodlums setting fire to a cat. Finally, suppose that her background 
beliefs cognitively penetrate her experience such that she perceptually 
represents the wrongness of what the hoodlums are doing. 
 
Assume for the sake of argument that Martha does in fact get some justification from her 
perceptual experience. If we assume that Martha’s background beliefs are justified, then I see 
no reason to withhold justification from her perceptually-based belief that what the hoodlums 
are doing is wrong. However, to see why the justification Martha gets from her perceptual 
state is inferential or mediate, consider a counterfactual scenario where Martha’s background 
beliefs are unjustified, e.g. her ethical background beliefs just popped into her head seconds 
prior to rounding the corner. In this sort of case I am highly reluctant to attribute justification 
to Martha’s perceptual belief. Given this, I think we have reason to think that Martha’s 
perceptual state is epistemically dependent in the way outlined. Now consider a case where the 
penetrating state is a non-doxastic state (I am assuming here that emotions are non-doxastic 
states – I will argue for this in the following chapter): 
                                                 
296
  Unlike the scientific case, I think it is more likely that ethical perceivers would base their beliefs upon 
ethical perceptions. 
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Guilty-Peter: Suppose that Phillip is angry with Peter and suppose that when 
Phillip sees Peter he perceptually represents him as guilty because of his 
emotional state. 
 
Suppose that Philip gets justification from his perceptual state. Again, if we assume that 
Phillip’s emotional state is itself justified, i.e. because it is based upon adequate grounds, then 
I am happy to say that Phillip could get justification in virtue of his perceptual state. However, 
now suppose that Phillip is angry with Peter for no reason, such that it makes sense to say that 
his emotion is itself unjustified. In this case I do not think that it is correct to say that Phillip 
has perceptually-based justification for believing that Peter is guilty. At the very least, I would 
want to hear very good reasons why we ought to credit Phillip with a justified belief in this 
case. In lieu of a response, I claim that we have good reason to think that, in insofar as 
Phillip’s experience does confer justification (and this is perhaps not obvious), his perceptual 
experience is epistemically dependent upon his emotional state and hence the justification he 
gets from his perceptual experience is mediate or non-basic.  
 
I present these as cases which clearly illustrate that at least some (and possibly a great many, 
or all) cases of ethical perceptual experience which is the result of cognitive penetration are 
only capable of conferring mediate or inferential justification. Hence it is not at all obvious 
whether the putative truth of EP* does in fact support EPj and ethical intuitionism.  
 
At this point, the perceptual Dogmatist may try to respond by claiming that we can 
characterise what is going on in the Martha and Guilty Peter cases in a way which is 
consistent with Dogmatism’s claim (2) 297; that insofar as perceptual experiences justify, they 
confer non-inferential justification. The Dogmatist response here would be that we can say 
that Martha and Peter’s perceptually-based beliefs are unjustified whilst maintaining that the 
reason for this is that the unjustified beliefs or ungrounded emotions serve to defeat (by 
undermining) their non-inferential perceptual justification. Indeed, we might think that it is 
natural to imagine that, in the Martha and Guilty Peter cases, the subjects do have reason to 
suspect that their beliefs or emotions are ungrounded and that these are having an impact on 
                                                 
    
297
     Note that this sort of strategy could also constitute a response to claim (1) of perceptual dogmatism. See 
Siegel (forthcoming a) for an argument against this response. 
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their perceptual experience. If this is correct, then it no longer seems that the perceptual 
experiences are epistemically dependent in the way I have claimed. In response to this I would 
say the following: it is not at all obvious why we should think that Martha and Peter get any 
justification for belief in the bad cases where the penetrating states are unjustified. Indeed, it 
seems odd to think that an experience that is cognitively penetrated by epistemically 
unjustified states could nonetheless get to justify, only to then have that non-inferential 
justification defeated by the presence of the very states that cognitively penetrated it. Hence, I 
think that it is more plausible to claim that the perceptual experiences are epistemically 
dependent in the way suggested. 
 
Despite all this, I do think that there is at least one sort of case of cognitive penetration that 
doesn’t involve epistemic dependency; this is cases where what appears to be doing the 
penetrating is the subjects’ possession of a concept, e.g. MORAL WRONGNESS, CRUELTY etc. 
The reason why these sorts of experiences can confer non-inferential or immediate 
justification is because concept possession is presupposed by the notion of epistemic 
dependency, and hence it cannot be true that a perceptual experience is itself epistemically 
dependent on the possession of a concept.  
 
Given all this, it seems that in order for EP* to support ethical intuitionism, ethical 
intuitionists will have to show that a specific sort of cognitive penetration is a psychologically 
real occurrence, namely, the penetration of experience by concept possession. So the 
conclusion of this section is not that EP* cannot support ethical intuitionism, but that ethical 
intuitionists should temper their enthusiasm for the view, given that EP* will only be 
sufficient for the truth of EPj if a particular kind of cognitive penetration is possible.  
 
Before proceeding, it is perhaps worth noting that it is unclear whether it makes sense to think 
of the possession of a concept as penetrating a subject’s perceptual experience, and hence 
whether concept possession is relevant to the truth of EP*. Given that it is not obvious that 
concepts can be usefully understood as mental states, it is perhaps hard to see how exactly 
they could get to be involved in the process of cognitive penetration. Perhaps then, the 
possession of ethical concepts simply enables subjects to form beliefs with ethical contents 
directly on the basis of (non-moral) perceptual experiences. Indeed, this seems to be the view 
of John Greco (2000):  
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 Moral perception would be just like all perception, being distinguished only by 
the conceptual content of the judgments it produces, rather than by the 
mechanism by which it produces them.
298
  
 
If this is correct, then the role of concept possession in perceptual experience might not 
actually have much relevance to the plausibility of EP*. Instead, concept possession may only 
be capable of facilitating what was referred to as secondary seeing. Importantly, however, it 
seems that this sort of model could be compatible with non-inferential justification. I will say a 
bit more about the prospects for the secondary seeing view in the following section. 
 
Having laid out my position, I would now like to briefly consider an objection to it from Jack 
Lyons (forthcoming), who claims that whether an input-belief to cognitive penetration is 
justified or whether one has good evidence for the penetrating belief has “little or nothing” to 
do with whether the resultant perceptual beliefs are justified.
299
 Justified beliefs are not 
necessary because of the following sort of case,  
 
Snakes: Jack has an unjustified belief that there are snakes in the grass, but if 
his belief increases his perceptual sensitivity to the existence of snakes, then it 
appears that he can still have justified perceptual beliefs. 
 
Justified beliefs are apparently not sufficient because of the following sort of example: 
 
Angry Note: Jack left Jill an angry note, causing her to believe with 
justification that he was angry at her. The belief penetrated her experience, so 
when she saw him, her experience represented him as angry. But her 
experience would represent him as being angry, whether his expression is angry 
or neutral.
300
 
 
                                                 
298
  (2000), p. 244 
299
  Instead, Lyons claims that what is important for epistemically good/bad cognitive penetration is not the 
justificatory status of any top-down influences, but rather, whether the perceptual experience is sufficiently 
sensitive or responsive to the way the world is. 
300
  This example comes from Siegel (forthcoming a). 
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Let me respond to these examples and their associated points in turn. One thing to highlight 
about Snakes is that it is not obvious that Jack’s perceptual experiences as of snakes in the 
grass are epistemically dependent on the prior (unjustified) belief about there being snakes in 
the grass. This is because the case is itself under-described. There appear to be two general 
possibilities about what is going on in Snakes: either Jack can perceive that there are snakes 
without the mechanism of cognitive penetration or Jack can only perceive snakes due to 
cognitive penetration. If the first disjunct is true, then it seems that Jack’s perceptual 
experiences of snakes are just like his perceptual experiences as of, e.g. colours, in which case 
the unjustified status of his belief about the existence of snakes shouldn’t have an impact on 
the justificatory status of beliefs based upon his perceptual experiences of snakes, i.e. his 
perceptual experiences of snakes are not epistemically dependent on prior beliefs etc. If, 
however, Jack can only perceive snakes due to cognitive penetration then there are (at least) 
three options: (i) his unjustified belief about there being snakes in the grass is doing the 
penetrating, (ii) some other unjustified belief is doing the penetrating, (iii) some other justified 
belief is doing the penetrating. It seems to me that (i) cannot be true, because the example of 
Snakes seems to presuppose that Jack can perceive snakes. Indeed, it is not obvious that, as it 
is described, Jack’s unjustified belief is cognitively penetrating his experience. As I 
understand it, cognitive penetration involves a cognitive state altering the content of a 
perceptual state in some intimate sort of way, such that if we held the subject’s attentional 
focus and environment fixed while toggling the presence of the cognitive state on and off, the 
content of the perceptual experience would alter accordingly. In the sort of case Lyons 
describes, it is not obvious that the belief is doing anything over-and-above focusing the 
subject’s attention, i.e. it is because the subject is primed to perceive snakes that their attention 
is focused on the grass and had they not have been primed they wouldn’t have been looking in 
the grass for snakes. However, this is consistent with saying that if the subject’s experience as 
of a snake was held fixed, and the presence of the snake-perception priming belief were 
toggled on and off, that the subject’s experience would not change. Hence it seems that either 
option (ii) or (iii) is correct. Depending on which we go for, we can then make a judgment 
about whether Jack’s perceptual experiences as of snakes are justification-conferring. What is 
important is whether the penetrating belief(s) about snakes are justified, i.e. the one’s that 
actually penetrate perceptual experience and enable it to represent snakes. If they are justified 
then I think Jack’s perceptual experiences could be justification-conferring, if not then I would 
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be reluctant to call his experiences justification-conferring. Either way, Snakes does not tell 
against my account. 
 
What about Angry Note? In this case I would say two things. Firstly, although I agree that 
sensitivity and discrimination are undeniably intimately related to the epistemology of 
perception, I take these to be most plausibly conditions on perceptual knowledge rather than 
justification. That is, for a subject to perceptually-know that p is for the subject to be able to 
perceptually discriminate F from things that are not-F (where the not-F’s are limited to 
relevant alternatives).
301
 However, I do not think that the same condition must necessarily 
hold for perceptual justification. That is, I think it is plausible that in some cases like Angry-
note, where the penetrating belief is justified, the subject’s perceptual experience will be able 
to confer justification for belief. However, there are of course degrees of (in)sensitivity. If the 
subject really is completely insensitive to the presence of anger in this case, then it does seem 
right to withhold justification for their perceptual belief. This brings me on to my second 
response. It is a part of my characterisation of epistemic dependency that the presence of 
justified beliefs is necessary for the non-doxastic state to be justification-conferring. It is not 
sufficient. Indeed, if justified beliefs really are capable of having epistemically-deleterious 
effects in the way described in Angry-note, then this seems like precisely the right thing to say. 
 
In this section I have suggested that it is not at all obvious that the putative truth of EP* is 
sufficient for EPj as Dogmatists suppose. Hence it is not clear whether EP* in fact supports 
ethical intuitionism. In the final section I would like to consider an alternative account of 
ethical perception which claims that even if EP* is false and we can only have what I have 
called secondary seeing of moral properties, this might still be compatible with the truth of 
EPj. 
 
5. Secondary Seeing and EPj 
In this final section I would like to briefly consider an alternative view which holds that if 
there is such a thing as ethical perception then it would be a mediate or secondary form of 
perception; roughly, that we would only perceive ethical properties by perceiving other, 
simpler properties with which they are regularly correlated. This seems to be the view of 
                                                 
301
  See Goldman (1976) for this sort of account. For more recent discussion, see Duncan Pritchard’s 
(2010). 
 159 
Andrew Cullison (2010). Interestingly, however, he appears to think that this is compatible 
with the justification had on this basis being non-inferential. 
 
Very briefly, I would like to suggest here that even if it is only possible to see, e.g., 
wrongness, in virtue of seeing simpler properties, and that it is only possible to have secondary 
fact-perception of moral properties generally, this still might be compatible with such 
justification being non-inferential, i.e., the falsity of EP* is compatible with the truth of EPj. 
Specifically, I think that the positing of a belief-state to perform the psychological and 
epistemological work in linking the primary seeing of simple properties to the presence of 
more complex properties (as McNeill does) is unnecessary. Instead, I think that McNeill has 
paid insufficient attention to the possibility that the same work could be performed by a non-
doxastic state. Furthermore, I think that it is plausible that in some of these cases the non-
doxastic state could be epistemically independent and hence capable of conferring non-
inferential justification. Indeed I think that there are at least three plausible candidates for 
filling this role: seeming states, concepts, and emotional experience. I have already spoken of 
seeming states in the previous chapter; recall, however, that I suggested that it is not obvious 
how seeming states about substantive ethical propositions get to justify. I have also suggested 
in §4 of this chapter that concepts could facilitate secondary seeing which is compatible with 
non-inferential justification. However, it is not obvious to me just what sort of justificatory 
status beliefs held on this basis would have. Given this, it is pressing that we discuss what the 
epistemological role of emotion might be. Supposing that Cullison is right and that EP* is 
plausibly false; still it might be possible that if one has an emotional experience in response to 
one’s perceptual experience, e.g., a response of anger or indignation to a perceptual experience 
as of the hoodlums setting the cat alight, one might come to non-inferentially, in both the 
psychological and epistemological senses, judge that what the boys are doing is wrong.’ In the 
next chapter I will explore in more detail this emotions-based account. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that, although EP* can survive some recent objections brought 
against it, it is far from obvious that ethical perceptual experiences (if there are any) can 
confer non-inferential justification for belief. Hence, it is not obvious whether the truth of EP* 
supports EPj and ethical intuitionism. 
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However, it has also been suggested that secondary ethical perception may be compatible with 
non-inferential justification and hence may be supportive of ethical intuitionism. I have 
already suggested that seeming states and concepts might be able to facilitate this although 
much work would have to be done in order to demonstrate this. In the next chapter I would 
like to consider the further possibility that emotional experiences might be able to, inter alia, 
facilitate secondary seeing. This will involve considering, inter alia, whether emotions are 
capable of conferring justification for belief. 
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Chapter 4: Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions 
In this final chapter I will assess the prospects for the view that emotional experiences are a 
potential source of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs: 
 
EE: ethical agents have some non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs on the 
basis of emotional experience. 
 
I will outline EE in a bit more detail shortly. Before doing so I would like to address an initial 
concern that the reader may have about a discussion of ethical intuitionism and the emotions. 
At first sight, a discussion of the theory of the emotions might seem out of place in an essay on 
ethical intuitionism. After all, intuitionism is most readily associated with appeals to self-
evidence, rational cognition, and robust realism, while talk of the emotions in ethics normally 
occurs in the context of discussions of non-cognitivism, sentimentalism, and ethical anti-
realism.  
 
There are, I think, a few things to say in order to assuage this general worry. Firstly, ethical 
intuitionism hasn’t always been associated with rationalism and self-evidence. The C17th and 
C18
th
 moral theorists such Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are broadly regarded as intuitionists
302
 
but eschewed a rationalist picture in favour of a quasi-perceptual model. On at least some 
interpretations, Hutcheson was committed to a realist account whereby the moral sense is an 
organ of emotional reaction which is capable of cognising or detecting the presence or 
absence in an action or person the properties of goodness, rightness etc.
303
  At this stage 
someone might think that the Moral Sense Theory sits better with an overall commitment to 
sentimentalism and an associated response-dependence ethical ontology. Hence, insofar as I 
am purporting to discuss ethical intuitionism, with its commitment to robust ethical realism, I 
would be wise to avoid citing the Moral Sense Theory as a motivation for discussing the 
emotions. There are, I think, two things to say to this objection. Firstly, ethical intuitionism is 
primarily an epistemological thesis that we can have non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, 
and hence, the issue of whether or not we adopt a robustly realist ontology is, in a sense, 
orthogonal to whether our emotions can provide us with this basic type of justification.
304
 The 
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      For details, see Hudson, (1967). 
303
      See Frankena, W., (1955). 
304
      Note the following from Jesse Prinz (2006): ‘Intuitionists believe that moral judgments are self-justifying… 
they seen to base this assertion on the phenomenology of moral judgments: moral judgments seem self-evident… 
 162 
second thing to say here is that even if we think that ethical intuitionism becomes distorted or 
cheapened when we drop the commitment to robust realism (and it is worth repeating the fact 
that almost all ethical intuitionists have endorsed this thesis), it seems that a more traditional 
intuitionist can, and should, be interested in the prospects for the emotions as a source of non-
inferential justification. What they should investigate is the idea that emotions could constitute 
an input from the stance-independent world of value and obligation, grounding (non-
inferential) justification for evaluative and deontic judgments.
305
 Indeed, recently Graham 
Oddie has argued for a stance-independent realism which takes our desires to be ‘experiences 
of value,’ which can serve to justify our evaluative beliefs. I am unaware of any principled 
reason why a robustly realist intuitionist couldn’t reasonably explore the idea that our 
emotional experiences function in much the same way as Oddie thinks that our desires do.
306
 
 
Now that I have hopefully addressed the worries about the general project of linking ethical 
intuitionism and the emotions, let me be more specific about the views that I will be 
discussing in this chapter. As it is standardly
307
 discussed, EE involves the conjunction of two 
claims. The first of these is a view about the nature of emotional experience: 
 
EN: occurrent emotional experiences (including ethical emotions, e.g., guilt, 
indignation etc) are intentional, non-doxastic states with a certain phenomenal 
character. 
 
The second view is a claim about the epistemological role of emotional experiences: 
 
EJ: ethical agents have non-inferentially justified ethical, emotional, beliefs.
308
 
 
I will primarily concern myself in this introductory section with outlining the motivations for 
EJ. Let me, however, say a little about EN. In recent years there has been the development of 
                                                                                                                                                         
far from opposing intuitionism, sentimentalism offers one of the most promising lines of defense… 
sentimentalism explains the phenomenology driving intuitionism, and it shows how intuitionism might be true.’ 
305
       I will use the term evaluative as a short-hand for the sorts of properties that emotions might be taken to track 
or represent. This of course might include deontic properties. 
306
     See his (2005). Although I will not be discussing Oddie’s view in this thesis, in passing we might note the 
oddity of the idea that a desire might give you a normative reason to believe that what you desire is good. 
307
       Although see Sabine Roeser (2011) for an exception to this. 
308
    I have already spoken extensively about non-inferentially justified beliefs referred to in EJ. All that is distinctive 
about EJ is that the non-inferentially beliefs in question are in some sense grounded in or based upon emotional 
experience. Also, the justification referred to is defeasible justification. 
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neo-judgmentalist and perceptual theories of the emotions (see Brady (2009), Döring (2003), 
(2005), (2007), Elgin (1999), (2005), Prinz, (2004), Roberts (2003), Tappolet (2005)). 
Roughly, the view is that emotional experiences are akin to affective construals or 
appearances or perceptions of value in that they apparently tell us about or represent the world 
of value.
309
 Given that it is widely assumed that construals, appearances and perceptions are 
non-doxastic and intentional states, we can perhaps see why drawing an analogy between 
emotional experience and these perception-like states essentially involves arguing for EN. I 
will discuss in some detail the reasons that neo-judgmentalist and perceptual theorists give for 
endorsing EN in §1 of this chapter. 
 
Let me say something about the reasons for discussing EJ. It seems to me that there are three 
main motivations for exploring the epistemological claim of EJ. The first of these is what I am 
calling the rationality of the emotions motivation. To understand what this amounts to, 
consider an opposing, traditional view, that emotional experiences are a threat to epistemic – 
and indeed rational – activity, e.g., the Stoical view of emotions as misguided judgments.310 
This irrationality of the emotions view has been historically popular, and is endorsed by some 
contemporary opponents of ethical intuitionism, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006)
311
, 
who regard the emotions as part of a broad class of epistemically distorting factors which 
threaten the possibility of non-inferential justification in ethics, i.e., the idea that emotions 
‘cloud’ our moral judgment. Moreover, some contemporary proponents of intuitionism also 
regard the emotions as only relevant to intuitionism insofar as emotions are a source (among 
others) of epistemic distortion vis-à-vis our intuitive moral judgments. In this regard, note the 
following from Michael Huemer (2008): 
 
emotions are known to impair judgment with respect to (other) factual 
questions, so, assuming the truth of moral realism, it is prima facie reasonable 
to assume that emotions impair our moral judgment as well.
312
  
 
                                                 
309
     There are other putative analogies between emotions and these sorts of perceptual states which I will not 
discuss here but are worth bearing in mind; both states are said to be passive, perspectival, typically caused by 
external events. 
310
      I think that part of the reason for this may be due to the conflation of emotional experiences and desires.  
311
     See his (2006b).  
312
     Huemer, M., (2008), pp. 378 
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Now despite the historical popularity of this view, there is a growing trend in the emotions 
literature towards thinking that it is excessively pessimistic to think that emotional experiences 
are always, or are mostly a source of epistemic distortion, and that to simply dismiss outright 
the thought of their having a positive epistemic role to play, e.g., in grounding justified 
beliefs,
313
 is too quick. Indeed, there has been a growing interest in the view that emotional 
experiences can in fact make a positive contribution to our epistemic activities.
314
 This has 
been, in part, due to two developments in the theory of the emotions. The first is the now 
widely endorsed thesis that emotions are not merely directionless feelings or perceptions of 
bodily changes that regularly obfuscate or derail reason, but are intentional or representational 
states which purport to depict the world in a certain evaluative way, e.g., the emotion of fear is 
directed towards an object or event which it can be said to represent as dangerous. Secondly, 
and related to the first point, it is now commonly thought that emotions are assessable for 
appropriateness or rationality, e.g., we often say things like ‘her anger was appropriate’, ‘his 
fear was unjustified’ etc. Furthermore, when we say that an emotion is justified we usually 
mean that the emotion is in some sense accurately representing the way the (evaluative) world 
happens to be. This seems to suggest that it is not at all obvious that emotions must always or 
mostly misguide or distort our epistemic and rational operations. Call this view the rationality 
of the emotions view.
315
  
 
The reason why the rationality of the emotions view is a motivation for EJ is that it seems 
plausible to think that, if an emotion can itself be a justified or appropriate response to a 
situation, it can potentially play a role in justifying or making appropriate evaluative beliefs.
316
 
Indeed, there are a growing number of philosophers of the emotions who think that emotions 
can play the epistemological role ascribed to them in EJ (see Döring (2003), (2007), Roeser 
(2011)). Furthermore, although some contemporary intuitionists regard the emotions as a 
source of distortion, others are sanguine about the idea that emotional experiences could figure 
in an account of our non-inferential knowledge. For example, note the following from Robert 
                                                 
313
       There are other ways in which emotions might have an epistemic role to play. Roughly-speaking, they might 
motivate us to search for evidence for evaluative beliefs, or they might focus or direct our attention onto 
emotionally-relevant objects and events. See Brun, G., Doğuoğlue, U. & Kuenzle, D. (eds.) (2008) for details. 
314
      See Brun, G., Doğuoğlue, U. & Kuenzle, D. (eds.) (2008) for details. 
315
     There is potentially an ambiguity with regard to the sense in which emotions can be rational, e.g., they could be 
rational in the sense that they are appropriate or justified, or they could be rational in the sense that they are 
integral to the successful functioning of a rational being. I am focusing here on the former sense.  
316
   here is one obvious way in which this might work: emotions may necessarily involve or be identical to 
evaluative judgments. See the discussion in §1 on judgmentalism. 
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Audi (2004): ‘emotions may reveal what is right or wrong before judgment articulates it; and 
they may both support ethical judgment and spur moral conduct’317. Another ethical 
intuitionist, Hugh McCann (2007), goes further. He has (briefly) sketched an account of non-
inferential moral knowledge which holds that emotional responses (specifically, what he calls 
felt obligation
318
) can be legitimately viewed as an objective awareness of obligation and can 
epistemically ground moral judgments.
319
 Again, both philosophers think that emotions can be 
assessed for rationality or appropriateness. 
 
In addition to this, I think there are two other primary motivations for holding the EJ view that 
I will mention here briefly. The first is that by pointing to emotional experience as a potential 
source of non-inferentially justified belief, it potentially enables ethical intuitionists to account 
for ethical justified belief whilst avoiding having to posit the existence of any special 
otherworldly or epistemologically queer faculties with which we are not already familiar, e.g., 
an ‘unnoticed’320 moral sense. Call this the Anti-Queerness motivation. Secondly, given that 
for some philosophers, emotions are grounded in our cares and concerns,
321
it seems that 
positing emotional experiences as the source and justification of many of our ethical beliefs 
will also be able to partially answer critics who worry that cognitivism - which intuitionism 
seems to be committed to - commits us to a dry intellectualised ethical knowledge and that it 
cannot explain why normal ethical agents care about morality when we come to know about 
it. Call this the Affective motivation. Note, however, that whether an appeal to emotions can 
actually account for the supposed motivational power of moral judgments (e.g., as Roeser 
(2011) argues) is a good deal less obvious.
 322
 
 
                                                 
317
     Audi, R., (2004), p. 57 
318
     This notion has its origin in Mandelbaum (1955). Sabine Roeser (2011) makes similar claims. 
319
     See his ‘(2007). McCann goes as far as to say that emotions can be viewed as the primary experience through 
which we become aware of rightness and wrongness.  
320
     Dancy, J., ‘Intuitionism’ from Companion to Ethics p. 415 
321
     For this claim, see the work of Robert C. Roberts, esp. his (2003). Roberts characterises emotions as concern-
based construals. 
322
    See Sabine Roeser’s (2011). Roeser argues that an appeal to a judgmentalist account of emotions can solve 
Michael Smith’s moral problem; roughly, the problem of reconciling realism, Humeanism about motivation, and 
internalism about moral judgments. Her account depends upon the thesis that emotions (which, on her view, are 
at least partly constituted by judgments) are necessarily – albeit defeasibly – motivating. It is not at all obvious 
that this claim is true, e.g., my grief at the death of a relative doesn’t obviously motivate me to do anything. Also, 
in the case of the aesthetic emotions it is not at all obvious that, e.g., when listening to Beethoven’s 
Appassionata, there is any motivational component. Thus the burden of proof is on Roeser to show that the moral 
emotions are different in kind with regard to motivation. 
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It will be the primary purpose of this chapter to evaluate the prospects for EE, understood as 
the conjunction of EN and EJ. This will be done by outlining the reasons for adopting the EN 
view, and then defending EJ against three serious extant objections to it. Roughly-speaking, I 
will argue that, although there are perhaps good reasons for endorsing EN and although the 
defender of EJ can respond to three significant objections to their view, much work still needs 
to be done in order to make the EE view plausible (particularly the EJ component of the view). 
 
The structure of the chapter will go as follows: 
 
In §1 I will explicate the EN thesis which is defended by neo-judgmentalist and perceptual 
theorists of the emotions. This will involve a discussion of their account of what occurrent 
emotional experiences are – roughly, intentional, representational states that fall short of 
outright belief which haven phenomenal character – as well as an argument to the effect that 
the neo-judgmentalist and perceptual theories are superior to rival judgmentalist and feelings 
accounts. In addition, I will also consider some additional theses that some proponents of EN 
also adopt.  
 
In §2 I will reintroduce the EJ thesis. After doing so I will consider a rival account of the 
epistemological function of emotional experience from Michael Brady ((2009), (2010a), 
(2010b), (2010c)), before outlining and responding to an objection against EJ which stems 
from his account: the Basing Objection. I will argue that we have good reason to think that 
emotional experiences are at least sometimes the reason why emotional subjects hold 
evaluative beliefs, and that, in lieu of further argument, the Basing Objection looks unsound. 
 
In §3 I will partially respond to another objection that derives from Brady’s rival account of 
the epistemological function of emotional experience: the Justification Objection. I will argue 
that the defender of EJ can partially defend against the claim that emotional experiences 
cannot confer justification by themselves, i.e. in the absence of an awareness of the evaluative-
property-making features of their situation. However, it will also be suggested that it is unclear 
whether subjects in this sort of case have a right to the relevant evaluative beliefs (in a sense to 
be explained). Finally, I will suggest that much work needs to be done by proponents of EJ in 
order to provide us with positive reason for endorsing their thesis. 
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Following from this, in §4, I will introduce and consider Brady’s Proxy Objection to EJ.323 
Specifically, this involves the claim that emotional experiences are, at best, proxy or pro 
tempore reasons for beliefs and hence lack the status of what he terms genuine epistemic 
reasons. Roughly, I will argue that emotional experiences need not be rendered normatively or 
justificatorily otiose when a subject is aware of the evaluative-property-making features of 
their situation, and that defenders of EJ can reject the claim that there is epistemic or 
normative pressure on subjects to become aware of evaluative-property-making-features in a 
way which does apparently render them normatively and justificatorily otiose.  
 
1. The EN Thesis 
Recall the EN thesis: 
 
EN: occurrent emotional experiences (including ethical emotions) are 
intentional, non-doxastic states with phenomenal character. 
 
EN is a thesis about what emotional experiences are. As was mentioned in the previous 
section, both neo-judgmentalists and perceptual theorists can be thought of as subscribing to 
EN. Note firstly that the EN account of emotions is limited to occurrent emotions, and is 
hence not purporting to account for all emotional phenomena, e.g., the nature of long-standing 
or dispositional emotions such as the love someone has for their partner (although it should 
account for the occurrent manifestations of such dispositions).
324
 Also, according to 
proponents of EN, emotions are intentional
325
 and their intentionality is representational. I 
have already said something about the intentionality of the emotions in the previous section. 
Let me simply repeat the point that it is now widely accepted that emotional experiences are 
intentional states. Indeed, the most plausible contemporary feelings theories of the emotions, 
i.e., theories that identify emotions with an awareness of bodily changes, try to accommodate 
this feature of the emotions.
326
  
 
                                                 
323
       Strictly-speaking, the Proxy Objection only tells against EJ insofar as the justification, evidence or reasons 
that EJ refers to involves non-proxy or ‘genuine’ justification, evidence or reasons. I discuss this point in more 
detail in §4. 
324
     Also, if we agree with Goldie (2000), that emotions are complex dynamic processes that are only partially 
constituted by emotional episodes (roughly, conscious and occurrent emotional experiences), then the perceptual 
theory can be viewed as focusing on emotions in their episodic form.  
325
       e.g. see Döring (2003) and (2007). 
326
      See Prinz (2004) for an example. 
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It is also uncontroversial that occurrent emotional experiences have a certain phenomenology 
or phenomenal character, i.e., there is something-it-is-like to undergo an occurrent emotional 
experience. Certainly, the idea that emotions typically feel a certain way, or have a certain 
phenomenology seems intuitive, e.g., the pang of guilt, the grip of fear, the emptiness of grief 
etc. Indeed, most philosophers of emotion think that emotions are felt states.
327
 So, e.g., a 
judgmentalist about emotional experience (who deny EN), i.e. the view that emotions are, or 
necessarily embody evaluative judgments, can allow that emotions are judgments with 
accompanying emotional feelings (usually taken to be bodily feelings). On this account, the 
feelings are add-ons to the intentional element(s) of the emotion.
328
 By contrast, perceptual 
theorists of the emotions (who endorse EN), will claim that the phenomenal character of 
emotional experience is intimately bound up with their representational or intentional nature. 
As Döring (2007) states:  
 
an emotion's intentionality cannot be separated from its phenomenology but is 
built into it. What an emotion is about is part of its conscious, subjective 
character, i.e. of what it is like to experience the emotion.
329
 
 
So on this view, the feelings in emotion are not simply the registering of bodily changes as
330
, 
e.g., a Jamesian feelings theorist about the emotions would have us believe, but instead are 
directed towards objects in the world. At least some emotional feelings are feelings towards. 
This notion originates with Peter Goldie
331
 who claims (2008): 
 
 the intuition behind the idea of feelings towards is that, just as we can have 
thought and perceptions directed towards the world beyond the bounds of our 
bodies, so too we can have feelings directed towards the world.
332
 
                                                 
327
    e.g. see the work of Peter Goldie (2000), (2008), Robert C. Roberts (2003), Martha Nussbaum (2001), Ronald 
de Sousa (1987). 
328
    See Goldie (2008) for an argument against add-on views which take an emotion’s intentionality to be fully 
explicable in functional terms. 
329
    (2007) p. 375 
330
    If this ‘registering’ were intentional then this would nonetheless, intuitively, be the wrong sort of intentionality. 
Although see Prinz (2004) for a neo-Jamesian account which (i) identifies emotional feelings with awareness of 
bodily changes, and (ii) attempts to accommodate for the notion that emotions represent features of the body-
independent world.  
331
  See his (2000). 
332
  Goldie, P., (2008), p.7 One point worth noting here is that perceptual theorists need not be committed to the 
claim that the representational content of emotional experience just is, or is constitutive of, its phenomenal character. 
They may however, adopt some sort of supervenience thesis regarding character and content, i.e., the view that there 
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At this point it should be made clear that the feelings-towards view about emotional 
experience is in no way integral to the view that emotions have phenomenal character, or to 
the view expressed in EN. Indeed, some proponents of EN appear to hold contrary views 
about the role of phenomenal character in emotional experience, e.g., Roberts (2003).
333
  
 
The most controversial component of EN is the claim that occurrent emotional states are non-
doxastic. What reasons are there for accepting this claim? As a starting point, consider the fact 
that emotions, like sensory perceptions, can ostensibly come into conflict with our consciously 
held evaluative beliefs and judgments. In the case of sensory perception this can occur with 
the phenomena of visual illusions and hallucination, e.g. the Müller-Lyer illusion, whilst in the 
emotional case we see divergence between emotion and belief with recalcitrant emotions, e.g. 
I fear the mouse whilst knowing (and hence believing) it to be perfectly harmless, or I feel 
guilty at keeping my job whilst my colleagues are made redundant, despite knowing that I 
have done nothing wrong. Of course, we need not think of the conflict between emotion and 
belief as rationally requiring that we always side with belief. In the emotional case, we 
applaud Huck Finn for allowing his emotional response (and rejecting his moral judgment) to 
guide his actions.  
 
Considering the phenomena of recalcitrant emotions (and other sorts of emotion/belief 
conflict) can apparently tell us quite a lot about the nature of emotional experience itself. 
Firstly, it seems that when emotional experience and evaluative judgment disagree, we have a 
conflict but not a contradiction.
334
 As Döring (2008) states: 
 
it is not contradictory to judge that you are safe whilst at the same time feeling 
fear, and that is: experiencing the situation as dangerous. Although judgment 
and emotion are about the same thing and seem to contradict each other in how 
they represent that thing, there is, in fact, no contradiction.
335
 
                                                                                                                                                         
are some phenomenal, intrinsic, but non-representational features associated with emotional experience. This would 
potentially allow some room for bodily feelings in the perceptual theory’s account of emotions. 
333
     Roberts characterises emotional experiences as concern-based construals. The thought here is that emotions 
have the affective phenomenology they do because they are based upon our concerns. This does not amount to 
the view that the affective phenomenology performs any representational function. 
334
    This phrase originates with Peter Goldie, e.g. see his (2008), but is also heavily used by Sabine Döring, e.g. see 
her (2008). 
335
     Döring, (2008), p. 84 
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As we shall see, defenders of EN more generally claim that this datum about emotional and 
judgmental conflict provides us with good reason to construe emotional experiences as non-
doxastic states. In order to see this, it should be noted how the phenomenon of emotional 
recalcitrance apparently puts serious pressure on alternative rival judgmentalist and feelings 
theories of the emotions.  
 
Judgmentalist theories
336
 of the emotions argue that evaluative judgments are identical to, or 
are necessary constituents of, emotions. Despite being plausible for much of our emotional 
experience (arguably, it seems that in many cases if I fear x, I will judge that x dangerous), 
with the phenomena of emotional recalcitrance the judgmentalist theory runs into problems.
337
 
Specifically, it seems that in the case of recalcitrant emotions, where the subject makes a 
conscious judgment which conflicts with their emotion, judgmentalists are committed to the 
claim that the embedded ‘emotional’ judgment is held unconsciously.338 As Brady (2009) has 
noted 
 
this is criticisable on two counts: first, it imputes too much irrationality to the 
subject of emotional recalcitrance; second it violates a principle of logical 
charity in our ascription of mental states.
339
 
 
On the first count, judgmentalists appear committed to claiming that agents with recalcitrant 
emotions have an incoherent cognitive profile. But given that emotional recalcitrance 
plausibly involves some rational conflict without contradiction or incoherence, this seems too 
strong a charge. Again, as Döring (2003) notes ‘it is not paradoxical, in the manner of Moore’s 
paradox, but perfectly coherent to say “I am afraid of the snake though (I know) it is not 
dangerous”’.340  
 
                                                 
336
       See the work of Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum. 
337
      In this respect I think an emotional-intuitionist account that endorses EN is superior to that presented by 
Sabine Roeser who adopts what appears to be a judgmentalist account of emotions. See her (2011). 
338
 Alternatively they might claim that in cases of conflict the subject switches between their emotional judgment and 
their non-emotional judgment. I do not find this response very plausible: it doesn’t seem like a good response in 
the perceptual case so I do not see any reason to think of it as a satisfactory response in the emotional case. 
339
  Quoted from Brady, M., (2009), p. 414, although the original point is made by Patricia Greenspan in her (1988), 
p. 18. 
340
  Döring, S., (2003),  pp. 222/3 
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On the second count, it seems that we should avoid attributing an incoherent cognitive profile 
to an agent unless there is an overriding reason to do so. In the case of recalcitrant emotions it 
seems that, given the existence of alternative accounts of the nature of emotions, e.g. feelings 
and perceptual accounts, we do not have such a reason. 
 
Notice, however, that the phenomena of emotional recalcitrance also places pressure on 
feelings theories of the emotion, which argue that we ought to identify emotions with feelings, 
understood as affective awareness, or perceptions of, bodily changes or disturbances. The 
problem for feelings theorists is that although the conflict between emotion and evaluative 
judgment doesn’t plausibly amount to contradiction or incoherence, there is some conflict 
between our emotion and evaluative belief in the case of emotional recalcitrance, and it is 
unclear how this can be accommodated if emotions are simply a subjective registering of 
bodily change. So in summary, it seems that we can agree with Peter Goldie (2008) when he 
claims that identifying emotions with 
 
bodily states and bodily feelings give us less than we want, namely no conflict, 
and belief gives us more than we want, namely contradiction. We want conflict 
without contradiction.
341
  
 
Defenders of EN, including perceptual theorists of the emotions, can therefore be viewed as 
taking the phenomena of conflict without contradiction as giving us reason to believe that 
emotional experience ought to be understood as a non-doxastic state. Indeed, I take this 
argument from conflict without contradiction as constituting a strong prima facie case in 
favour of construing occurrent emotional experiences in the way EN recommends.  
 
I will therefore be assuming for the rest of this chapter that the EN view is in fact correct. 
Note, however, there are some potential problems with the view,
 342
 which, due to constraints 
of space, I will not have time to consider. 
                                                 
341
      Goldie, P.,  (2008), p. 16 
342
      One potential problem is that emotional recalcitrance seems to differ from visual illusion in the following way: 
in the former case we think that the emotions are irrational whilst we do not attribute any rational failing to the 
subject of a perceptual illusion. This, however, need not be regarded as fatal for the theory. For a good account of 
how the proponent of EN might account for the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions see Brady (2009). Also, a 
related problem is that it seems plausible that emotions are, unlike perceptions – and like beliefs – subject to 
inferential constraints. Indeed, it has been argued that, e.g., experiencing fear of the dog does rationally commit 
me to being in other emotional states, e.g., if the dog leaves my immediate environment I ought to feel relief. 
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In the following section I will proceed to consider the prospects for EJ. 
 
2. EJ and the Basing Objection 
Let us now consider EJ: 
 
EJ: ethical agents have non-inferentially justified ethical, emotional, beliefs. 
 
A number of philosophers now subscribe to something like EJ. Note the following from 
Sabine Döring (2003): 
 
the fact that emotions have representational content opens up the possibility 
that the occurrence of an emotion can, in suitable circumstances, entitle a 
thinker to judge, and possibly know its content simply by taking its 
representational content at face value. In the case of the moral emotions, the 
possibility emerges that those emotions may give the thinker a non-inferential 
way of coming to know moral propositions.
343
 
 
Catherine Elgin (2008) suggests something similar: 
 
emotional deliverances are indicators, but not always accurate indicators of 
aspects of their objects. Just as my experiencing something as blue is 
evidence… that it is blue, me being frightened of something is evidence… that 
it is dangerous.
344
 
 
To illustrate; when I, e.g., feel disgust at the bankers lavishing themselves with bonuses this 
allegedly provides me with justification to endorse the representational content of my emotion, 
                                                                                                                                                         
Indeed, we might think that a subject who did not feel relief (or something like this) once a fear-inducing object 
was removed from their environment, wasn’t really in a state of fear. See the Bennett Helm (2003) for the claim 
that emotions involve rational commitments in a way that, e.g., perceptual experiences, apparently do not. 
343
  Döring, S., (2003), , pp. 229  
344
  Elgin, C., (2008), p. 37 
      Note also the following remarks she makes elsewhere: 
       '[That] a contention is grounded in emotion does not automatically discredit it. For emotion need not distort 
perception or derail reason. Emotions often heighten awareness, redirect attention and sensitize their subjects to 
factors that had previously eluded them (and others). Absent specific reason to distrust them, cognitive 
deliverances of emotion are initially tenable.’ From Elgin (1999), p. 150 
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and form the judgment (or something like it) that the bankers’ rewarding themselves with 
bonuses is disgusting. Or, e.g., when I feel indignant at the biased decisions of the referee, my 
indignance supposedly gives me epistemic justification for believing that that the referee is 
unjust. In other words, absent defeaters about, e.g., the untrustworthiness of my emotional 
capacity, I am epistemically justified in taking the content of my emotion at face value. As a 
result, and as is putatively the case with our everyday perceptual beliefs, the (defeasible) 
justification for evaluative beliefs formed directly on the basis of emotional experience will, 
according to proponents of EJ, be non-inferential. 
 
I have already discussed non-inferentially justified belief at length in the Introduction of the 
thesis. Recall that I suggested that a plausible way of understanding non-inferentially justified 
belief is in terms of beliefs that are epistemically grounded in justification-conferring non-
doxastic states. Given this, we can hopefully see that if this conception of non-inferentially 
justified belief is on the right track then the EN thesis is necessary for the truth of EJ. So it is 
therefore important for ethical intuitionists to defend some sort of neo-judgmentalist or 
perceptual theory of the nature of emotions. EN is not, however, sufficient for the truth of EJ. 
This is because someone could accept that emotional experiences are non-doxastic states while 
holding the following epistemological theses: 
 
Justification Objection: emotional experiences are not, by themselves, 
sufficient to confer justification for outright reasonable belief. 
  
Basing Objection: emotions are rarely or never a subject’s reason for holding 
an evaluative belief. 
 
Hopefully the reader can see that both of these constitute a direct threat to EJ. If the 
Justification Objection is correct then emotional experiences could never be themselves 
sufficient for conferring propositional justification for ethical beliefs. If the Basing Objection 
goes through then even if emotions could sometimes confer justification for beliefs, they 
would rarely or never ground doxastic justification, i.e., justified beliefs.
345
 This would of 
course undermine the potential for the EJ view to support ethical intuitionism. 
 
                                                 
345
   See the Introduction and Chapter 2 for details on the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification.  
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One philosopher who holds the EN thesis but rejects EJ is Michael Brady. In a series of recent 
papers ((2009), (2010a), (2010b), (2010c)), Brady has argued that there are significant 
problems with EJ and has essentially endorsed something like the Justification and Basing 
Objections.
346
Note, however, that Brady is not a pessimist about the epistemological potential 
of emotional experiences. That is, he does not endorse the traditional view of the emotions as 
irrational and obfuscating. Instead, Brady rejects EJ because he holds an alternative account of 
the epistemological role of emotional experience. Given that Brady is sympathetic to the view 
that emotions can play an epistemological role I think it is therefore particularly important that 
proponents of EJ address his challenges.  
 
In order to understand why Brady rejects EJ let me outline his alternative account of emotion’s 
epistemic role. Taking evidence from recent work in cognitive science,
347
 Brady argues that 
emotions typically serve to capture and focus our attention onto emotionally relevant 
objects/situations, so as to achieve an enhanced representation of those objects. On what 
appears to be an evolutionary teleological account, it is claimed that in a world where human 
subjects are assailed by continuous and large volumes of information from the external world, 
emotions fulfill a need for what has been termed preferential perceptual processing. That is to 
say, emotions cut through this mass of data and focus our attention onto emotionally 
significant objects and events. By persisting, emotions make us more sensitive to these objects 
and events, serving to facilitate the enhanced representation of these features, and enabling the 
subject to ascertain whether their emotional state accurately represents the world, e.g. the 
increased attention associated with fear can be thought of as the subject being on the look out 
for signs of danger. In other words, emotional experiences can be thought of as relatively 
‘quick and dirty’ responses to external stimuli which facilitate the discovery of reasons for 
evaluative appearances. Moreover, the persistence of attention will incline the subject to look 
for reasons bearing on the accuracy of their emotional take on the situation. As Brady (2010a) 
states: 
 
                                                 
346
       Note however, that Brady does not refer to these problems in the way that I do. For example, he does not raise 
the problem of what I am denoting the Basing Objection in the context of a discussion about propositional and 
doxastic justification. Rather, he raises it as a problem for the perceptual theory emotions which claims that there 
is an important epistemological analogy between emotions and perception. The same goes for the Justification 
Objection. In what follows, I will be using Brady’s alternative account of the epistemological role of the 
emotions as a basis for the Justification and Basing Objections.  
347
    Specifically, the work of Ben Ze’ev, A. (2000) and LeDoux, J. (1996) 
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what normally happens in emotional experience is that we (more or less) 
reflectively and consciously seek out reasons which either support or count 
against our initial emotional appraisal or take on our situation… we feel the 
need to seek out reasons that either back up or disconfirm our emotional take 
on some object or event, and thus feel the need to seek out considerations that 
have a bearing on the accuracy of our initial emotional response. In so far as the 
persistence of attention motivates this search, it functions to promote conscious 
reflection on such reasons, and enables us to gain an enhanced representation of 
our evaluative situation.
348
 
 
So Brady’s claim is that the function of the capture and consumption of attention is to arrive at 
an enhanced representation of the subject’s emotional situation, e.g., by becoming aware of 
the evaluative-property-making-features (EPMFs hereafter) of their situation. Given this 
picture, we can perhaps understand why Brady endorses the Justification and Basing 
Objections: it is because of his characterisation of emotional experience and its relation to 
attention. Regarding the Justification Objection, Brady claims that in the absence of a non-
emotional awareness of the EPMFs subjects will feel inclined to search for reasons and we 
therefore shouldn’t think that emotional experience by itself constitutes justification for 
endorsing the content of their emotional experience.  Regarding the Basing Objection; if it is 
true that emotions capture and consume subject’s attention by inclining emotional subjects to 
seek out reasons for endorsing the content of their emotional experience, it does not seem 
correct to claim that emotions are typically or perhaps ever the reason or basis for subject’s 
holding evaluative beliefs. Instead, on Brady’s picture it seems more plausible that subjects 
form beliefs on the basis of a non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs, and not on emotional 
experience.  
 
It is my view that the defender of EJ can respond to the Basing Objection and at least partially 
respond to the Justification Objection. It will be the task of this section to show how they can 
respond to the Basing Objection (I will respond to the Justification Objection in §3). The 
Basing Objection can be formalised in the following way
349
: 
 
                                                 
348
      Brady (2010a), pp. 121-22 
349
       Note that this is not quite the way Brady sets up the problem 
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P1: Emotions typically, or always incline subjects to search for reasons that 
bear on their accuracy (i.e., the EPMFs). 
P2: If emotions typically, or always incline subjects to search for reasons that 
bear on their accuracy then they are rarely or perhaps never the reason for 
subject’s evaluative or ethical beliefs. 
P3: If emotions are rarely or never the reason for subject’s evaluative or ethical 
beliefs then it is not at all clear how they could ground non-inferentially 
justified beliefs. 
C: It is not at all clear how emotions could ground non-inferentially justified 
beliefs. 
 
How might the proponent of EJ respond here? To begin, it is worth noting that proponents of 
EJ like Sabine Döring appear to take it for granted that emotional experiences are – in a way 
similar to perceptual experiences – often or normally taken at face value by subjects. As she 
claims: 
 
being occurrent conscious states, sense perceptions and emotions are very 
effective at causing judgments. Even if one could work out by inference, or by 
memory, that the snake is dangerous, the fear of the snake, and its 
representation in immediate consciousness, means that a judgment which takes 
that content of the emotion at face value does not need to wait on other means 
of reaching that same content, if indeed such means exist. Whether or not there 
are such means, we often operate in a default mode in which we take the 
content of our emotions at face value.
350
 
 
It is noteworthy how striking the contrast is with Brady’s account of emotional experience. 
However, Döring simply asserts that the default mode is for subjects to take their emotions at 
face value and we will need more than an assertion in order to cast doubt on the soundness of 
                                                 
350
  (2007) p. 379  
      Note that I am assuming that taking at face value and the basing relation that is relevant to the 
propositional/doxastic justification distinction amount to the same thing. 
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the Basing Objection.
351
 Here, then, are some examples of emotional experience which I think 
make P1 of the Basing Objection look dubious: 
 
Rom-Com: While watching a trite romantic comedy, I experience profound 
boredom. However, I am in no way motivated to search for the reasons that 
bear on the accuracy of this boredom. 
 
Strauss: My grandmother experiences wonder and beauty when listening to the 
waltzes of Johann Strauss. However, she is in no way motivated to search for 
the reasons that bear on the accuracy of this wonder and beauty. 
 
Party: I meet someone a party. While talking to them I develop a sense of 
unease and suspicion. Trusting my instincts I make a polite excuse and talk to 
someone else. I have no inclination to try to search for the reasons that bear on 
the accuracy of my suspicion.
352
 
 
I find these examples plausible as cases where it is false that having an emotional experience 
inclines the person involved to search for reasons that bear on the accuracy of their emotion. 
Furthermore, I do not think that these sorts of examples are in any way out of the ordinary. 
Indeed, they seem typical of the sorts of emotional experiences we are familiar with. Also, it 
seems plausible that in these sorts of cases people do take their emotional experience at face 
value, e.g., my grandmother believes that the waltzes are beautiful. Hence P1 of the Basing 
Objection looks dubious. 
 
In response to this, Brady and the proponent of the Basing Objection might claim that P1 is 
not an accurate reflection of their position. Instead they might insist that their claim is that, 
when experienced by themselves, emotional experiences typically incline subjects to search for 
reasons (and, given an amended P2, are not taken at face value). As Brady suggests (2009): 
 
it is implausible to suggest that in normal circumstances we take the 
representational content of emotional experiences at face value when forming 
                                                 
351
  Part of the reason why Döring thinks that emotions are good at getting us to form judgments might be due to the 
occurrent and phenomenal nature of emotional states, i.e., their salience in consciousness makes them effective at 
producing judgments. 
352
 This example is based upon one given by Terence Cuneo in his (2006). 
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the relevant evaluative beliefs – at least if this suggests that we take such 
experience at face value in the absence of an awareness of those reasons which 
bear on the accuracy of our emotional response.
353
 
 
To illustrate his point, Brady (2010b) presents the following sort of example: 
 
Guilty: Suppose David wakes up feeling guilty the morning after a party at a 
colleague’s house but can’t remember the events of the night before. The 
persistence of guilt might incline David to reflect on the possible reasons for 
his guilt, i.e., David might be inclined to seek out the possible reasons to judge 
that he has done something wrong. However, David will not simply take his 
guilt at face value and form the belief that he did something wrong at the party. 
 
Examples like Guilty are supposed to demonstrate that subjects do not take their emotional 
experiences at face value. Furthermore, the proponent of the Basing Objection will claim that, 
when the subject does have an emotional experience where they are aware of the EPMFs, we 
have good reason to think that it is an awareness of these features upon which the subject’s 
belief is based and not emotional experience. Hence, we have good reasons for thinking that 
emotional experiences are not typically, or perhaps ever, the reason for subject’s evaluative 
beliefs in the way that EJ appears to require.  
 
In response to this I think the proponent of EJ should say three things. Firstly, although it is 
plausible that many people would not take their emotional experience at face value in the 
specific case of Guilty), it is not obvious that this will apply to all emotional subjects (it is an 
empirical claim after all). For example, we can imagine a romantic Rousseauian who always 
trusts his emotion and who would form a judgment on the basis of his emotion in cases like 
Guilty. Similarly, we can imagine someone who is so convinced of their own moral turpitude 
that whenever they feel guilty they automatically take this as a reason to believe that they have 
done wrong. 
 
Secondly, it is not at all obvious that the examples of Rom-Com, Strauss and Party do involve 
an awareness of the EPMFs of the situation. I think this is especially plausible in the case of 
                                                 
353
 (2010b), p. 14  
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Strauss (although I do think the point plausibly holds for all three). My grandmother might be 
incapable of saying anything (over-and-above vague statements like ‘it sounds wonderful’) 
about just what it is that makes her feel wonder and beauty when listening to Strauss 
waltzes.
354
 Given that cases like this seem quite typical, we might think that cases like this cast 
doubt on the truth of the amended version of P1. At the very least, it looks like it is highly 
plausible that emotions are sometimes taken at face value by emotional subjects, even in the 
absence of an awareness of the EPMFs of their situation. 
 
Finally, even if P1 of the amended Basing Objection were true, i.e., that in the absence of an 
awareness of the EPMFs, subjects will be inclined to search for reasons, I think that 
proponents of EJ can reasonably challenge P2. That is, they can challenge the claim that if 
subjects are typically or always inclined to search for reasons that bear on the accuracy of their 
emotional experience, then this entails that they will rarely or never take their emotional 
experience at face value. More specifically, they can challenge the claim that there is a tight 
connection between, on the one hand, emotional experience inclining subjects to search for 
reasons, and on the other, subjects not taking emotional experience at face value.  
 
The problem with P2 of the Basing Objection is that it assumes that the search for reasons will 
always be in the manner of a detective looking for clues to support a hypothesis that has not 
yet been endorsed. However, some psychologists claim that we have good empirical evidence 
to support the claim that in at least some cases, the search for reasons is sometimes a post hoc 
rationalization of an already made emotional judgment. I have in mind here the empirical 
work associated primarily with Jonathan Haidt (2000), (2001), (2005) and his view that the 
aetiology of moral judgment can be understood as involving a quick emotional response to 
external stimuli, followed by a phenomenologically immediate judgment based on this 
response. So it might be the case that a search for reasons (i.e., the EPMFs) may amount to a 
post hoc rationalization of an emotionally-based judgment, much in the same way as a lawyer 
constructs a case for a position they have been assigned. Hence, in lieu of further empirical 
research and argument, P2 looks dubious and the Basing Objection increasingly looks 
unsound. 
                                                 
354
    It might be objected that this is simply a point about capacities for expression rather than a point about the grasp 
or awareness of features. Although I admit that there may be cases like Strauss that simply involve a lack of 
articulacy, I claim that it is plausible to think that there are cases where it makes sense to say that subjects lack 
such capacities because they lack an awareness of the features. 
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In addition to this I think that the proponent of EJ can point to some positive evidence for their 
claim that emotions are typically taken at face value. For example, Jesse Prinz (2007) thinks 
that we have good empirical evidence for thinking that emotions co-occur with the making of 
ethical judgments: 
 
the major players in moral cognition are brain areas associated with emotion. 
Common hotspots include areas such as the orbital frontal cortex and the 
temporal pole, which are involved in assigned emotional significance to events, 
and areas such as cingulate cortex, which are associated with emotional 
experience. This has led researchers to conclude the emotions are centrally 
involved in moral judgment.
355
 
 
Furthermore, he thinks that the experiments associated with Haidt give us good reason to think 
that emotional experiences are sufficient for ethical judgments. For example, when Murphy, 
Haidt and Bjorklund (2000) presented subjects with a scenario of consensual incest between 
siblings, the subjects were reported as having made an ostensibly emotionally-based judgment 
that incest is morally wrong. Subjects were then challenged to justify their ostensibly 
emotionally-based belief and were recorded as trying to search for reasons to justify their 
judgments. However, such attempts were thwarted at every point by their being told that such 
justification was irrelevant in the scenario at hand. Nonetheless, subjects still held fast to their 
apparently emotionally-based beliefs. Participants in experiments like these were often left 
feeling ‘morally dumbfounded’, 
 
that is, they would stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to find 
supporting reasons, yet they would not change their initial judgments of 
condemnation.
356
  
 
Furthermore, in such experiments ‘eventually, many people say something like, “I don’t know, 
I can’t explain it, I just know its wrong”’357. Although this does not, by itself, establish the 
                                                 
355
    Prinz, J., (2007), p. 272 
356
    Haidt, J. (2001) e.g., in the consensual incest case, when some cited as ground for wrongness the possibility of 
genetic mutation in potential offspring they were told that the individuals in the example used contraception. 
357
    Haidt, J., (2001), p. 814  
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truth of the claim that emotions are typically taken at face value by emotional subjects, they 
certainly give us reason to think that emotions are at least sometimes taken at face value. 
Importantly, I think that cumulatively, the preceding arguments give us good reason to doubt 
that the Basing Objection is sound, and that the burden of proof has been shifted from the 
defender of EJ and on to the proponent of the Basing Objection.
358
 I therefore will proceed on 
the assumption that emotional subjects do – at least sometimes – take their emotional 
experiences at face value, and hence, if emotional experiences can generate justification for 
beliefs, then they sometimes ground non-inferentially justified beliefs. Indeed, contra the 
Basing Objection, this may in fact be the typical case.  
 
In the following section I will consider how the defender of EJ might respond to the 
Justification Objection. 
 
3. EJ and the Justification Objection 
This brings us on to the Justification Objection which amounts to the denial that subjects who 
take the content of their emotional experiences at face value, apparently in the absence of an 
awareness of the EPMFs, would be justified in doing so. So, e.g., in the case of Guilty, Brady 
(2010b) claims the following: ‘We might not think that the feeling [of guilt] by itself is a 
conclusive reason for me to believe that I did anything wrong at the party’359. Instead, we need 
to become aware of the EPMFs in order to be justified and to feel entitled to such beliefs: 
 
Absent the discovery (or invention) of such reasons, it is by no means obvious 
that we regard ourselves as entitled to take the content of our emotional 
experience at face value.
360
  
 
Insofar as emotional experiences can only confer justification when subjects lack an awareness 
of the EPMFs, then the Justification Objection constitutes a direct challenge to the truth of EJ. 
In the remainder of this section I will respond to this objection on behalf of the proponent of 
EJ. 
                                                 
358
    If the reader is still sceptical about the idea that emotions are the reason for some subjects’ ethical and 
evaluative beliefs, it ought to be noted that rival judgmentalist theories of the emotions gain a lot of credibility from 
the idea that typically, when we experience an emotion, e.g. fear, we judge that we are in danger. Of course, the 
judgmentalist claims that emotions are constituted – at least in part - by evaluative judgments, which is a claim I 
think we ought to reject. 
359
 Brady (2010b), p. 10 
360
 Ibid., p. 14 
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As noted, Brady points to the case of Guilty in order to support the Justification Objection. 
Here is an amended version of that example: 
 
Guilty: Suppose David wakes up feeling guilty the morning after a party at a 
colleague’s house but can’t remember the events of the night before. The 
persistence of guilt might incline David to reflect on the possible reasons for 
his guilt, i.e. David might be motivated to seek out the possible reasons to 
judge that he has done something wrong. However, if David were to take the 
content of his emotional experience at face value, i.e. without an awareness of 
the reasons for his guilt, then his belief that he had done something wrong 
would not be justified. 
 
Let me begin by saying that any response to this example ought to concede the point that there 
is something normatively or epistemically dubious about David forming the belief on the basis 
of his emotion. Indeed, I think that the defender of EJ should concede the point that subjects 
might not take themselves to be entitled to their beliefs in cases like Guilty. However, I do not 
think that in acknowledging this, EJ thereby falls foul of the Justification Objection which is 
concerned with justification and not entitlement (more on this distinction below). 
 
The first thing to say here is that some defenders of EJ might claim that, insofar as David’s 
guilt is responding to a justified awareness of the EPMFs, e.g., perceptual experiences or 
beliefs about his behaviour at the party, then his emotional experience is itself justified. Given 
this, we shouldn’t shy away from saying that the emotional experience could itself confer 
justification for belief. Of course, David has, as a matter of fact, ostensibly forgotten about his 
behaviour at the party, but this need not negate the justified status of his guilt and hence need 
not impinge on the justified status of a belief formed on the basis of this emotion. However, as 
was noted, it seems that there is something dubious about David’s belief. How might the 
proponent of EJ account for this? It seems to me that they could go one of two ways here. 
Either, they could account for the dubiousness of David’s belief in terms of a failure of 
justification or of some other normative failure.   
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Let me briefly consider the first option. Someone might claim that, by itself, emotional 
experience can only confer some justification for belief, but not enough for outright reasonable 
belief. So in the case of Guilty, David will have to discover reasons that bear on the accuracy 
of emotional experience in order to have justification sufficient for outright reasonable belief. 
This might appeal to those who worry that without an awareness of the EPMFs it isn’t very 
plausible to claim that David’s guilt is justification-conferring (even if it is itself justified).361 
However, we should be aware that this option would essentially involve something of a 
capitulation to the Justification Objection.
362
 
 
Although this position needn’t be devastating for the view, I am not convinced that proponents 
of EJ need to settle with it. Instead I think that they could reasonably challenge the claim that 
what is normatively dubious about David’s belief in Guilty is that his emotion does not confer 
justification for his belief. Instead, proponents of EJ might try to point to some other feature of 
David’s epistemic activity which accounts for the dubiousness of his belief, but which 
maintains that his epistemic failing is not a justificatory failure. In order to make good on this 
claim, I suggest that defenders of EJ ought to consider seriously the idea that a goal of 
evaluative and ethical thinking – perhaps the goal – is to attain an understanding of one’s 
ethical or evaluative situation, where ethical understanding is ‘a grasp of the reasons why 
some action is right, or why some policy or practice is morally wrong’363 and involves a set of 
abilities that go beyond what is required for knowledge, e.g. S can follow an explanation of 
why p, S can explain why p in her own words, S can draw the conclusion that p from q etc. 
Why think that this is true? Well, inter alia, positing something like understanding as a goal of 
evaluative and ethical thinking can arguably best explain what is normatively dubious
364
 about 
forming beliefs on the basis of moral testimony in a way that avoids claiming, implausibly, 
                                                 
361
       Cf. Patricia Greenspan’s ‘Reasons to Feel’ where she claims that an emotion could itself be justified without it 
being capable of conferring justification for belief.  
362
     Although note that Catherine Elgin (2008) appears to endorse something like this thesis: ‘to have less tenability 
is not to have none. The very fact that [emotional experiences] present themselves as indicators of how things 
stand gives them some degree of initial tenability.’ p. 57 
363
     Alison Hills’ (2010), p. 256  
       One might worry about being over-demanding about articulacy of reasons here, but Hills thinks that grasping the 
moral reasons does not require ‘a grasp of reasons “all the way down”’ 
364
   If this isn’t obvious, consider the following example: 
Suppose that there is to be a referendum on abolishing taxation for only the highest earners. Due to my laziness I 
don’t have the time to give the issue any thought or consideration. Voting is, however, compulsory. As I walk to 
the polling-booth I bump into my friends who tell me that, after lengthy consideration, each has independently 
arrived at the conclusion that the tax-abolition is morally unjustified, and will hence be voting ‘No.’ On the basis 
of this testimony, I form the belief that the proposed policy is morally wrong and that I ought to vote against it. 
The pessimist intuition (which I share) is that there is something dubious about my forming a moral belief in this 
case. 
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that moral testimony is incapable of making justified beliefs available to the recipient of that 
testimony.
365
 I would like to suggest that defenders of EJ ought to treat examples like Guilty as 
cases where justified belief could perhaps be made available to the subject, i.e., they could 
have justification for belief, but where there is something normatively illicit about forming 
beliefs on this basis due to the subject lacking an understanding of their situation, e.g., David 
hasn’t any clue as to why his guilt might be an appropriate response to the events of the night 
before. To put this another way; I suggest that defenders of EJ should argue that in cases like 
Guilty where the subject lacks an awareness of the EPMFs they have much the same epistemic 
and normative standing as someone who accepts testimony on a moral matter, e.g., where I 
believe that a proposed tax-break for the rich is morally unjustified on the basis of your say-so 
but without having given the matter any consideration. 
 
If this is plausible, then it seems that proponents of EJ can admit that there is something 
normatively awry about David’s belief in Guilty without being forced to concede to the 
Justification Objection. At this point, however, it seems that there are two outstanding 
problems.
366
 Let me deal with the less serious of these first. Someone might object that, 
although positing understanding as a goal of evaluative and ethical thought might explain why 
there is something dubious about David’s belief, in other emotional cases where a subject 
lacks an awareness of the EPMFs, e.g., cases like Strauss or Rom-Com, there doesn’t seem to 
be any normative pressure to gain an understanding. Hence, there is something suspect about 
pointing to understanding in order to explain the normative dubiousness of the belief in Guilty. 
In response to this, I think that the defender of EJ should admit that there doesn’t appear to be 
anything normatively dubious about, e.g. my grandmother’s belief about the beauty of Strauss 
waltzes, but that this is because either (i) acquaintance with rather than understanding of 
aesthetic objects, e.g. works of art, pieces of music, is what counts
367
, or, (ii) subjects only 
have a reason to attain an understanding if they can do so (admittedly, though, this wouldn’t 
explain why there doesn’t appear to be anything dubious about my belief in Rom-Com). 
However, in the ethical case, understanding rather than acquaintance with ‘ethical’ scenarios is 
                                                 
365
 See Robert Hopkins (2007). Hopkins argues, convincingly, that recipients of moral testimony could gain 
knowledge via an inductive Humean argument, i.e. I has been trustworthy in the past, I says p, therefore I have 
reason to believe p. Alternatively, we might simply have a default right to believe on the say-so of others, and 
there doesn’t appear to be compelling reason to think this wouldn’t hold in the moral case. 
366
 There is another worry luring in the background. If emotional experiences can only represent ethical properties 
via some sort of cognitive penetration (see Chapter 3) then they might only be able to confer inferential or 
mediate justification.  
367
 See Hopkins, R., (2011) for this suggestion. 
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what is ultimately important, and hence we can legitimately explain what is dubious about the 
belief in Guilty. If all of this seems right then it appears that proponents of EJ can appeal to 
understanding as the goal of evaluative thinking in order to partially respond to the 
Justification Objection. 
 
Importantly, however, on some accounts (e.g. Hopkins), such agents who lack a grasp of the 
moral reasons why for their moral belief would in fact lack a right to their belief, despite the 
fact that, if adopted, the belief would constitute justified belief or knowledge. Indeed, this is 
how Hopkins accounts for what is normatively dubious about forming a moral belief on the 
basis of testimony. If this view were plausible, then it might be possible to launch an 
alternative objection to EJ, i.e., emotional experiences are insufficient for a right or 
entitlement to belief by themselves and hence they ought not to be the reason for a subject’s 
belief. Indeed, if moral agents really do lack a right to these sorts of emotionally-based beliefs, 
then it seems that we are faced again with the problem of whether emotional experiences can 
ground justified beliefs since although emotional experiences might confer justification for 
beliefs, they can’t ground justified beliefs because emotions are insufficient to ground rights to 
beliefs.
368
 This point is worth keeping in mind for the section that follows. 
 
The second, more serious problem facing EJ, is that, even if proponents of EJ can account for 
the alleged dubiousness of forming beliefs solely on the basis of emotional experience by 
appeal to the goal of understanding, we have yet to be given good positive reasons for thinking 
that the emotional experiences do in fact confer justification in the way that EJ claims. Indeed, 
if emotional experiences are, as Brady claims, quick and dirty responses to external stimuli 
then we may wonder just what degree of justification they could be capable of conferring. 
Note also, Peter Goldie’s (2008) related claim that emotional experiences can often skew the 
epistemic landscape in such a way as to make the formation of accurate evaluative beliefs 
difficult.
369
 Given this, we might be left wondering just what the epistemic credentials of 
emotional experience really are. Furthermore, and perhaps more seriously, if ethical 
intuitionist proponents of EJ have a robustly realist ethical ontology
370
 in mind then they are 
                                                 
368
      Technically, if subjects did go ahead and form beliefs (as my response to the Basing Objection suggests), then 
emotions could ground justified beliefs, but there would be something normatively dubious about them doing so. 
369
     Goldie discusses cases where subjects who are in the grip of an emotion, e.g., jealousy, might invent reasons 
for their emotional construal of the situation. Furthermore, he suggests that it can be difficult for the subject to 
come to realise that this is happening. 
370
     Possible, things are less problematic when we adopt a response-dependent ontology. I do not have the space to 
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arguably faced with similar sorts of epistemological work to do as proponents of intellectual 
seemings accounts (see chapter 2). Recall that in chapter 2 it was suggested that proponents of 
the intellectual seemings account of non-inferential justification cannot simply rely on the 
truth of a general epistemological principle like Phenomenal Conservatism in order to ground 
their ethical epistemology. I would like to suggest that the same holds for emotional 
experiences
371
 and EJ: given that proponents of EJ cannot obviously rely on some general 
epistemological principle to ground their epistemological claim, it seems that they have 
serious work to do in order to provide an explanation of how emotional experiences are the 
sorts of experiences that do get to justify beliefs. As I said, this is particularly important if we 
are assuming a robustly realist ethical ontology. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that we have good reason to think that EJ can be at least 
partially defended in the face of the Justification Objection, i.e., emotions could confer non-
inferential propositional justification for ethical beliefs. However, as was just highlighted, it 
seems that much work still needs to be done in order to give us positive reason for thinking 
that EJ is correct, i.e., that emotions can or do confer justification for beliefs.  
 
In the following section, §4, I would like to consider a further objection that Brady raises 
against EJ which concedes that emotions could confer justification; the Proxy Objection. As 
shall become clear, I think we have good reason to think that the proponent of EJ can plausibly 
rebut this objection too. 
 
4. EJ and the Proxy Objection 
I would now like to consider the following objection that potentially causes problems for EJ 
and which is adapted from the work of Brady (2010c)
372
: 
 
Proxy Objection: Insofar as emotional experiences can provide epistemic 
reasons or justification for beliefs, they can, at best, provide proxy or pro 
tempore epistemic reasons or justification. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
consider this issue here. 
371
 Someone might think that emotions just are a species of seeming-states. The same problem would apply. 
372
 Note that Brady raises this objection against the claim of the perceptual theory of the emotions that emotions 
confer justification in the same way as perceptual experiences do. 
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A few comments are in order. Firstly, some clarification on what a proxy or pro tempore 
epistemic reason or justification is supposed to be; the claim here is that the only sorts of 
epistemic reasons or justification an emotional experience could constitute or confer are 
reasons or justifications which ‘stand in the place of something else’ (presumably ‘better’ or 
‘genuine’ epistemic reasons) and ‘for the time being’ (presumably until the ‘better’ or 
‘genuine’ epistemic reasons can be found). The implication is that emotional epistemic 
reasons or justification are of an epistemically inferior sort that ought to be jettisoned when 
better epistemic reasons can be found.  
 
In more detail, the bearing of the Proxy Objection on EJ amounts to this: insofar as emotional 
experiences can confer epistemic reasons or justification for belief, they are of an 
epistemically inferior sort that ought to be jettisoned when better epistemic reasons can be 
found. The thought here is that the ‘better’ reasons for evaluative judgments are an awareness 
(presumably non-emotional) of evaluative-property-making features (EPMFs). Furthermore, 
given that understanding is plausibly the goal of evaluative thinking, then there is epistemic 
and normative pressure on us to become aware of these better reasons. So, subjects who are in 
scenarios like Guilty have a normative reason to become aware of the genuine reasons for 
evaluative belief, but in doing so their emotional justification is apparently rendered otiose 
(because emotional justification or epistemic reasons are mere proxies). So it seems that the 
epistemic role that EJ attributes to emotional experience is in some degree of doubt. On the 
one hand, if subjects are unaware of the EPMFs but only have their emotional experience to 
rely on it is (i) unclear whether they have justification, and/or (ii) not obvious that they have a 
right to their belief. However, if subjects do become aware of the EPMFs, then according to 
the Proxy Objection, their emotional experience is rendered justificatorily and normatively 
redundant. Hence, it seems that defenders of EJ ought to say something in response to the 
Proxy Objection as it threatens to seriously undermine the sort of epistemic role that 
proponents of that view clearly have in mind for emotional experiences.
373
   
 
                                                 
373
       It is presumably a background assumption of the Proxy Objection that paradigmatic justifying states, e.g., 
perceptual experiences, are not mere proxy or pro tempore epistemic reasons. Rather, the objection appears to 
assume that perceptual experiences are genuine epistemic reasons or can confer epistemic justification. However, 
it has been suggested to me by Martin Smith that it is not altogether obvious that perceptual experience are not 
proxy or pro tem reasons. If we understand by proxy or pro tem epistemic reasons, epistemic reasons until better 
epistemic reasons come along, then it does not seem inconceivable that at some future point we could discover a 
knowledge-gathering method which does render perceptual experiences epistemically inferior in the relevant 
sense. 
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In order to fully understand the Proxy Objection we need to consider briefly Brady’s account 
of the normative relationship between emotion, EPMFs and evaluative beliefs. Firstly, he 
claims that, unlike perceptions, emotional experiences are or ought to be responsive to 
reasons. On Brady’s view, this amounts to saying that emotional experiences are or ought to 
be responsive to EPMFs. Moreover, the EPMFs which are supposed to be reasons for 
emotional responses are also reasons for the relevant evaluative belief. To illustrate; features 
of the situation which are reasons for David’s guilt, e.g., his having insulted a colleague at the 
party, are the same features which are reasons for his judging that he has done something 
wrong. On this picture, then, emotions and evaluative beliefs are responsive to the very same 
reasons; the EPMFs.
 374
 Finally, Brady appears to think that emotional experiences could only 
provide reasons, evidence or justification insofar as they track EPMFs, i.e., it is only because 
they track these features that they could ever be capable of providing reasons for evaluative 
beliefs. 
 
With this picture in hand we can understand more fully just in what sense emotional 
experiences are supposed to be – at best – capable of constituting proxy or pro tem epistemic 
reasons or justification for beliefs. As Brady (2010c) claims, this is because  
 
the normative or justificatory force of our emotional experience would seem to 
be exhausted by the normative or justificatory force of the features that we take 
our emotional experience to reliably track... awareness of such features, and of 
the relation between such features and value, would thus seem to render the 
emotional experience otiose from the justificatory perspective.
375
  
 
To illustrate; once I become aware of reasons for judging the film to be boring in Rom-Com, 
e.g., that the plot structure of the film is entirely derivative, then my emotional experience of 
boredom no longer constitutes an epistemic reason or additional justification for believing that 
the film is boring. If I were to do so then I would, according to Brady, be engaging in an illicit 
form of ‘double-counting.’ That is, I would be counting the presence of the EPMFs twice; 
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      This picture is more-or-less identical to that presented in Peter Goldie’s (2004), e.g., in the case of a piece of 
disgusting meat ‘the reasons that justify the ascription of disgustingness to the piece of meat (the fact that it is 
maggot-infested, etc.) are the very same reasons that make feeling disgust justified on this occasion.’ p. 10 Note 
that it seems that Brady and Goldie are essentially endorsing some sort of buck-passing account of ethical (and 
evaluative) properties. I will be more-or-less taking their account for granted here in order to engage with the 
debate. 
375
    Brady, (2010c), p. 5 
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once through my emotion (which is tracking the EPMFs) and again when I become aware of 
the EPMFs that the emotion was tracking all along. Hence, there is perhaps reason to think 
that my emotional experience becomes epistemically otiose once I become aware of the 
EPMFs of the situation.  
 
Brady claims that the epistemic role of emotions is roughly analogous to role played by rules-
of-thumb by the lights of act-consequentialism. He asks us to consider the case where I believe 
that an act is wrong because it involves promise-breaking and because of the relevant rule-of-
thumb that forbids promise-breaking. Given this, 
 
suppose that I become aware of the fact that the act in question resulted in bad 
consequences, and believe that it is wrong for this reason. It would be a mistake 
to think that the fact that the act is a case of promise-breaking is or continues to 
be an additional reason to believe it wrong.
376
  
 
Again, the idea is that to count the fact that the act falls under a rule-of-thumb as an additional 
epistemic reason for believing that the act was wrong would be to engage in double-counting, 
i.e., the bad consequences of the act (which, on the assumption of act-consequentialism, are 
both explanatory and constitutive of its being wrong) are illicitly coming into the epistemic 
picture twice. Insofar as we think the rule-of-thumb becomes otiose, and insofar as there is an 
analogy between this case and the emotional case, the emotions look only to be capable of 
conferring mere proxy or pro tempore epistemic reasons or justification. 
 
Before explaining how I think the proponent of EJ can and should respond, I want to briefly 
make clear at the outset that in the following I will be essentially arguing that the epistemic 
role of emotional experience – assuming that there is one - is not simply limited to case where 
subjects are unaware of the EPMFs of the situation. Instead, I think that emotions could 
potentially ground non-inferential justification in situations where they are, in a sense to be 
explained, aware of the EPMFs. This seems important given the worries expressed in the 
previous section about agents who are unaware of the EPMFs lacking a right to the relevant 
evaluative or ethical beliefs. Indeed, I think that we can think of three broad cases of 
emotional experience: 
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(a) Subjects have an emotional experience but lack an awareness of the 
EPMFS, e.g., cases like Guilty. 
(b) Subjects have an emotional experience and a non-emotional awareness of 
the EPMFs, e.g., cases of the sort Brady describes and for which he thinks 
emotions are rendered otiose. 
(c) Subjects have an emotional experience but have a different sort of 
awareness of EPMFs from that in (b), i.e., different from a non-emotional 
awareness.  
 
In this section I am basically aiming to show that (c) is a live option and that in these sorts of 
cases emotions could confer justification and subjects would unambiguously have a right to 
their emotionally-based beliefs. 
 
So how might the defender of EJ respond to the Proxy Objection? I think there are two main 
ways of responding, the first of which is a good deal more controversial than the second. I 
shall therefore be relatively brief in discussing this first response (although for what it’s worth 
I do not think that it is implausible). Proponents of EJ might respond to the charge that 
emotional experiences are rendered justificatorily otiose by an awareness of the EPMFs of the 
situation by denying a key premise of the Proxy Objection; that is, the claim that emotional 
experiences are responding to, or are supposed to be responding to the very same features and 
events that we can become non-emotionally aware of. Indeed, I do not think that Brady has 
given us sufficient reason to think that emotional experience is picking up on the EPMFs 
which he refers to, as opposed to, e.g., the supervening evaluative property. Now, it is not my 
purpose here to get bogged down in questions of evaluative and moral metaphysics, but it 
seems that a potentially fruitful avenue for the defender of EJ to explore would be to claim 
that the emotional experience picks up on supervening evaluative properties, e.g. danger, 
wrongness etc, such that it perhaps makes some sense to say that becoming non-emotionally 
aware of the EPMFs isn’t simply duplicating the epistemic operations of the emotional 
experience (and vice versa). This might allow the proponent of EJ to avoid the claim that 
emotional experience is rendered justificatorily otiose and might avoid the claim that to count 
the emotional experience as an additional (non-inferential) justification would be to engage in 
double-counting. There are, however, things the opponent could probably say in response to 
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this point. Rather than get side-tracked in a very complicated metaphysical debate allow me to 
go on to consider the other less controversial response that I think the proponent of EJ can 
make. 
 
Brady claims that once an emotional subject becomes aware of the EPMFs the justificatory 
and normative power of the emotional experience is rendered otiose. I think that in response, 
the perceptual theorist should say that there is a significant ambiguity as to what constitutes an 
awareness of the EPMFs. Consider the following familiar example: 
 
Cat: Suppose that you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour 
gasoline on a cat and ignite it. 
 
Now it seems to me that there are broadly two ways in which you might come to judge that 
what the hoodlums are doing is wrong. One way would be to note the EPMFs, e.g., the 
causing of suffering, the taking of enjoyment in the causing of suffering etc., as premises that 
could figure in a conclusion that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong. Call this a non-
emotional awareness of the EPMFs. In this case I think proponents of EJ can admit that to 
count your emotion as an additional reason for thinking that what the hoodlums are doing is 
wrong might reasonably strike some people as odd. However, there is another way
377
 in which 
you might be aware of the EPMFs and come to judge that what the hoodlums are doing is 
wrong; what I am calling an emotional awareness. That is, I think that it is plausible to say that 
your emotional response of revulsion or outrage or horror (or whatever) to the Cat scenario 
may itself be said to constitute an holistic awareness of the EPMFs which then forms the basis 
of your judgment. Some clarification on the idea of an holistic awareness: I think it is 
reasonable to claim that, in the cases at issue, your emotional experience is a way of taking in 
the relevant properties of the scenario as evaluative-making-property-features as whole; a kind 
of broad summing-up of the evaluative aspects of the situation.  Admittedly, giving a precise 
account of this idea of holistic awareness is tricky, but it is not without precedent, e.g. see 
Audi (2004) on conclusions of reflection. 
 
What is the import of making this distinction? Well it seems to me that in the case where the 
subject has an emotional awareness, they could be reasonably said to be aware of the EPMFs 
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     I am setting aside the possibility that you visually perceive the wrongness. 
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of the scenario without it being the case that they are engaging in anything like illicit double-
counting. Let me explain this point. Someone might think that there is still double-counting 
going on if we think of the subject as having formed beliefs about the EPMFs or noting the 
grounds that warrant their emotional response in addition to responding emotionally. 
However, I don’t think that this needs to be the case. Indeed, although it might be true that, if 
challenged on their ethical judgment, a subject may be disposed to cite particular EPMFs of 
the situation in Cat, I don’t see any good reason for thinking that this entails that, when they 
originally judge that what the hoodlums are doing is wrong, they have already formed beliefs 
about the EPMFs, such that it could be said to be true that they are engaging in anything like 
double-counting of the EPMFs as an epistemic basis for their judgment. Furthermore, I don’t 
see any compelling reason why we should think of the emotional experience as being rendered 
justificatorily or normatively otiose in this case. So, I am essentially claiming here that there is 
a way of being emotionally aware of the EPMFs that is a sort of middle-way between having 
an emotional experience but lacking an awareness of the EPMFs (option (a) above), and 
having an emotional experience with a non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs (option (b) 
above). This is important because the former might involve subjects lacking a right to the 
relevant beliefs, while the latter might render the emotional experience justificatorily and 
normatively otiose. 
 
At this point the objector might dig their heels in and say that the emotion still doesn’t 
constitute justification or an epistemic reason for ethical judgment in Cat, i.e., even if the 
subject has formed beliefs, it is the non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs (perhaps 
perceptual) that is still doing the justificatory work here. In response to this, I think the 
perceptual theorist can retrench and claim that even if the emotional experience doesn’t, 
strictly-speaking, constitute justification itself, it does constitute an holistic awareness of 
epistemic reasons or evidence for evaluative belief, i.e., the EPMFs. That is, it constitutes an 
holistic awareness of those features of the scenario as evidence for evaluative properties. Even 
if proponents of EJ retrench to this position I do not see any compelling reason to think that 
the emotional experience is rendered justificatorily or normatively otiose. After all, it is 
enabling us to become holistically aware of the epistemic reasons or evidence for the 
evaluative belief. Furthermore, it is not obvious to me that this would undermine the claim that 
emotional experiences can ground justified beliefs as EJ claims. In sum, I think that defenders 
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of EJ should deny that an awareness of EPMFs necessarily renders otiose the justificatory or 
normative power of emotional experience.
378
  
 
Brady and the proponent of the Proxy Objection might concede all of the foregoing but still 
claim that there is a problem with this idea of emotional awareness. Specifically, they will 
claim that a non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs (which they think plausibly does render 
the emotional experience otiose) constitutes epistemically and normatively better reasons or 
evidence for evaluative judgment. That is, there is epistemic pressure for emotional subjects to 
become non-emotionally aware of the EPMFs. Brady’s reason for thinking this is that he takes 
it to be true that attaining an understanding of emotional objects and events is a goal (perhaps 
the goal) of ethical thinking. Recall that an ethical understanding is ‘a grasp of the reasons 
why some action is right, or why some policy or practice is morally wrong’379 and involves a 
set of abilities that go beyond what is required for knowledge. Brady’s point is that we have 
reason to attain what I am calling a non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs of evaluative 
scenarios because this aids our understanding of those scenarios and hence enables subjects to 
attain an important epistemic goal. Presumably Brady will claim that emotional awareness 
does not help subjects attain this goal. Certainly, he does claim that, in the absence of any 
awareness of the EPMFs, emotional experience does not facilitate ethical understanding.
380
 
Hence, even if all I have said is true, it still might be the case that we have normative reasons 
to put ourselves in an epistemic position whereby emotional experiences are rendered 
justificatorily and normatively otiose. 
 
Before considering how the defender of EJ might respond, it is important to briefly explain in 
a little more detail why Brady holds the view that attaining an understanding might be a goal 
of ethical thinking. Recall that positing understanding as a goal of ethical thinking arguably 
best explains what is normatively dubious about forming beliefs on the basis of moral 
testimony in a way that avoids claiming, implausibly, that moral testimony is incapable of 
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    I think it is worth noting that if being emotionally aware of EPMFs involves a sort of holistic awareness of those 
features of the subject’s evaluative scenario as evidence for evaluative properties then it might seem that beliefs 
based upon these sorts of experiences could only be inferentially or mediately justified. In other words, it might be 
plausible to think that insofar as they get to confer justification, these sorts of experiences will be epistemically 
dependent on, e.g., justification-conferring perceptual experiences as of the EPMFs. However, in order to fully 
address this issue, more work will need to be done in order to establish what it is for a non-doxastic state and some 
other state to be relevant or appropriately related to one another in the way that epistemic dependency specifies.  
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    Alison Hills’, (2010), p. 256  
380
    This is essentially what he argues in his (2010c). 
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making knowledge available to the recipient of that testimony. In addition, positing 
understanding as a goal of ethical thinking is plausible because understanding, i.e., grasping 
the reasons why something is, e.g., wrong, are important (perhaps necessary) for morally 
worthy action. That is to say, grasping the moral reasons why charity is, e.g. morally required, 
enables agents to act on moral reasons and hence renders their action morally worthy. Insofar 
as we should act in a morally worthy way, we have reason to attain understanding. Thirdly, 
understanding might also be important for the regulation of our behaviour, e.g. it can facilitate 
greater control over our emotional responses because emotions are typically responsive to 
understanding, e.g., 
 
my fear tends to dissipate when I come to understand why I am not in danger… 
my guilt usually recedes when I grasp why I didn’t do anything wrong… my 
anger tends to peter out when I come to understand why he didn’t insult me.381 
 
Hence we have yet another reason to attain an ethical understanding of the moral reasons why; 
it can potentially contribute to bringing our emotional experiences under our control, and 
presumably can at least sometimes contribute to their being more epistemically trustworthy. 
 
Given all this, we can now get a better grip on Brady’s claim that we have reason to attain 
what I have called a non-emotional awareness of EPMFs. As he claims: 
 
if the goal of thinking about emotional objects and events is understanding 
rather than evaluative belief or evaluative knowledge, then there is a clear 
reason why we ought to make ourselves aware of such reasons, rather than 
resting content with the information provided by our emotional responses 
alone. This is because the fact that we are afraid of something, let’s say, does 
not contribute to our understanding of the dangerousness of the situation; for 
the fact that we are afraid is not a feature in virtue of which something counts 
as dangerous… In resting content with our emotional experiences, we would be 
failing to pursue our primary epistemic goal of understanding.
382
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   Brady, (2010c), pp. 7-8 
      Brady does allow that this goal is defeasible, i.e. there may be some occasions whereby it is permissible to rely 
on proxy reasons, e.g., because gaining understanding is too costly. 
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Given this, how might the defender of EJ respond? It seems to me that there two main ways in 
which they could respond. I favour the second of these but will briefly sketch the alternative. 
Firstly, proponents of EJ might simply reject the claim that understanding is the primary goal 
of evaluative thinking. Perhaps understanding is the primary goal for philosophers to attain 
when thinking about evaluative and moral matters, but for ordinary ethical agents, simply 
attaining ethical knowledge or justified belief is enough. However, in taking this option 
proponents of EJ are faced with some problems. Firstly, in denying that understanding is a 
goal of ethical thought, they can no longer appeal to understanding as a way of partially 
responding to the Justification Objection (see §3 above). Secondly, they will also be faced 
with the task of providing an alternative account of moral testimony. One option for them 
might be to become optimists about the ability of moral testimony to transmit justification and 
knowledge. Considering whether this is plausible, however, is far out-with the scope of this 
chapter. Let me simply register my opinion that some form of pessimism about moral 
testimony seems most plausible. With regard to morally worthy action, perceptual theorists 
might simply claim that acting in this way is supererogatory and is not required of ordinary 
ethical agents, e.g. we would still praise Huck Finn if it really turned out that he had no 
awareness of the EPMFs that make it right to help Jim. Finally, proponents of EJ might argue 
that if ethical agents are already sufficiently virtuous, then the need for understanding as a way 
of aiding regulation and control of emotional responses appears to fall out of the picture. 
Hence, for relatively virtuous agents there is no need to become aware of the EPMFs in a way 
that renders emotion justificatorily and normatively otiose. 
 
Although this could constitute a response, I favour an alternative which concedes the plausible 
claim that understanding might be the goal of ethical thinking whilst denying that this entails 
that ethical agents ought to become aware of EPMFs in a way that renders emotional 
experience normatively and justificatorily otiose. The benefits of adopting this position are 
that proponents of EJ can (i) retain their partial response to the Justification Objection, (ii) are 
not blocked from what seems like a plausible account of what’s normatively wrong with moral 
testimony, and (iii) can also account for what seems important about morally worthy action. 
Of course, admitting that understanding is a goal of ethical and evaluative thought means that 
they have to concede that there is indeed something normatively dubious about ethical beliefs 
in cases like Guilty, and that there is epistemic reason for subjects to become aware of the 
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EPMFs in cases like this. However, I think that proponents of EJ can still resist the claim that 
subjects with what I called an emotional awareness of the EPMFs are under epistemic 
pressure to become aware of EPMFs in a way which apparently renders them justificatorily 
and normatively otiose. This is because I think that emotional awareness is not at all 
antithetical to or unaccommodating of ethical understanding. Indeed, it seems plausible to 
claim that when a subject has an emotional awareness of their ethical situation, this emotional 
awareness does constitute a grasp of the moral reasons.
383
 Furthermore, given that subjects 
with an emotional awareness will likely be disposed to cite the moral reasons for their emotion 
and (perhaps) judgment, it seems that they can be reasonably said to have what might be 
described as a dispositional understanding of their ethical situation. That is, an understanding 
which is not occurrent or held consciously but could be brought into consciousness if the 
subject were to reflect. This is in contrast to cases like Guilty, where subjects may have, at 
best, an inchoate or weak grasp of the moral reasons, but who lack a dispositional 
understanding. Given that subjects with an emotional awareness arguably have this sort of 
understanding, it seems to me that actions performed on the basis of an emotional awareness 
could also be reasonably said to have moral worth. Furthermore, if the subject in question is 
already sufficiently virtuous vis-à-vis emotional experience, it is unclear what need there is to 
attain an occurrent understanding in order to attain great control and regulative power. 
 
In response to this, it might be suggested that subjects still have a normative reason to attain an 
explicit understanding of their ethical situation. I think that at this point the defender of EJ 
should appeal to a distinction between those who are engaged in ethical philosophy and 
ordinary ethical agents. I do not see any compelling reason for thinking that the latter group 
are under any epistemic obligation to attain the sort of understanding that would render their 
emotional experience justificatorily and normatively otiose. Hence, it seems that defenders of 
EJ can respond to the second part of the Proxy Objection. 
 
So, to recap: I have shown in this chapter that emotions could confer propositional 
justification for belief, and, insofar as they are taken at face value, could ground justified 
beliefs. However, I have also argued that the only sort of case where taking an emotional 
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    At this point someone might think that subjects in cases like Guilty must also have a grasp of the moral reasons 
since they seem to be having emotional experiences that are more-or-less the same as those in the cases I attribute 
an emotional awareness to subjects. I think that at best, agents in cases like Guilty have an inchoate or weak grasp 
of the moral reasons, although I am happier saying that they lack an awareness altogether. 
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experience at face value will be both justified and normatively kosher (e.g. it won't violate any 
plausible norms of moral belief formation), will be cases where subjects have what I have 
denoted an emotional awareness of the EPMFs of their evaluative situation. In cases where 
subjects lack an awareness of the EPMFs, e.g. cases like Guilty, beliefs formed on the basis of 
emotion are normatively dubious (i.e., it is not obvious that subjects have a right or entitlement 
to their beliefs), while in cases where subjects have a non-emotional awareness of the EPMFs 
it is perhaps reasonable to think that the justificatory force of the emotion is rendered otiose.  
 
Conclusion 
It has been argued in this chapter that we have a strong prima facie reason to believe the EN 
thesis: occurrent emotional experiences are intentional, non-doxastic states with phenomenal 
character. It has also been argued that the proponent of the EJ thesis can defend their view (at 
least partially) against three major objections recently brought against it. However, it has also 
been suggested that our enthusiasm for the EE view, and the EJ thesis in particular, should 
remain muted for now: for it seems that proponents of the view still have a lot of work to do in 
order to show that emotional experiences really are capable of conferring justification for 
evaluative and ethical beliefs in the way that the thesis claims. 
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Conclusion 
Let me end by briefly restating the conclusions reached in each of the foregoing chapters. 
 
In chapter one, I considered the prospects for the view that we can have non-inferentially 
justified beliefs on the basis of adequately understanding the substantive Rossian principles. 
There I argued that we have good reason to think that a version of the Understanding 
Objection (Understanding*) against that claim is sound. That is to say, we good reason to 
think that, given the robust conception of adequate understanding ethical intuitionists appear 
to be forced to adopt, the claim that the substantive Rossian principles can be known non-
inferentially (or justifiably believed non-inferentially) on the basis of adequately 
understanding them looks highly dubious. I also considered and rejected the view that we can 
plausibly think of the Rossian principles as being propositions for which it is default 
reasonable to believe. In lieu of further counter-arguments, I contend that we have good reason 
to think that the understanding/self-evidence account of ethical intuitionism is in serious 
trouble. 
 
In chapter two I went on to consider the prospects for the seemings account of non-
inferentially justified ethical beliefs which involves a commitment to Phenomenal 
Conservatism, and the Self-Defeat argument that supports it. Since Phenomenal Conservatism 
claims that all seemings get to justify, then ethical intuitionists can appeal to this principle in 
order to ground their epistemological claim. Against the seemings account I argued that (i) we 
have good reason to reject the Self-Defeat argument which claims that any theory that denies 
the epistemological principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is self-defeating, and, (ii) the 
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism faces plausible counterexamples, and, (iii) that the 
seemings account appears committed to the implausible conclusion that all of our justified 
beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Given all this, it was suggested that we have reason to 
think that if any version of the seemings account is going to be plausible it will involve a 
commitment to a restricted version of Phenomenal Conservatism. The upshot of this for 
ethical intuitionism is that intuitionists cannot rely on Phenomenal Conservatism to ground 
their epistemological claim. Ethical intuitionists therefore need to do a lot more work to show 
that substantive ethical seemings do indeed get to confer propositional justification (and 
ground justified beliefs). I ended by suggesting that we have good reason to adopt a new 
improved account of non-inferential justification (and justified belief) and considered some 
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applications of this; notably, my improved account of non-inferential justification makes it 
clearer why adequate understanding-based justification for substantive ethical principles 
plausibly involves inferential justification.  
 
In chapter three I considered the prospects for the view that (i) ethical agents can have 
perceptual experiences that represent ethical properties (EP*), and (ii) ethical agents can have 
non-inferentially justified ethical perceptual beliefs (EPj). There I argued that proponents of 
EP* can adequately respond to the most serious extant objections to the view, notably the 
Looks Objection. There I suggested that by distinguishing between what is phenomenally 
present and what is phenomenally present as absent in perceptual experience, the view that 
ethical properties do not look a certain way (and therefore can’t figure in the contents of 
perceptual experience) does not seem compelling. Following from this, I went on to suggest 
that the most plausible way in which ethical properties could come to be represented in 
experience would be via the process of cognitive penetration, before suggesting some 
plausible models of how this might work in the ethical case. I then proceeded to discuss the 
prospects for EPj, and considered some reasons for thinking that the truth of EP* is necessary 
for the truth of EPj. I then argued that, given my improved account of non-inferential 
justification, we have good reason to doubt that the putative truth of EP* is sufficient for the 
truth of EPj, i.e., even if ethical agents can have perceptual experiences as of ethical 
properties, this may not support the claim that ethical agents can have non-inferentially 
justified ethical perceptual beliefs. I ended by suggesting that the truth of EP* may not in fact 
be necessary for the truth of EPj, i.e., ethical agents could have non-inferentially justified 
ethical perceptual beliefs even if ethical properties are not represented in perceptual 
experience. However, it should be noted that the plausibility of this view will depend upon (a) 
whether it can be shown that substantive ethical seemings do in fact confer (non-inferential) 
justification, and, (b) whether it can be shown that emotional experiences get to confer (non-
inferential) justification. 
 
In chapter four I considered the prospects for the view that (i) emotional experiences are non-
doxastic states (EN), and, (ii) ethical agents can have emotional experiences can ground non-
inferentially justified ethical beliefs (EJ). There I argued that we have a strong prima facie 
reason to think that EN is correct; that emotional experiences are most plausibly construed as 
non-doxastic states. I then proceeded to defend EJ against three serious extant objections to 
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the view: the Basing Objection, the Justification Objection and the Proxy Objection. Against 
the Basing Objection I suggested that we have good reason to think that emotional experiences 
are at least sometimes the reason why ethical agents hold ethical beliefs. Against the 
Justification Objection I argued that by appealing to the distinction between justification and 
understanding, the defender of EJ can give a partial response to the objection that emotional 
experiences cannot confer justification by themselves. However, I also suggested that it is 
unclear whether ethical agents who base their beliefs on an emotional experience – by itself – 
could have a right to that belief. Furthermore, I argued that proponents of EJ still need to give 
us positive reason for thinking that emotional experiences do in fact confer justification for 
believing ethical propositions. This is particularly pressing for those who adopt a robust realist 
metaphysical view. Finally, against the Proxy Objection I suggested that emotional 
experiences are not rendered normatively or justificatorily otiose when subjects are aware of 
the evaluative-property-making features of their situation. In addition, I suggested that ethical 
agents are not under pressure to become aware of the evaluative-property-making features of 
their situation in a way which plausibly might render emotional experience justificatorily and 
normatively otiose. 
 
As should be clear from the arguments of the foregoing chapters, it is not my considered view 
that ethical intuitionism is implausible. However, I do think that the recent upsurge in 
enthusiasm for the view ought to be seriously tempered: I have argued that a lot more 
philosophical work will need to be done in order to make ethical intuitionism an acceptable 
meta-ethical position to adopt. Specifically, ethical intuitionists need to give us better reasons 
for thinking that substantive ethical seemings and emotional experiences do in fact confer 
justification. Also, ethical intuitionists will need to say something about the account of non-
inferential justification offered in this thesis (see chapter two for discussion). I find that 
account plausible, but ethical intuitionists will likely want to take issue with it, given that it 
appears to render some kinds of non-doxastic states only capable of grounding inferentially 
justified ethical beliefs, e.g., as was suggested for the case of the justification conferred by 
robust adequate understanding, ethical perceptual experiences and possibly emotional 
experiences. Finally, and on a more general note, it seems to me that ethical intuitionists will 
need to respond to the recent developments in ethical epistemology which appear to suggest 
that the traditional focus on justified ethical belief and ethical knowledge may be somewhat 
misguided. That is, they will need to say something about the possibility that understanding 
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might be the goal of ethical thinking and what implications this may have for traditional 
ethical epistemological views. An interesting possibility is that, if understanding and not 
justified belief is the goal of ethical thinking, then it is not obvious that some of the 
motivations for views like ethical intuitionism, e.g., addressing the epistemic regress of 
justification, really are as significant as has previously been assumed.  
 
Given all of the foregoing, the reader will hopefully agree that, in highlighting some 
significant problems with the extant accounts of ethical intuitionism and defending the view 
against unsuccessful objections, I have moved the debate about the plausibility of ethical 
intuitionism some way forward and have paved the way for an improvement and progression 
in the philosophical debates surrounding the thesis.   
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